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Thesis Abstract
Cooperative actions on climate change are dicult to achieve due to asymmetries
among countries and free-rider incentives. In addition, the eectiveness of non-
cooperative actions is undermined by carbon leakage. Using a game-theoretic
analysis, the aim of this thesis is to study and evaluate the impact of dierent
measures to mitigate climate change. The rst essay in the thesis discusses the
main features of the interaction among countries in mitigating climate change. We
explain the trade-o between individual rationality and eciency and demonstrate
ways in which asymmetries among countries could aect the outcomes of climate
negotiations.
The second essay investigates the incentives of governments when designing their
non-cooperative climate policies under dierent policy regimes. We study the
eect of a gradual shift from bilateral production-based carbon taxes to unilateral
or bilateral consumption-based ones, considering various forms of trade measures
called border carbon adjustments (BCAs). We nd that although prot-shifting
and carbon leakage distortions are only eliminated by combining carbon taris
with a full export rebate, the optimal tax may still be below individual marginal
damages. In contrast, a bilateral consumption-based tax could be set equal to or
even above individual marginal damages.
The third essay investigates the conditions under which a sequence of escalating
penalties of BCA-measures could be successful in enforcing a fully cooperative
agreement. We show that import taris are the least distortionary policy instru-
ment but the weakest punishment, and import taris with a full export rebate is
the most distortionary instrument if implemented but the harshest punishment to
enforce cooperation. However, whenever full cooperation is be expected to gen-
erate the highest global welfare gains, the harshest punishment fails to establish
cooperation.
The fourth essay analyses the role of BCAs in a setting where the location of rms
is chosen endogenously and countries choose their carbon taxes simultaneously or
sequentially. We nd that without BCAs, a 'race to the bottom' is the Nash equi-
librium. In a Stackelberg equilibrium, a second less negative `chicken equilibrium'
may emerge. With BCAs, the race-to-the-bottom in carbon taxes can be avoided
in the Nash equilibrium. However, a Nash equilibrium may not exist due to the
discontinuity of best response functions. BCAs always reduce global emissions






International environmental problems, such as the climate change, have become
important issues, both at the economic and political levels. The international
aspect of these problems leads to considerable interdependence among countries.
For instance, all countries contribute to and are aected by greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, the major driver of global warming. Therefore, an eective solution to
climate change requires cooperation among all countries in designing international
instead of national climate policies to internalise global damages from emissions.
Negotiations to coordinate actions of nations on climate change started when the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adop-
ted in 1992. The rst historic binding agreement on climate change is the Kyoto
Protocol, which came into force in 2005 with only 37 of the developed and indus-
trialised countries agreeing to undertake binding targets to reduce their emissions.
The eectiveness of the Kyoto Agreement has been questioned both due to the ex-
emption of all developing countries including China and India from binding targets
and the withdrawal of the United States (Böhringer and Finus, 2005; Nordhaus
and Boyer, 1999). The Paris Agreement, which was adopted in 2015, is considered
the second historic agreement to mitigate climate change, where both developed
and developing countries agreed to reduce their GHG emissions (UNFCCC, 2015).
However, the Paris Agreement is not binding. That is, countries have put forward
their voluntary pledges in the form of nationally determined contributions. These
pledges collectively will fall short of meeting the intended target of restraining
global warming to below 2◦C (Höhne et al., 2017). Moreover, the United States
announced its intention to withdraw from the agreement, suggesting that a world
of sub-global climate actions will still prevail, at least in the short run.
As reviewed above, the long history of climate negotiations reects the diculty
of reaching a climate agreement. A wide strand of the game-theoretic literature
analyses the challenges of cooperation and the formation of international environ-
mental agreements (IEAs)(e.g., Barrett, 1994; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Finus,
2008). This literature explains that in the absence of an enforcement power to
make climate agreements legally binding, the cooperation of countries must be
voluntary and must satisfy each country's self-interest. However, because it is a
global public good, emission abatement is non-excludable, and thus countries have
incentives to free-ride on the abatement eorts undertaken by other countries. In
addition, countries are asymmetric regarding dierent political priorities, income
levels or technologies. Those asymmetries among nations are also reected in their
valuation of environmental damages and willingness to abate emissions rendering
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cooperation not protable for environmentally less concerned countries.
Early IEA literature shows that due to the above mentioned challenges, in partic-
ular free-rider incentives, the gains achieved from cooperation are not meaningful
(Barrett, 1994). That is, either small stable agreements emerge or if there are
large agreements, then the need for cooperation in terms of global welfare is not
large. In an attempt to achieve more optimistic outcomes, the literature has
been extended in dierent directions.1 For instance, instead of assuming a cost
eective allocation of abatement burdens among cooperating countries, some pa-
pers consider dierent bargaining rules such as emission reduction quotas (e.g.,
Altamirano-Cabrera et al., 2008; Endres and Finus, 2002; Finus and Rundsha-
gen, 1998; Hoel, 1992). Some other papers introduce side payments, taking the
form of dierent transfer schemes (e.g., Barrett, 2001; Botteon and Carraro, 1997;
Carraro et al., 2006). Transfers, either monetary or in-kind, is an important 'car-
rot' instrument to enhance cooperation among asymmetric countries. However,
monetary transfers are rarely observed in reality due to challenges of commit-
ment among donors and receivers and between donors themselves (Barrett, 1994;
Finus, 2002). In contrast, trade sanctions are considered as a 'stick' instrument
to enforce cooperation (Barrett, 1997). A well known example of trade sanctions
is prohibiting trade in chlorouorocarbons products between signatories and non-
signatories of the Montreal Protocol which was signed in 1987. However, trade
sanctions face certain constraints as they should be credible but also compatible
with international trade agreements.
Beside the interaction among countries in mitigating climate change, introducing
other sources of interdependence among nations may add to the challenges of
reducing global emissions. Two important sources are international trade and
factor mobility, both of which are closely linked to climate change. Emission
reductions by some environmentally friendly countries can be partly or completely
oset by higher emission levels in other countries, a phenomenon known as 'carbon
leakage'. This could occur through the relocation of the production of rms either
in terms of market shares or the entire production facilities, to countries with
less strict (without) climate policies. Carbon leakage raises concerns of countries
about the eectiveness of their unilateral or sub-global actions, but also about
the competitiveness of their rms particularly in emission-intensive trade-exposed
(EITE) industries.
In order to address carbon leakage and protect domestic industries, border car-
bon adjustments (BCAs) have been recently proposed both by policy makers
1See Finus and Caparros (2015) for a recent survey of the literature.
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(Baker et al., 2017; Davenport, 2016), and economists (e.g., Böhringer et al.,
2012; Branger and Quirion, 2014; Fischer and Fox, 2012). BCAs are trade meas-
ures, adjusting the dierence between the carbon prices of countries, and thus
would be imposed by relatively more regulated countries. These border adjust-
ment measures might be imposed on imports, taking the form of carbon taris,
or on exports, taking the form of export rebates, or on imports and exports by
combining both measures.
Additional arguments advocating BCAs suggest that they could incentivise coun-
tries on which these measures are imposed to implement comparable carbon
policies and hence might assist in fostering climate agreements (Helm et al., 2012;
Stiglitz, 2006). Furthermore, BCAs are also relevant in the debate concerning the
allocation of emissions mitigation costs between consumers and producers. That
is, complementing national climate policies with BCAs implies de facto regulating
emissions based on consumption rather than production. Hence, some economists
view BCAs as a way of switching to a partial or full consumption-based carbon
price which might be more favourable than the current production-based approach
(Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Steininger et al., 2014). Nevertheless, being unilateral
trade measures, BCAs should be designed to meet the rules of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO)(Horn and Mavroidis, 2011; Ismer and Neuho, 2007).
2 Thesis Context and Objectives
Against the above background, this thesis studies the strategic interaction among
asymmetric countries facing the problem of climate change. The thesis consists of
four self-contained essays which together contribute to the literature by analysing
dierent measures to stimulate the eorts of nations to mitigate global emissions
in cooperative or non-cooperative settings. Throughout the thesis, we consider
two-country models under dierent levels of interdependence among countries.
Essay 1 explains the main features of the interaction among countries in mitig-
ating climate change. In order to reach a fully cooperative outcome, cooperation
must be individually rational (protable). In the absence of transfers, a socially
optimal solution may not be achieved if countries are suciently asymmetric in
terms of their benets and costs of emission abatement. We show how the type
and degree of asymmetry among countries would aect the outcomes of climate
negotiations. In addition, we briey discuss the impacts of some domestic policies
on the negotiations like investment and adaptation.
Trade measures, like BCAs, could also aect climate negotiations. In order to
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analyse the eects of these measures in detail, the remaining three essays are de-
voted to studying the impacts of BCAs on the non-cooperative outcomes (Essay
2 and 4) and on enforcing a fully cooperative outcome (Essay 3). For this, we em-
ploy a strategic trade model, which is an extended version of Brander and Spencer
(1985). Essays 2, 3 and 4 consider two countries which evaluate the damages from
global emissions dierently. Both countries impose a carbon tax that aects not
only their individual damages but also their governmental revenues, consumers,
and the prots of rms which compete in a Cournot-fashion. As mentioned above,
introducing international trade and factor mobility implies that countries do not
confront only challenges of protability or free-riding, but also competitiveness
and carbon leakage issues, which we cover in these essays.
Essays 2 and 3 study the implications of a gradual shift from a production-based
to consumption-based carbon tax regimes using BCA-measures, including carbon
taris and export rebates. In Essay 2, we solve a two-stage game in which countries
simultaneously choose their carbon taxes in the rst stage, and then rms choose
their output levels in the second stage. The focus of Essay 2 is to study the impacts
of BCAs on the incentives of governments when designing their non-cooperative
optimal climate policies. Whereas the focus of Essay 3 is to analyse the strategic
role of dierent BCA-measures in enforcing a fully cooperative agreement and
to evaluate their impacts on global emissions and global welfare if implemented.
Thus, we extend the game in Essay 2 to three stages, such that countries decide
whether to fully cooperate and implement a uniform socially optimal tax level in
the rst stage.
We assume that the location of rms is xed in Essays 2 and 3. That is, these
two essays consider carbon leakage due to the relocation of market shares. In
Essay 4, we relax this assumption and allow for rm mobility, according to which,
rms could relocate their entire production facilities to countries with lax climate
policies. Here, we also extend the game of Essay 2 to three stages in which
governments rst choose their carbon tax, and then rms choose their location
in the second stage and their output levels in the third stage. In this way, the
focus of Essay 4 is to study the impacts of BCAs (carbon taris) on climate policy
levels, global emissions and global welfare when rm locations are endogenous.
3 Summary of Essays
In this section, I will provide a brief summary of the contents and ndings of each
essay.
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Essay 1: Negotiations on Climate Change Mitigation among Asymmet-
ric Countries
Essay 1 presents the basic features of the climate change negotiations among
asymmetric countries. A Pareto-ecient solution can be reached through maxim-
ising the weighted sum of the welfare functions of all countries. Depending on the
weights attached to countries in the global welfare function, many cooperative
outcomes could emerge from the negotiations. We compare the rst-best (FB)
solution, which follows from unconstrained joint welfare maximisation with the
constrained joint welfare maximisation and the Nash bargaining solution (NBS).
The type of asymmetry between benets and costs associated with abatement
greatly aects the trade-os between eciency and individual rationality. We
provide some insights about the role of asymmetries in allocating abatement ef-
forts and on global abatement under dierent Pareto-optimal outcomes. Finally,
we show how transfers and domestic policies could change the outcomes of climate
negotiations.
Essay 2: Non-Cooperative Climate Policies among Asymmetric Coun-
tries: Production- versus Consumption-based Carbon Taxes
Essay 2 studies the eect of a gradual shift from bilateral production- to unilateral
or bilateral consumption-based carbon tax. We consider ve non-cooperative re-
gimes: a bilateral production-based tax (PB-regime) and a bilateral consumption-
based tax (CB-regime) regime as well as three border carbon adjustments (BCAs)
regimes, under which the environmentally more concerned country complements
its carbon tax with carbon taris and export rebates. We assume that carbon
taris fully adjust the dierence between national carbon taxes, while two forms
of export rebates are considered: optimal and full rebates. This essay contributes
to the literature by analysing whether a switch to either a unilateral or bilateral
consumption-based tax regime could restore the eectiveness of non-cooperative
climate policies in a strategic context.
We nd that carbon taris create a new incentive for both governments to tax
emissions. In addition, combining carbon taris with full export rebate would
eliminate the prot-shifting and carbon leakage eects. However, the eectiveness
of carbon taxes of both countries could be restored to fully internalise individual
damages only under the CB-regime. Our results show that adding export rebates
reinforces (weakens) the eect of carbon taris on the climate policy level of the
environmentally more (less) concerned country.
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Essay 3: Enforcing Climate Agreements: The Role of Escalating Border
Carbon Adjustments
Essays 3 considers the same BCA-regimes as Essay 2. We start our analysis from
the assumption that moving from non-cooperative and non-uniform production-
based carbon taxes to a uniform socially optimal tax is not attractive to the
environmentally less concerned country. The decision of countries on coopera-
tion is then based on a multi-stage escalating penalty game. In each stage, the
environmentally more concerned country moves rst and decides whether to use
a BCA-threat to propose 'cooperation'. After this, the other country chooses
whether to accept the proposal. We contribute to the literature by analysing
whether and under which conditions a sequence of BCA-threats, which gradually
lead to a unilateral consumption-based carbon tax, would enforce full coopera-
tion. In addition, we evaluate the outcome in terms of global emissions and global
welfare.
We nd that our escalating sequence of BCA penalties is eective, but also credible
to enforce full cooperation if environmental damages are not too large compared
to the net benets from production and consumption. However, this implies in our
model that the potential gains from full cooperation would also not be too large.
We show that if BCAs fail to establish cooperation, they lead to higher global
welfare and lower global emission levels if they need to be implemented. However,
the harsher a BCA-threat, the more distortionary it would be if implemented
compared to the social optimum.
Essay 4: Strategic Climate Policies with Endogenous Plant Location:
The Role of Border Carbon Adjustments
Essay 4 studies a carbon tax competition game between two governments that
strive to attract the plants of two rms. We consider two regimes. Under the
No-BCA regime, each government imposes a carbon tax on the production of
plants located within its national boundaries. Under the BCA regime, the country
that sets a higher carbon tax can additionally impose a carbon tari on imports
from plants located abroad. For each policy regime, we determine climate policy
equilibria in a simultaneous and a sequential game. This essay contributes to
the literature by investigating the impacts of BCAs on imports if governments
consider the endogenous location choices of rms.
On the one hand, all plants will locate in the country which sets a lower carbon
tax under a No-BCA regime. This leads to a erce tax competition under the
simultaneous choice of taxes. As a result, the Nash equilibrium is 'race to the
bottom'. We show that moving sequentially could be Pareto-improving for both
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countries and lead to lower global emissions if the marginal damage of the Stack-
elberg leader is suciently high. On the other hand, the country which imposes
BCAs is able to partially protect its home rm which supplies the domestic mar-
ket. However, we nd that a Nash equilibrium may not exist under the BCA
regime. Nevertheless, if a Nash exists, BCAs lead to a more ambitious climate
policy level in both countries and higher global welfare than under the No-BCA
regime. Furthermore, the race-to-the-bottom equilibrium under the sequential
choice of taxes is less likely to emerge with BCAs implying lower global emissions
and in most cases higher global welfare levels.
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1 Introduction
Climate change has become one of the most pressing environmental issues at the
economic and political levels. The global nature of this problem implies that it
aects all countries, irrespective of the location of emissions. This implies that
climate change mitigation is a global public good that benets all countries. Non-
cooperative climate policies aiming to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
only consider a country's own benets while the benets to other countries are
not internalised. This leads to the underprovision of the total abatement level
required from the global point of view. Therefore, cooperation among countries
is needed to reach a globally ecient outcome.
Despite the long history of climate change negotiations, which started in 1992 with
the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), only two climate agreements came into force, which reects the dif-
culty of achieving cooperation. The rst and only legally binding agreement is
the Kyoto Protocol, which commits 37 industrialised countries to reduce their
emissions. However, major global emitters such as China and the United States
(USA) together with developing countries are not part of this agreement. The
second one is the Paris Agreement, under which 190 countries have determined
their voluntary pledges (nationally determined contributions) of emission reduc-
tions. However, those contributions will fall short of the 2-degree global warming
target (Höhne et al., 2017).
The strategic interaction among countries in the process of climate change nego-
tiations has attracted the attention of many economists and game-theorists. This
paper provides an overview of the main features of the climate change negoti-
ations using game theoretical models and focus on the role of asymmetry among
countries with respect to their benets and costs of GHG abatement. We are
mainly interested to show how the type of asymmetry would aect the alloca-
tion of abatement burden between countries and the global abatement level under
dierent Pareto-optimal solutions.
From a theoretical perspective, a non-cooperative solution to a global pollution
problem is not Pareto-ecient. Hence, a Pareto-ecient outcome can be achieved
through maximising a global welfare function, which is the weighted sum of the
welfare functions of all countries (e.g., Chichilnisky and Heal, 1994; Escapa and
Gutiérrez, 1997; Eyckmans et al., 1993; Hoel, 1991). Depending on the weights
attached to countries in the global welfare function, many cooperative outcomes
could emerge from negotiations.
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First, we illustrate dierent Pareto-optimal solutions and the corresponding relat-
ive weights attached to countries in a global welfare function. The rst-best (FB)
solution, which follows from unconstrained joint welfare maximisation, implies
equal weights attached to countries' welfare function. This, in turn, implies a cost-
eective provision of abatement, where the marginal abatement costs of countries
are equalised. Choosing abatement levels cost-eectively requires countries with
relatively atter marginal abatement cost curves to contribute more. However, if
they perceive the benets from joint abatement to be not very high, these coun-
tries might be made worse o under cooperation than under a non-cooperative
outcome. That is, for those countries, cooperation may not be individually ra-
tional. Hence, the FB solution could not be achieved without transfers. For this,
we consider two second-best (SB) solutions which are individually rational: the
constrained joint welfare maximisation and the Nash bargaining solution (NBS).
Second, we shed more light on the role of asymmetry among countries in the
climate negotiations. We start from the assumption that the FB solution may not
be achieved due to asymmetries, and illustrate the trade-o between individual
rationality and eciency. The constrained joint welfare maximisation outcome is
associated with the minimum global welfare loss compared to the FB solution,
however, all gains from cooperation are captured by the country with a non-
binding constraint. In contrast, the NBS leads to a more symmetric distribution
of the gains from cooperation along with a higher global welfare loss than the
constrained outcome. We then provide insights regarding ways in which the type
of asymmetry aects the allocation of abatement burdens and global abatement.
While most of the literature, e.g. Hoel (1992) and Boom (2006), that analyses the
allocation of abatement between countries under the SB solutions focuses on one-
sided asymmetry, i.e. either on the benet or the cost side, we extend the analysis
to dierent types of two-sided asymmetry. In addition, we show the impacts of
these types of asymmetry on global abatement and on the performance of the SB
solutions in closing the gap between no cooperation and the social optimum. We
show that only if the country for which the individual rationality constraint is not
binding has a higher marginal benet and a atter marginal cost curve, global
abatement could be higher under the SB solutions compared to the FB solution.
Though higher global abatement is also associated with a global welfare loss.
Finally, we briey discuss certain domestic policies such as investment, adaptation
and trade, which have been shown in the literature to aect the climate negotiation
outcomes.
The early literature on environmental cooperation, in particular the formation of
international environmental agreements (IEAs) assumes countries are symmetric
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(e.g., Barrett, 1994; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993), and hence attaching equal
weights to countries is innocuous. These papers conclude that only a small number
of countries choose to cooperate due to strong free-rider incentives associated
with the positive externality property of the IEAs. Although assuming symmetric
countries is commonly used in the literature for the sake of simplicity, symmetry
is far from reality.
Countries dier according to their stage of economic development, endowment of
resources, population and level of technology. These disparities among nations are
also reected in their valuation of emission reduction. Therefore, many authors
have relaxed this assumption, and alternatively have started to reect the asym-
metry among countries in their models (e.g., Barrett, 1997; Finus and McGinty,
2019; Hoel, 1992; Pavlova and De Zeeuw, 2013). However, if countries are hetero-
geneous, unconstrained joint welfare maximisation (i.e. attaching equal weights
to countries) may result in an asymmetric distribution of the gains achieved from
cooperation. To overcome this problem, many papers, for instance Barrett (2001);
Botteon and Carraro (1997) and Carraro et al. (2006), consider dierent trans-
fer schemes to compensate losers from cooperation.1 Although transfers were
found to be a vehicle for enhancing cooperation, they are rarely observed in real-
ity. However, a few recent studies show that the type and degree of asymmetry
among countries play a prominent role in the formation of IEAs, where asym-
metries could complement or even substitute transfers (Finus and McGinty, 2019;
McGinty, 2007; Pavlova and De Zeeuw, 2013).
In the absence of transfers, some literature departs from the FB solution and as-
sumes bargaining rules to allocate the abatement duties among countries, which
are referred to as second-best (SB) solutions. Under the SB solutions, countries
are not treated equally, and their relative weights in a global welfare function are
dierent. For instance, Escapa and Gutiérrez (1997), in a dynamic model, com-
pare three cooperative outcomes: the FB solution, the Nash bargaining Solution
(NBS) and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Their main focus is to calculate the
endogenous welfare weights corresponding to the three solutions for six countries.2
They nd that the weights countries receive in the global welfare function depend
negatively on their gains from cooperation under the FB outcome. As a result,
1There are four transfer schemes which have been used in the IEAs literature. Three of
them are related to concepts from cooperative game theory: the Nash bargaining solution, the
Shapely value and the Chander-Tulkens transfer scheme, while the optimal transfer scheme is
related to the non-cooperative game theory.
2See also Eyckmans et al. (1993) who compute the welfare weights of 12 regions for dierent
designs of IEAs.
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the highest weights in their simulations correspond to China and the USA which
have atter marginal cost functions relative to other regions.
While Pareto-optimal solutions are viewed as a normative approach, some other
studies consider a positive analysis and assume that countries reduce their emis-
sions by equal percentages from a certain base year. From the early papers,
Hoel (1992) assumes that countries dier in their environmental damage but have
the same abatement costs. He compares the FB solution with two cooperat-
ive outcomes: the constrained joint welfare maximisation, implying dierentiated
abatement levels, and a uniform emission reduction quota. He shows that the
quota system is cost-inecient and results in a higher global emission level and
a lower global welfare than the FB outcome, while the global welfare loss under
the constrained outcome is very small. Finus and Rundshagen (1998) compare
two allocation rules; the uniform emission reduction quota and uniform emission
tax. Although the latter is considered to be a cost-eective instrument, countries
prefer the uniform quota over a uniform tax. A similar result has been reached
by Endres and Finus (2002), namely that in equilibrium, an emission quota may
achieve lower global emissions and a higher global welfare than an emission tax.
Using the generalized Nash bargaining solution, Bayramoglu and Jacques (2015)
compare the relative eciency of two SB agreements: a uniform agreement with
transfers and a dierentiated agreement without transfers. Their analysis focuses
on the eect of transfer payment costs on comparing the two agreements. They
show that the rst agreement is superior to the second one in terms of global and
individual welfare levels if the cost of transfers is suciently low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general frame-
work explaining the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions to mitigate climate
change. Section 3 shows the eect of asymmetries among countries on the out-
comes of climate negotiations. Section 4 discusses the eects of pre-negotiations
domestic policies and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Welfare Function
Consider the following welfare function of country i ∈ N :
Wi = Bi(Q)− Ci(qi) , (1)
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where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes a nite set of n countries. In the business-as-
usual (BAU) scenario, each country has an initial unabated level of greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions eoi . If the country adopts a cooperative or non-cooperative
climate policy to reduce emissions, its welfare function Wi can be dened as the
dierence between the benets and costs of GHG abatement. Let qi denote a
particular abatement level of country i, and the vector of abatement levels of
countries be q = (q1, q2, ..., qn). Because GHG emissions mix uniformly in the
atmosphere, each country receives benets not only from its own contribution,
but also from other countries. Hence, the benet function, which reects the
interdependence among countries, depends on global abatement Q, where Q =∑
i∈N qi. In contrast, the cost function depends only on the individual level of
abatement Ci (qi).
The welfare function of each country is assumed to be strictly concave and twice
dierentiable. The benet function increases in Q at a decreasing (or constant)
rate, while the cost function increases in qi at an increasing rate. Therefore,
we have the following standard assumptions for all i ∈ N : B′i > 0 , B
′′
i ≤ 0,
Bi(0) = 0, and C
′
i > 0, C
′′
i > 0 and Ci(0) = 0 (Finus, 2001; Hoel, 1991). These
assumptions are sucient for interior solutions. The abatement space is compact
and convex Q = Q1 × ... × Qn, where the abatement space of each country is
Qi ∈ [0, eoi ] ∀i ∈ N .
2.2 Non-Cooperative Outcome
In the absence of cooperation, each country pursues its own self-interest and
chooses an abatement level that maximises its individual welfare function (1)
taking the abatement levels of other countries as given. The rst-order condition







i (qi) = 0 ∀i ∈ N
⇔ B′i (Q) = C
′
i (qi) . (2)
The above equation implies that the Nash equilibrium (NE) abatement level q∗NEi
of each country is determined when its marginal benet is equal to its marginal
cost. Obviously, the non-cooperative outcome is not Pareto-optimal because each
country does not consider the benets of other countries, which leads to the un-
derprovision of GHG abatement levels required globally. Therefore, cooperation
of countries is needed to internalise global benets from abatement and to reach
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a Pareto-ecient outcome.
The welfare function of each country in the non-cooperative outcome is a function
of the vector of the NE abatement levels, W ∗NEi (q
∗NE
1 , ..., q
∗NE
n ) ∀i ∈ N . Global








i , respectively. The NE welfare level W
∗NE
i is an important reference
point in the negotiations among countries to decide whether joining a climate
agreement is individually rational for each country. That is, a necessary condition
for each country to accept cooperation is to obtain a welfare level under cooper-
ation, W ∗Ci , at least as high as its welfare level in the non-cooperative outcome.
3
Thus, individual rationality constraint requires: W ∗Ci ≥ W ∗NEi ∀i.
2.3 Cooperative Outcomes (Pareto-optimal Outcomes)
All Pareto-optimal outcomes can be obtained from maximising the weighted sum





αiWi (q) , (3)
where the weight attached to each country is αi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 αi = 1. These
weights can be interpreted as the power or bargaining position of countries in
a global (social) welfare function (Escapa and Gutiérrez, 1997; Eyckmans and
Cornillie, 2002; Eyckmans et al., 1993).
















The above condition shows that the abatement level of each country under a
cooperative outcome is such that the weighted marginal cost of each country is
equal to the sum of weighted marginal benets of all countries. This implies
that each country internalises the benets of other countries and the weighted
marginal costs of countries are equal. Therefore, the ratio of weights of countries
3Individual rationality or protability is only a necessary condition for countries to participate
in an agreement. However, a sucient condition requires that each country obtains at least what
it would obtain if it remains outside the agreement while other countries continue to cooperate,
which is referred to as the 'internal stability' condition due to d'Aspremont et al. (1983).
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Given that the welfare function of each country is strictly concave, the maxim-
isation of (3) derives the whole set of Pareto-optimal outcomes for each vector of
weights α = (α1, α2, .....αn). Consequently, we have:
 The slope of the line tangent to the Pareto frontier at any point is the ratio
of the weights attached to countries in the global welfare function:−αi
αj
.4
 For the welfare function (1), the absolute value of the slope of the line
tangent to the Pareto frontier at any point is equal to the inverse ratio of
marginal abatement costs of countries.
Dierent points on the Pareto frontier correspond to dierent cooperative solu-
tions that could emerge from the negotiations. In the following two subsections,
we consider three Pareto-optimal outcomes. We start with the rst-best (FB)
solution, where the socially (globally) optimal abatement level is determined by
the unconstrained joint welfare maximisation. After this we consider two second-
best (SB) solutions, where the abatement burdens are allocated among countries
based on the constrained joint welfare maximisation or the Nash Bargaining Solu-
tion (NBS). In addition, we show how the relative weights of countries in (3)
correspond to the three outcomes.
2.3.1 Unconstrained Joint Welfare Maximisation (FB Solution)













4See the proof in Engwerda (2005). However, for instructive purposes, I illustrate the proof






j(qj) ∀ i 6= j . (8)
Equation (7) shows that individual marginal costs of abatement are equal to the
sum of marginal benets in all countries, implying that global benets from GHG
abatement are fully internalised. Thus, in (8), the marginal abatement costs of
countries are equalised implying that the abatement levels are allocated among
countries cost-eectively.
The FB social optimum is attained if weights attached to countries in (3) are
equal, i.e. αi = 1n . That is, the cost eectiveness condition in (8) implies that the
absolute value of the slope of the line tangent to the Pareto frontier at the FB













= 1 , (9)
where the superscript (Unc) refers to the unconstrained maximisation.
Each country chooses its optimal abatement level q∗Unci from solving (7).
Let the vector of abatement levels under the FB solution be q∗Unc =
(q∗Unc1 , q
∗Unc
2 , ..., q
∗Unc






Inserting these equilibrium abatement levels into (1) gives individual and global






A cost-eective allocation of abatement burdens as in (8) implies that countries
with relatively atter marginal cost functions should reduce emissions more than
other countries. However, if those countries perceives benets from global abate-
ment to be suciently low, they would be worse o under cooperation than in the
non-cooperative outcome and hence cooperation may not be individually rational
for those countries.
One possible measure to compensate the losers from cooperation is to use side
payments or transfers τ . Most of the literature assumes self-nanced transfers
where
∑
j∈N τj = 0. The equilibrium individual welfare level can be modied
with transfers to be WUnc+τi = W
∗Unc
i ± τi.5 We will analyse the eects of adding
transfers in subsection 3.3. However, although transfers can greatly enhance co-
operation among asymmetric countries, they are rarely observed in reality, in
particular monetary transfers. Therefore, if transfers are not allowed, countries
would depart from the FB outcome and choose dierent cooperative solutions.
5If a country receives transfers, then τi > 0 , while if it pays transfers, τi < 0 , so that∑
j∈N τj = 0.
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2.3.2 Second-best Solutions
In this subsection, the allocation of abatement burdens among countries may
follow from the constrained joint welfare maximisation or the Nash bargaining
solution (NBS), which are referred to as second-best (SB) solutions.
1) Constrained Joint Welfare Maximisation
One possible outcome of the negotiations is to allocate abatement burdens such
that no one country is made worse o under cooperation. Under this solution,
countries maximise their joint welfare subject to a constraint that each country
obtains at least as high as it would obtain in the non-cooperative outcome (Hoel,







Wi = Bi(Q)− Ci(qi) ≥ W ∗NEi . (10)







λj[Bj(Q)− Cj(qj)−W ∗NEj ]. (11)




















Simplifying the above condition, we can obtain the following:
(1 + λi)C
′
i(qi) = (1 + λj)C
′











Compared to (8), the cost-eectiveness condition clearly breaks down in the above
equation since marginal costs are not equalised. Thus, the inverse ratio of marginal
abatement costs of countries depends on the ratio of the Lagrangian multipliers
associated with their individual rationality constraint.
Since the outcome of the above solution lies on the Pareto frontier, there is a
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vector of weights in (3) corresponding to this outcome. These weights can be
written in terms of each country's Lagrangian multiplier. If we compare the rst-
order condition in (12) with (4), and compare (14) with (5), the ratio of countries'










where the superscript (Con) refers to the constrained maximisation.
Therefore, those countries whose Lagrangian multiplier is relatively larger should
be attached a higher weight relative to other countries in the global welfare func-
tion and have lower marginal costs in equilibrium (Eyckmans, 2009).
Let the vector of the abatement levels under the constrained maximisation solution
be q∗Con = (q∗Con1 , q
∗Con
2 , ..., q
∗Con




i . Inserting these equilibrium abatement levels into (1) gives individual





i , respectively. For
those countries whose constraint is binding, they would obtain the same welfare
level as under the non-cooperative outcome and hence all gains are captured by
other countries which have a non-binding constraint.
2) Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)
The outcome of climate negotiations could also follow from the Nash bargaining





(Bi(Q)− Ci(qi)−W ∗NEi ) , (16)
whereW ∗NEi represents the 'threat or disagreement point' as dened in subsection
2.2. That is, if countries fail to negotiate an agreement, they end up in the non-
cooperative NE outcome (Hoel, 1991).






















where Gi = Wi −W ∗NEi are the gains from cooperation.
The above condition states that the ratio of each country's marginal cost to its
gains from cooperation is equal to the sum of the ratio of marginal benets of










,∀i 6= j . (19)
The allocation of the abatement levels under the NBS is cost-ineective because
marginal costs of countries are not equalised. Countries' relative marginal costs










,∀i 6= j . (20)
One of the main axiomatic properties of the NBS is Pareto-optimality (Nash Jr,










,∀i 6= j , (21)
where the superscript (NBS) refers to the Nash bargaining solution.
From (5) and (20), we have the ratio of weights of countries corresponding to the
NBS outcome equal to the inverse ratio of their gains from cooperation or, in other
words, the weighted gains from cooperation are equal (Douven and Engwerda,
1995; Engwerda, 2005).
Let the vector of the abatement levels under the NBS be q∗NBS =
(q∗NBS1 , q
∗NBS
2 , ..., q
∗NBS






Inserting these equilibrium abatement levels into (1) gives individual and global






By comparing the rst-order conditions given in (7), (12) and (18), it is clear
that the three solutions yield the same outcome if countries are symmetric. In
such cases, the individual rationality constraint of all countries is non-binding,
i.e. λi = 0 ∀i ∈ N , and equation (12) converges to (7). Similarly, if countries
are symmetric, they have the same gain from cooperation under the NBS Gi =
Gj = ... = Gn. Therefore, (18) also converges to (7). Therefore, comparing the
three outcomes is interesting only if countries have asymmetric benet and cost
functions as will be shown in the next section.
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3 Asymmetry and Climate Negotiations Out-
comes
For the rest of the paper, we will consider negotiations between two asymmetric
countries or regions, i = 1, 2, choosing their abatement levels cooperatively or
non-cooperatively. This helps us to compare the three Pareto-optimal outcomes
under dierent types of asymmetry.
In the absence of transfers, we need to focus our attention on a setting where cer-
tain countries become worse o under the FB outcome than under no cooperation
due to asymmetries. For this, we assume, without loss of generality, that the FB
outcome is not individually rational for country 2.
Assumption 1(a):
If transfers are not allowed, country 2 is worse o under cooperation using joint
welfare unconstrained maximisation, i.e. the individual rationality constraint of
country 2 is binding, λ2 > λ1 = 0.
Given the above assumption, we can illustrate the trade-o between individual
rationality and eciency in negotiations on the Pareto frontier as shown in Figure
1. The FB solution is represented by point F on the Pareto frontier. Given
Assumption 1(a), the FB outcome cannot be reached. The range of the possible
outcomes for a Pareto-improving agreement lies between two points: C1 and C2.
Point C2 corresponds to the outcome under the constrained joint welfare maxim-
isation if the individual rationality constraint of country 2 is binding.6 This point
represents the maximum (minimum) weight country 1 (2) would have relative
to country 2 (1) for both of them to cooperate. At this point, the slope of the





)∗Unc = 1. Point C2 is associated with the minimum
global welfare loss that can be incurred if we depart from the FB outcome for a
Pareto-improving agreement. At this outcome, all gains from cooperation go to
country 1, while country 2 obtains the same welfare level as under no cooperation.
6Point C1 corresponds to the outcome under the constrained joint welfare maximisation if
the constraint of country 1 is binding.
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Figure 1: Individual Rationality versus Eciency in Climate Change Negotiations
Point N corresponds to the NBS, where both countries gain from cooperation.7
The slope of the line tangent to the Pareto frontier at the NBS outcome is even






)∗NBS. This clearly implies
that, across the three solutions, country 1 obtains the highest welfare level under
the unconstrained maximisation, followed by the constrained maximisation and




1 , while the opposite is true for country 2,




2 . In addition, compared to the FB outcome, the NBS
is associated with a larger global welfare loss if the alternative is the constrained
maximisation.
As shown in (8), marginal costs of abatement are equalised across countries under
the FB outcome. However, given Assumption 1(a), country 2 will not accept
cooperation. In such cases, country 1 has higher marginal costs than country 2
under the SB solutions.
Lemma 1. Given Assumption 1(a), i. country 1 has higher marginal costs


















ii. Country 1 has larger gains than country 2 under the NBS, G1 > G2.
Proof. Follows from (14), (15) and (20), (21), given Assumption 1(a) that λ2 >




7This point is determined by the tangency between the Pareto frontier and a rectangular
hyperbola with the origin the disagreement point, which is the NE welfare levels in Figure
1. For the geometric proof of the NBS, see Binmore (1998), pp.78-80 and Friedman (1986),
pp.157-158.
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3.1 Specic Welfare Function
In order to determine the conditions under which the FB solution is not mutually
protable without transfers, we use a specic welfare function. Following many
papers in the IEA literature (e.g., Finus and McGinty, 2019; Hoel, 1992; Pavlova











where one unit of GHG abatement qi generates to country 1 and country 2 constant
marginal benets of b and βb , respectively; and marginal costs of cq1 and γcq2,
respectively. Assumptions regarding the values of β and γ will be stated below
according to dierent types of asymmetry, however, we assume all parameters are
positive, b, c, β, γ > 0.
Dierent marginal benets among countries can be interpreted in terms of their
vulnerability to climate change or their willingness to pay for emission reduc-
tions.8 Whereas dierent marginal cost functions might reect dierences across
countries with respect to their technological eciency or their fossil fuel consump-
tion. As shown empirically, using the Stability of Coalition (STACO) model (e.g.,
Altamirano-Cabrera et al., 2008; Finus, 2008), large industrialised countries sim-
ilar to those in the European Union, the Unites States (USA) and Japan are the
main beneciaries of global abatement, whereas energy exporting and Asian coun-
tries and Brazil receive the lowest benets.9 On the abatement cost side, both
China and USA have the attest marginal abatement cost curves, whereas Brazil
and Japan have the steepest curves.
Using the welfare functions in (22) and (23), the equilibrium abatement and wel-
fare levels of countries under the non-cooperative and the cooperative outcomes
are presented in Appendix B.1.
In what follows, we show the eect of the asymmetry among countries in terms
of their evaluation of benets and costs of GHG abatement on the negotiations
to reach a climate agreement. Taking symmetry as a benchmark, β = 1 and
8It can reect the dierences in income levels among countries. High-income countries are
willing and able to pay more for improved environmental quality than low-income countries
(Copeland and Taylor, 2005).
9STACO (Stability of Coalitions) model investigates the formation and stability of interna-
tional environmental agreements. This model captures twelve world regions and considers a
period of 100 years, see Dellink et al. (2004).
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γ = 1, both countries will gain from cooperation under the FB solution and
hence a cost-eective allocation of abatement burdens is achievable. However,
asymmetries could change the incentives for countries to cooperate. Proposition 1
shows that a negative correlation between the cost and benet sides is more likely
to lead to the FB outcome.
Proposition 1. The First-best Outcome versus No Cooperation
i. The two countries have incentives to cooperate under the FB solution without
transfers if 1
2
< β2γ < 2 or, to put it dierently, if a) β2 < 2
γ
or b)β2 > 1
2γ
.
ii. Let the potential gains from cooperation under the FB outcome ∆W = W ∗Unc−






Proof. See Appendix B.1.
In the absence of transfers, the FB social optimum is individually rational if the
asymmetry on the cost side is compensated by a large inverse asymmetry on the
benet side. That is, if country 2 has a at marginal cost function, it would ac-
cept a cost-eective allocation of abatement burdens (i.e. under the FB outcome)
only if its marginal benets from abatement are suciently large. This type of
asymmetry is referred to in the literature as 'negative covariance', i.e. countries
with higher marginal benets of abatement also have atter marginal cost func-
tions (Finus and McGinty, 2019; McGinty, 2007). If transfers are not allowed,
Finus and McGinty (2019) explain that the compensatory role of transfers could
work through this type of asymmetry. However, if we look at the negotiations
between developed and developing countries on climate change, we can notice the
opposite type of asymmetry. For instance, and as mentioned above, most of the
developed countries perceive benets from abatement more importantly than de-
veloping countries, but face steeper marginal cost curves which is refereed to as a
'positive covariance' between benets and costs.
Note that the global welfare gains that could be achieved from cooperation un-
der the FB outcome, where global welfare is maximised, increase in the benet
parameters, b and β, while decrease in the cost parameters c and γ.




, or equivalently γ > 2
β2
,
implies that the constraint of country 1 is binding λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0. In contrast,




, or equivalently γ < 1
2β2
, implies that the
constraint of country 2 is binding λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0. Following Assumption 1(a),







, or equivalently, γ < 1
2β2
. That is, country 2 has no incentive to
cooperate under the FB solution if transfers are not allowed.
In the previous section, we showed that for each Pareto-optimal outcome, there
are corresponding relative weights associated to countries in the global welfare
function. Using (22) and (23), we can show that these weights depend on the
gains from cooperation under the FB outcome, which in turns depend only on β
and γ. That is, the relative weights corresponding to the constrained maximisation
and the NBS are (α1
α2





In Proposition 1, the lower the value of β2γ, the larger the gains of country 1 from
cooperation under the FB solution and the lower is its relative weight under the SB
Solutions. For six of the world regions, Escapa and Gutiérrez (1997) show, using
numerical simulations, that the relative power weights of countries in negotiations
are negatively related to their net benets under the FB solution.
3.2 Comparison of the Equilibrium Outcomes
In this subsection, we analyse how the type of asymmetry aects the distribution
of the abatement burden between countries under the negotiated outcomes. In
addition, we evaluate the impacts of asymmetries on global abatement and global
welfare. Although we do the comparison between the three cooperative outcomes,
recall that, given Assumption 1, the FB outcome cannot be achieved.
Before turning to the allocation of burdens among countries, the following result
shows that the abatement eorts of country 1 increase as we move from the FB
to the constrained outcome, and increase even further under the NBS. That is,
as the relative weight of country 1 decreases, its contribution to reduce emissions
increases.10 On the other hand, country 2, for which the constraint is binding,
abates less under the two SB solutions compared to the FB solution.
Corollary 1. Ranking of Equilibrium Abatement of Countries














































Proof. See Appendix B.2.
10As will be mentioned in Section 4, Hoel (1991) shows that as the position of a country is
weakened in negotiations, it incurs more abatement eorts.
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In what follows, we consider the impacts of dierent types of asymmetry. Most of
the literature considers asymmetry either on the benet or the cost side, hence,
we start our analysis with one-sided asymmetry. On the one hand, if the two
countries are asymmetric on the benet side only, i.e. γ = 1, Assumption 1(b)




' 0.707. Thus, country 1 has a higher marginal benet than
country 2. Symmetric cost functions implies that both countries contribute the
same level of abatement under the FB outcome. Whereas in the two SB solutions,
the allocation of burdens among countries depends on their marginal benets of
abatement, where the country with higher marginal benets abates more.11 On
the other hand, if the two countries are asymmetric on the cost side only, i.e.
β = 1, country 2 has a atter marginal cost curve, γ < 1
2
(see Assumption 1(b)).
A cost-eective allocation of abatement implies that the country which has a
relatively atter marginal cost function always contributes more under the FB
solution. This is likewise the allocation of the abatement eorts under the SB
solutions. However, although country 2 contributes more than country 1 under
the three outcomes, we show in Corollary 1 that it contributes the highest level of
abatement under the FB outcome. Thus, country 2 shifts some of its abatement
burden to country 1 under the SB solutions.
Corollary 2. Allocation of Abatement Burdens: One-sided Asymmetry
i. If both countries have symmetric cost functions, γ = 1, they contribute the same
level of abatement under the FB solution: q∗Unc1 = q
∗Unc
2 , while country 1 abates









ii. If both countries have symmetric benet functions, β = 1, country 2 abates
more than country 1 under the three solutions.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
More realistically, the following result considers two-sided asymmetry, i.e. coun-
tries dier on both the benet and cost sides. As mentioned before, the FB
solution implies that countries with a relatively atter marginal cost function
contribute more than other countries, irrespective of the dierences in their mar-
ginal benets of abatement. On the contrary, the relation between asymmetries
on both sides determines the allocation of abatement burdens among countries
under the SB solutions, which leads to a more symmetric distribution of the gains
from cooperation.
11In an emission game, and if countries are asymmetric on the damage (benet in the abate-
ment game) side, see for instance Hoel (1992) under the constrained joint welfare maximisation,
and Boom (2006) under the NBS.
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Corollary 3. Allocation of Abatement Burdens: Two-sided Asymmetry
 If there is a negative β − γ covariance, we may have:
i. β < 1 and γ > 1, where country 1 contributes more than country 2 under
the three outcomes.
ii. β > 1 and γ < 1
2
, where country 2 contributes more than country 1 under
the three outcomes.
 If there is a positive β − γ covariance, we have β < 1 and γ < 1, where,
i. q∗Unc1 < q
∗Unc
2 .
ii. q∗Con1 ≥ (<) q∗Con2 if β ≤ (>) 1√2γ.
iii. q∗NBS1 < q
∗NBS
2 for all γ > γ ' 0.79 and q∗NBS1 ≥ (<) q∗NBS2 if β ≤ (>) γ
for all γ < γ.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
We analyse two types of asymmetry. First, a negative covariance between benet
and cost parameters (negative β−γ covariance), where the country with a higher
marginal benet has a atter marginal cost curve and vice-versa, i.e. the country
with a lower marginal benet has a steeper marginal cost curve. On the one hand,
if we assume γ > 1, Assumption 1(b) implies that β < 1. Thus, country 1 has
a higher marginal benet and a atter marginal cost curve than country 2 and
contributes more than country 2 under the three outcomes. Nevertheless, across
the three outcomes, country 1's abatement level would be the highest under the
NBS (see Corollary 1). On the other hand, if we assume γ < 1, then β > 1 can
only hold if γ < 1
2
given Assumption 1(b). This implies that country 2 has a
higher marginal benet and a atter marginal cost curve and contributes more
than country 1.
Second, a positive covariance between benets and costs (positive β − γ covari-
ance), where a country with a lower marginal benet has a atter marginal cost
curve, and vice-versa, i.e. a country with a higher marginal benet has a steeper
marginal cost curve. Given Assumption 1(b), we cannot have both γ > 1 and
β > 1 at the same time. That is, a country with higher marginal benets and
steeper marginal costs has a non-binding constraint (like country 1). For this
reason, we consider only the case where, β < 1 and γ < 1. That is, country 2
has a atter marginal cost curve and lower marginal benets than country 1.12
12Note that for 12 < γ < 1, Assumption 1(b) is sucient to guarantee that β < 1.
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These conditions imply that country 2 always contributes more than country 1
under the FB solution. However, under a more symmetric burden sharing rules,
country 2 may contribute more or less than or equal to country 1, depending on
the benet and cost asymmetries.
Corollary 1 has shown that moving from the FB solution to either the constrained
outcome or the NBS, country 1 (2) contributes more (less) to mitigate emissions.
Therefore, the eect on global abatement is a priori ambiguous.
Corollary 4. Ranking of Equilibrium Global Abatement
 For γ = 1:
i. Q∗Unc > Q∗Con and Q∗Unc > Q∗NBS;
ii. Q∗Con > (<)Q∗NBS ∀β > (<) 0.5.
 For β = 1: Q∗Unc > Q∗Con > Q∗NBS .
 For a negative β − γ covariance:
a) β < 1 and γ > 1: i. Q∗Unc > Q∗Con ∀γ < 2, while Q∗Unc ≷ Q∗Con if
γ > 2;
ii. Q∗Unc > Q∗NBS ∀γ < 1.26, while Q∗Unc ≷ Q∗NBS if γ > 1.26;
iii. Q∗Con > (<)Q∗NBS if only if β > (<) 0.5γ ∀γ < 1.26, while Q∗Con <
Q∗NBS ∀γ > 1.26.
b) β > 1 and γ < 0.5: Q∗Unc > Q∗Con > Q∗NBS.
 For a positive β − γ covariance, β < 1 and γ < 1:
i. Q∗Unc > Q∗Con and Q∗Unc > Q∗NBS;
ii. Q∗Con ≥ (<)Q∗NBS ∀β ≥ (<) 0.5γ.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
Corollary 4 shows that total abatement generally decrease as we depart from the
FB solution to the SB solutions for most types of asymmetry. An exception is the
case of a negative β − γ covariance under which country 1 has a higher marginal
benet and a atter marginal cost curve. In this case, if the asymmetry among
countries is large on both sides, we may have a higher global abatement level
under the SB solutions than under the FB outcome. With respect to the two
SB solutions, comparing the global abatement level is less straightforward since
it depends on the degree of asymmetry.
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From the above results, we can conclude that if the asymmetry among countries is
suciently large, the NBS will lead not only to a more symmetric distribution of
the gains from cooperation, but also to higher global abatement compared to the
constrained outcome. However, this goes along with a higher global welfare loss.
In addition, only if the country for which the individual rationality constraint is
not binding has a higher marginal benet and a atter marginal cost curve, global
abatement could be higher under the SB solutions compared to the FB solution.
Though higher global abatement is also associated with a global welfare loss.
The degree and type of asymmetry among countries also aect the global welfare
loss as we move away from the FB solution. As shown in Figure 1, the parallel
linesW ∗Unc,W ∗Con andW ∗NBS represent the global welfare level at each outcome,
where it decreases as we depart from the FB solution moving up along the Pareto
curve. In the following analysis, we evaluate the two SB solutions in terms of
global welfare using a relative measure called the closing the gap index (CGI)
as suggested by Eyckmans and Finus (2006). In our context, the CGI measures
to which extent the SB solutions close the gap between the FB solution and the
non-cooperative outcome:
CGICon =
W ∗Con −W ∗NE
∆W
· 100 & CGINBS = W
∗NBS −W ∗NE
∆W
· 100 , (24)
with ∆W as dened in Proposition 1.
The CGI in (24) depends only on β and γ.13 We nd that for all types of asym-
metry mentioned above, the CGI decreases as the degree of asymmetry among
countries increases. As usual, we start our analysis with one-sided asymmetry.
On the benet side, i.e. γ = 1 and β <
√
1/2, if the β-asymmetry increases,
(i.e. β decreases), the CGI decreases, ∂CGI
∂β
> 0. However, this goes along with
a decrease in the potential gains achieved from the FB outcome, ∂∆W
∂β
> 0. In
contrast, on the cost side, i.e. β = 1 and γ < 1
2
, if the γ-asymmetry increases
(i.e. γ decreases), the CGI also decreases,∂CGI
∂γ




Consider now our two cases of the negative β − γ covariance. On the one hand,
if β < 1 and γ > 1, increasing the asymmetry can be obtained by a marginal
decrease in β combined with a marginal increase in γ, i.e. β − ε (γ + ε). In
such cases, both the CGI and the ∆W decrease in the degree of asymmetry.
Recall from above that ∆W decreases as β decreases and as γ increases. On the
13See Appendix B.6 for details.
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other hand, if β > 1 and γ < 1, increasing negative β − γ covariance can be
obtained by a marginal increase in β combined with a marginal decrease in γ,
i.e. β + ε (γ − ε). As a result, the ∆W increases in the degree of asymmetry
though the CGI decreases. For the positive β − γ covariance case, i.e. β < 1
and γ < 1, asymmetry is increased by a marginal decrease in both β and γ,
i.e. β − ε (γ − ε). The eect of this type of asymmetry is less straightforward
on the potential gains from cooperation. Starting from γ = 1, and β =
√
1/2
(see Assumption 1(b)), we nd that ∆W rst decreases and then increases in the
degree of asymmetry. More precisely, when γ suciently decreases, its positive
impact on ∆W outweighs the negative impact of low β. In any case, the CGI
decreases in the degree of asymmetry.
3.3 The Role of Transfers in Negotiations
We have assumed so far that transfers are not allowed, and hence countries negoti-
ate only about the allocation of the abatement burdens. However, with transfers,
negotiations deal over both side payments and abatement levels. Therefore, in
this subsection, we compare the incentives of countries if the FB solution can be
made mutually protable with the availability of transfers. It is common in the
literature to assume that countries distribute the gains from cooperation equally
(e.g., Botteon and Carraro, 1997; Carraro et al., 2006). The welfare level of each
country with transfers can be written as:14
W ∗Unc+τi = W
∗NE
i + ωi(∆W ) ∀i = 1, 2 , (25)
with ωi = 12 , and ∆W as dened in Proposition 1.
Assumption 2:
If countries cooperate under the FB solution, they share the total gains from co-
operation equally.
Taken together, Assumption 1 and 2 imply that country 1 gives side payments
to compensate country 2. Hence, in what follows, we focus more on whether and
under which conditions country 1 will prefer to pay transfers. Given the ranking of
the equilibrium abatement levels in Corollary 1, country 1 chooses either to incur
14The transfer scheme we use in (25) is the NBS, under which each country obtains its non-
cooperative NE welfare level and receives an equal share of the total gains from cooperation.
Other transfers schemes are the Shapely Value and the Chander and Tulken transfer schemes.
See footnote 1.
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larger abatement burden under the SB than the FB outcome or to pay transfers
to achieve the FB outcome. Both options imply a redistribution of the gains from
country 1 to country 2 either in terms of reallocation of abatement burdens or
direct transfers. In order to gain insights into the preferences of countries after
allowing transfers, we consider only one-sided asymmetry.
Corollary 5. Given Assumption 1, and if countries are asymmetric either on
the benet or the cost side, country 1 is more likely to give transfers under the
FB outcome than to choose a SB outcome (either the constrained joint welfare
maximisation or the NBS) only if the asymmetry among countries are suciently
large.
Proof. See Appendix B.7.
On the one hand, if countries are asymmetric on the benet side only, i.e.γ = 1 and
β < 0.707 (recall Assumption 1(b)), we nd that as long as the β-asymmetry is
not very large, country 1 is better o under the SB outcome than giving transfers
under the FB outcome. More specically, the value of β which makes country 1
indierent between the two outcomes is β ' 0.49 for the NBS and β ' 0.14 for
the constrained maximisation outcome. However, if β becomes suciently small,
implying larger benet-asymmetry, country 1 prefers to choose the FB outcome
with transfers. With respect to country 2, it is always better o under the FB
with transfers. On the other hand, if countries are asymmetric on the cost side
only, i.e. β = 1 and γ < 0.5, country 1 will also choose the SB solutions as long
as the asymmetry among countries is not very large. We nd that country 1 is
indierent between the two outcomes if γ ' 0.24 under the NBS and γ ' 0.019
under the constrained outcome. It is straightforward to show that even if we relax
Assumption 2 and allow for unequal distribution of the gains from cooperation,
country 1 is more likely to choose the FB outcome with transfers if the asymmetry
among countries is large. That is, there is a positive relation between β or γ
and ω1. In other words, the larger the degree of asymmetry, the more likely that
country 1 would give transfers, even for a smaller share of the surplus than country
2.
4 Pre-Negotiation Domestic Policies
We have shown in the previous section that climate negotiations outcomes depend
greatly on the asymmetry among countries and whether additional instruments
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such as side payments are available. However, domestic policies such as unilateral
abatement actions, investment and adaptation could also aect the disagreement
welfare level of nations (i.e., non-cooperative status quo) which in turn aect the
negotiations.
The impact of a unilateral emission reduction action on the outcomes of negoti-
ations was analysed by Hoel (1991). He shows that if a country (say country 1
in our model) undertakes a unilateral emission reduction action in excess of its
NE output level (q∗NE1 ), the non-cooperative outcomes (the disagreement point)
shifts in favour of country 2. Consequently, the new outcome of the NBS implies
a reduction in the relative weight (bargaining position) of country 1 (for illustra-
tion, it can be any point from C1 and N in Figure 1). As a result, the cooperative
welfare level of country 1 (2) decreases (increases) and country 1 (2) incurs higher
(lower) abatement eorts than an initial situation without commitment to a uni-
lateral action. He nds that the change in global emissions depends on the ratio




2 . More precisely, in our notations,
if 1
γ
is high (low) global emissions will increase (decrease) as a result of a unilateral
action.
Anticipating climate change negotiations could aect the countries' domestic
policies. From this perspective, Buchholz and Konrad (1994), assuming symmet-
ric countries, show that countries have a strategic incentive to choose technologies
which reduce emissions at high per unit cost. They explain that having a relat-
ively higher cost of abatement allows the country to commit to a lower abatement
level either under no cooperation or under a cooperative agreement. If countries
are symmetric on the benet side, it is clear from (A.11) that the country with a
steeper marginal cost curve (country 1 if γ < 1) contributes less and gains more
under no cooperation than the other country. In addition, the country which
chooses higher abatement costs would shift the disagreement point and the NBS
in its favour. This leads to what is known in the literature by the 'hold-up' prob-
lem which may result in underinvestment of clean technology (Harstad, 2016).
Adaptation to climate change could also aect the negotiations on mitigation.
Zehaie (2009) shows that undertaking adaptation actions before negotiating the
abatement levels could give countries a strategic advantage (stronger position) in
bargaining such that they would secure lower abatement burden. The main intu-
ition is that adaptation reduces the country's vulnerability to climate change (i.e.
its benets from abatement decrease), and hence its future abatement eorts. If
countries are symmetric on the cost side, it is also clear from (A.11) that if β < 1,
country 2 contributes less under no cooperation, but also under the SB agree-
ments (see Corollary 2). Therefore, countries can shift their abatement burdens
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to others through adaptation.
Trade policies such as border carbon adjustments (BCAs) could also aect climate
change negotiations (Helm et al., 2012). BCAs adjust the dierences between na-
tional carbon prices through import taris or export rebates. These policies have
been recently proposed to support unilateral actions of environmentally friendly
countries or as trade sanctions to enforce climate agreements. If we go back to
Section 3, assume that country 1, which gains from cooperation under the FB
outcome (recall Assumption 1(a)), represents a developed or an environmentally
more concerned country. Let point N in Figure 1 be the initial cooperative out-
come given that BCAs are not available at the disagreement point. If country 1
chooses to support its non-cooperative welfare level by imposing BCAs against
country 2, BCAs may shift the disagreement point and the cooperative outcome
in favour of country 1. That is, the outcome of the negotiations could be any point
between N and F in Figure 1 implying stronger bargaining position for country
1 and a higher global welfare level. Of course, at this abstract level, we cannot
determine exactly the eects of BCAs on the non-cooperative outcome and under
which conditions the FB solution (at point F ) could be attained as a cooperative
outcome. In order to analyse the detailed impacts of these policies, trade between
countries should be modelled explicitly.
5 Conclusions
Solving the climate change problem requires cooperation among countries to in-
ternalise global benets from GHG abatement. A Pareto-ecient solution for
climate change can be reached through maximising the weighted sum of the wel-
fare functions of all countries. The relative weights attached to countries' welfare
functions lead to dierent cooperative outcomes with dierent allocation of abate-
ment burdens. The incentives for countries to cooperate depend on their benets
and costs associated with abatement. However, benets and costs of abatement
dier among countries to such extent that some countries could be worse o un-
der a cooperative outcome than under no cooperation implying that cooperation
might not prove individually rational for them.
The rst-best (FB) outcome can be achieved if the welfare weights attached to
countries are equal, implying a cost-eective allocation of abatement burdens
among countries. However, if transfers are not allowed to redistribute the gains
achieved from cooperation, the FB solution may not be reached due to large
asymmetries among countries. In such cases, countries would negotiate second-
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best (SB) agreements. Under the SB solutions, a lower relative weight should be
attached to countries which gain more from cooperation. Despite the fact that
the distribution of the potential gains from cooperation is more symmetric under
the SB than the FB outcome, this is associated with a global welfare loss. Never-
theless, global abatement may increase or decrease depending on the asymmetry
among countries. Even if transfers are allowed, countries may end up in a SB
outcome if the degree of asymmetry among countries is not suciently high. Be-
sides asymmetries between countries, domestic policies such as trade, investment
and adaptation could also aect the bargaining positions of countries in climate
negotiations, and hence the cooperative outcome and the allocation of abatement
duties.
In this paper, we presented the basic features of the interaction among countries
in mitigating climate change. We focused on the eects of asymmetries among
countries on the outcomes of negotiations and the allocation of abatement bur-
dens. We restricted our analysis to two countries, implying that the condition of
individual rationality is sucient for cooperation. Generalising the model to n
countries adds a more challenging participation constraint due to free-rider incent-
ives. This constraint is known in the literature as the 'internal stability condition'.
That is, each country chooses to join an agreement if it receives at least as high as
its free-rider payo which is obtained by remaining outside the agreement while
other countries cooperate. The internal stability condition is stronger than indi-
vidual rationality because of the positive externalities associated with abatement
eorts. As a result, as mentioned in Section 1, the IEA literature concludes that a
small number of countries will cooperate. We can solve the constrained maximisa-
tion using the internal stability condition as a participation constraint and solve
the NBS using the free-rider payo as a threat point. Although the individual
rationality condition is always satised under these two SB solutions, the internal
stability condition may be violated. Therefore, we may reach the same conclusion
as in the literature that only small agreements are stable under the SB solutions.
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A Appendix of Section 2
A.1
If we have two countries, equation (3) can be written as α1W1(q)+α2W2(q), where
q = (q1, q2). q∗ = arg max
q∈Q
α1W1(q)+α2W2(q). Maximisation of this function gives




2(q) = 0, at any Pareto point. This gives
q∗ as a continuously dierentiable function of α, where α = (α1, a2). The Pareto
frontier can be parametrised by α1 since α2 = 1 − α1. Now, the outcome on the
Pareto curve is determined by α1, so we have W ∗1 (α1) and W
∗
2 (α1). Substituting



















15For the proof of n-countries, see Douven and Engwerda (1995), Appendix A, pp.15-16.
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A.2 Constrained Joint Welfare Maximisation
From the Lagrangian in (11), the rst-order condition is given by:
∂L
∂qi
= 0→ B′1(Q)(1 + λ1) +B
′





i(qi)(1 + λi) . (A.1)
The Kuhn-Tucker (KT) conditions are: ∂L
∂λi
= Bi(Q)−Ci(qi)−W ∗NEi ≥ 0, λi ≥ 0
and λi ∂L∂λi = 0.
Equation (12) can be re-written to compare the constrained with the uncon-









j(Q) = (1 + λi)C
′
i(qi) . (A.2)

















































j(Q) = (1 + λi)C
′
i(qi) . (A.3)
Divide (A.3) by 1 + λi delivers (12) in the text.
A.3 Nash Bargaining Solution


































= 0 . (A.5)
Let Bi(Q)− Ci(qi)−W ∗NEi = Gi, where Gi is the gain from cooperation.
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B Appendix of Section 3
B.1 Equilibrium Abatement and Welfare Levels
Using (22) and (23):
B.1.1 The Non-cooperative Outcome
If countries maximise their own welfare function, the non-cooperative (NE) abate-








By inserting the above equilibrium abatement levels into (22) and (23), we ob-










, which are the welfare levels of
countries if negotiations fail, i.e. at the disagreement point.
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B.1.2 The FB Solution

















b (β + 1)
γc
. (A.12)











B.1.3 Constrained Joint Welfare Maximisation
Under the constrained outcome, countries allocate their abatement eorts by solv-
ing (10), from which the equilibrium abatement levels q∗Coni follows:
q∗Con1 =
b (β + 1)
c
+
(λ2 − λ1) βb
(1 + λ1) c
& q∗Con2 =




(1 + λ2) γc
. (A.13)
Solving the rst-order condition in (A.1) and the KT conditions, which are given
by ∂L/∂λ1 ≥ 0 , ∂L/∂λ2 ≥ 0 , λ1 (∂L/∂λ1 ) = 0 and λ2 (∂L/∂λ2 ) = 0, there are
basically four congurations possible at the optimum:
i) If constraints of both countries are not binding, i.e. λ1 = λ2 = 0, which corres-
ponds to the unconstrained maximisation, we obtain the same equilibrium abate-





> 0 ⇔ a) β2 < 2
γ
, while if we substitute these abatement
levels in ∂L/∂λ2 > 0 we get 12
b2(2β2γ−1)
γc
> 0 ⇔ b) β2 > 1
2γ
which are the two
conditions stated in Proposition 1.
ii) If the constraint of country 1 is binding, i.e. λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0, we solve the




substitute the value of λ1 in the rst-order condition ∂L/∂q1 = 0 . With respect
to the KT conditions, since λ1 > 0 , we have ∂L/∂λ1 = 0 . Solving these two




















iii) Similarly, if the constraint of country 2 is binding λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0, we solve

































and W ∗Con2 = W
∗NE
2 .
iv) Finally, if we assume the constraints of both countries are binding, i.e. λ1 >
0 and λ2 > 0. By solving the two KT equations: ∂L/∂λ1 = 0 and ∂L/∂λ2 = 0 , we
obtain q1 = bc and q2 =
βb
γc
, which are the NE abatement levels. Substituting these
equilibrium abatement levels into the two rst-order conditions ∂L/∂q1 = 0 and
∂L/∂q2 = 0 and solving for λ1 and λ2, we get λ1 = −1 and λ2 = −1 which
contradicts the KT conditions λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2. Therefore, it is impossible for the
two countries' constraints to be binding.
B.1.4 The Nash Bargaining Solution
If both countries allocate their abatement burdens using the NBS as shown in



































































B.2 Proof of Corollary 1

























. First, since b (1 + β + λ2β) > b (1 + β) given λ2 > 0,












⇐⇒ q∗Con1 > q∗Unc1 . Second, we have shown
in Section 3 that the slope of the line tangent to the Pareto curve at the NBS











> (1+λ2) given our assumption that λ1 = 0. Therefore, by comparing the con-






> b (1 + β (1 + λ2))
since G1
G2












⇐⇒ q∗NBS1 > q∗Con1 .
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1 + β − λ2
1+λ2
)
< b (1 + β) given λ2 > 0,












⇐⇒ q∗Con2 < q∗Unc2 . Furthermore,
b
(
1 + β − λ2
1+λ2
)































⇐⇒ q∗NBS2 < q∗Con2 .
B.3 Proof of Corollary 2











2 . Since both countries have the same cost functions, i.e. γ = 1,
country 1 contributes more than country 2 under the constrained maximisation
and the NBS.
ii. Given Assumption 1, country 2 receives no gains from cooperation under
the constrained outcome. Therefore, W ∗Con1 − W ∗NE1 > W ∗Con2 − W ∗NE2 = 0.
As country 1 has a steeper marginal cost function than country 2, i.e. γ < 1,
it enjoys a higher welfare level than country 2 in the non-cooperative outcome,
W ∗NE1 −W ∗NE2 = 12
b2(1−γ)
γc







determine which country contributes more, assume on the contrary that q∗Con1 >
q∗Con2 . In this case, country 1 incurs higher costs than country 2 while both
countries enjoy the same benets: C1(q1) > C2(q2) and B1(Q) = B2(Q). Thus,
we obtain W ∗Con1 < W
∗Con









2(q2) as shown in Lemma 1. Therefore,
G1 = W
∗NBS
1 −W ∗NE1 > G2 = W ∗NBS2 −W ∗NE2 . Assume that q∗NBS1 > q∗NBS2 . In
this case, country 1 has higher costs than country 2 while both countries enjoys
the same benets. Thus, we obtainW ∗NBS1 < W
∗NBS
2 . However, we haveW
∗NE
1 >




which is a contradiction, so we have q∗NBS1 < q
∗NBS
2 .
B.4 Proof of Corollary 3
In the case of a negative β − γ covariance, combining the results of the previous
appendix, it is straightforward to check that the country which has a higher
marginal benets and a atter marginal cost curve contributes more than the













2 as shown in Lemma 1. ii) If β > 1
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and γ < 1
2
, and using Appendix B.1.3(iii), q∗Con1 < q
∗Con






γ for all γ < 1
2
, hence we have, q∗Con1 < q
∗Con
2 .
In the case of a positive β−γ covariance, i.e. if β < 1 and γ < 1. Using Appendix
B.1.3(iii) again, we have q∗Con1 ≥ (<) q∗Con2 if β ≤ (>) 1√2γ. However, Assumption
1(b) is not sucient to guarantee this condition, so it needs to hold. Similarly,
for the NBS, using (A.15), q∗NBS1 ≥ (<) q∗NBS2 if β ≤ (<) γ. Given Assumption
1(b), we can only obtain β ≤ γ if γ < γ ' 0.79.
B.5 Proof of Corollary 4
We use the equilibrium abatement levels in Appendix B.1.
 For γ = 1, (i.e. β < 0.707, given Assumption 1(b)), we have Q∗Unc > Q∗Con
if β < 0.707, which always holds. Similarly, we get Q∗Unc > Q∗NBS if β < 1.




 For β = 1, (i.e. γ < 0.5, given Assumption 1(b)). Similar to the previous
case, we obtain Q∗Unc > Q∗Con if γ < 0.5, and Q∗Unc > Q∗NBS if γ < 1. In
addition, we get Q∗Con > Q∗NBS if γ < 2. Therefore, we have the following
ranking of global abatement levels: Q∗Unc > Q∗Con > Q∗NBS .
 For a negative β − γ covariance: a)β < 1 and γ > 1, we nd that Q∗Unc >




or β < 2
γ2
. The rst solution violates Assumption
1(b) and hence we ignore this solution. Therefore, Q∗Unc > Q∗Con if β < 2
γ2
.
For all 1 < γ < 2, assumption 1 is sucient to guarantee the satisfaction
of this condition, thus we have Q∗Unc > Q∗Con. However, if γ > 2, we need
β < 2
γ2
to hold. If β > 2
γ2
, we have Q∗Unc < Q∗Con ∀γ > 2. Similarly,
we obtain Q∗Unc > Q∗NBS if β < 1
γ2







. However, if γ > 1.26, we need this condition to
hold. Therefore, if β > 1
γ2
, we have Q∗Unc < Q∗NBS. Finally, we have
Q∗Con > Q∗NBS if and only if β > 1
2
γ, which violates Assumption 1(b)








b) β > 1 and γ < 1, we have , as shown above, Q∗Unc > Q∗Con if β < 2
γ2
,




. In addition, we always have






for all values of γ < 1. Furthermore,
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given γ < 1 and β > 1, we always have in this case β > 1
2
γ, hence Q∗Con >
Q∗NBS.





















, therefore, Q∗Con > Q∗NBS if and only if β > 1
2
γ, while if β > 1
2
γ,
we have Q∗Con < Q∗NBS.
B.6 The Closing the Gap Index








· 100. For the case of benet-asymmetry, we have
∂CGICon
∂β










> 0∀β ∈ (0, 1) given γ = 1. Similarly,
for the cost-asymmetry case, ∂CGI
Con
∂γ








> 0∀γ ∈ (0, 1)
given β = 1.
B.7 Proof of Corollary 5
We use the equilibrium welfare levels in Appendix B.1 and W ∗Unc+τi as dened in
(25).
 For γ = 1, we have W ∗Unc+τ1 −W ∗NBS1 = 14
b2(β2−2β2/3+1)
c
≥ 0 if β ≤ 0.485 or
β ≥ 1. Given Assumption 1(b), β < 0.707 if γ = 1. Similarly, W ∗Unc+τ1 −








≥ 0 if β ≤ 0.14 or β ≥ 2.4, where the second
condition violates Assumption 1(b). Therefore, as long as β < 0.14, we have














γ ≤ 0.236 or γ ≥ 1. However, given Assumption 1(b), γ < 1
2
if β = 1.
Similarly, we obtainW ∗Unc+τ1 −W ∗Con1 = −14
b2(321/3γ1/3−γ−1)
γc
≥ 0 if γ ≤ 0.019
or γ ≥ 5.8, where the second condition does not hold. Therefore, as long as
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bon taxes might be set ineciently low due the concern of governments
about carbon leakage and the loss of competitiveness of their emission-
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mentally more concerned government shifts unilaterally to a consumption-
based policy, BCAs on imports create a new incentive for the optimal tax
structure of both governments to tax emissions. Although prot-shifting and
carbon leakage distortions are only eliminated by combining carbon taris
with a full export rebate, the optimal tax may still be below individual
marginal damages due to the strategic interaction between governments. In
contrast, a bilateral consumption-based tax could be set equal to or even
above individual marginal damages. We nd that, in equilibrium, all forms
of BCAs could allow both governments to set high carbon taxes than under
a bilateral production-based tax regime. However, adding export rebates
weakens the positive strategic impact of carbon taris on the climate policy
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1 Introduction
Actions to mitigate climate change have mainly focused on emissions released
within national boundaries of countries, referred to as the production-based ap-
proach. However, in the absence of a cooperative climate policy, this raises two
main concerns. First, an environmental concern about the eectiveness of unilat-
eral or sub-global actions: emission reductions by some environmentally friendly
countries are partly or completely oset by higher emissions in other countries, a
phenomenon known as 'carbon leakage'. Second, a competitiveness concern about
the loss of market shares of rms located in countries with stricter climate policies.
These concerns greatly aect the incentives of governments when designing their
non-cooperative climate policies.
In order to address these concerns and to support a more ambitious climate policy,
some economists have argued in favour of taxing emissions based on consumption
rather than production (Helm et al., 2012; Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Steininger
et al., 2014; Stiglitz, 2006).1 Consumption-based climate policies can be imple-
mented through trade instruments such as border carbon adjustments (BCAs).
That is, countries complement their production-based carbon tax with carbon
taris (BCAs on imports) and/or export rebates (BCAs on exports) in order to
make up for and protect against lower carbon taxes abroad. If a full adjustment
on imports is combined with a full export rebate, sometimes referred to as full
BCAs, this constitutes de facto a unilateral consumption-based tax.
The strategic choice of environmental policies has been widely studied in the
environmental-trade policy literature. Many of those models build on the strategic
imperfect-competition trade model due to Brander and Spencer (1985), extending
their model by including consumers and environmental damages. For instance,
Barrett (1994), Conrad (1993) and Kennedy (1994) conclude that if environmental
policy is the only instrument available to governments (i.e., a production-based
environmental policy), environmental policies may be set ineciently lax, i.e.,
below not only global but also individual marginal damages.
In this paper, we study whether a gradual shift from production-based to
consumption-based policies, using various forms of BCAs including carbon tar-
is and export rebates, could restore the eectiveness of non-cooperative climate
policies. For this, we derive the general optimal tax structure for two asymmet-
ric countries which perceive global damages from greenhouse gases dierently,
1See also Jakob et al. (2014) for a survey of the literature that compares production with
consumption-based approaches.
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considering dierent policy regimes.
We solve a two-stage game in which governments choose their carbon taxes in the
rst stage, and then rms choose their output levels in the second stage. Our
analysis starts with a bilateral production-based tax (PB) regime under which
both governments impose a carbon tax on the home rm only. BCAs are then
introduced as unilateral measures supplementing the production-based tax of the
environmentally more concerned country to which the other country will respond
by choosing its production-based tax. The three BCA-regimes which we consider
are: (i) BCAs on imports, which fully adjust the dierence between the two
national tax levels, (ii) BCAs on imports and exports where the export rebate rate
is chosen optimally and (iii) BCAs on imports with a full export rebate, which
is de facto a unilateral consumption-based tax. Finally, we consider a bilateral
consumption-based tax (CB) regime under which both governments impose a
carbon tax on consumption only.
On the one hand, we show that for the country which imposes BCAs, moving
gradually to a unilateral consumption-based tax mitigates both, the carbon leak-
age and prot-shifting eect. Only full BCAs could allow this government to
fully internalise its own damages from global emissions. Nevertheless, due to the
strategic interaction with the other government, the optimal tax could still be set
below individual marginal damages. On the other hand, we nd that the optimal
tax structure of the country on which BCAs are imposed changes with carbon
taris which incentivise it to set higher carbon taxes. This is to avoid that tax
revenues go abroad. Moreover, unlike the PB-regime, carbon taxes under the CB-
regime may be set equal to or above individual marginal damages, depending on
the demand curvature. Even though all BCA-measures may support more ambi-
tious carbon taxes in the two countries, adding export rebates reinforces (weakens)
the eect of carbon taris on the climate policy level of the environmentally more
(less) concerned country.
Our paper builds on the literature on strategic environmental-trade policies. This
literature demonstrates that two strategic eects reduce the incentive of countries
to set environmental policy at ambitious levels. First, if rms engage in Cournot
competition, governments have an incentive to set lax policies to provide their
rms with a strategic advantage over their rivals, which is known as the prot-
shifting incentive (Barrett, 1994; Conrad, 1993; Kennedy, 1994). Second, if pol-
lution is transboundary, the eectiveness of environmental policies is undermined
by carbon leakage (Conrad, 1993; Duval and Hamilton, 2002; Kennedy, 1994).
Hence, we extend this literature to show how these strategic eects could change
under dierent policy regimes, and investigate whether new strategic eects would
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emerge.
Our paper benets from the literature which compares bilateral production-based
and bilateral consumption-based tax regimes for international traded products
under imperfect competition, as, for instance, Hauer et al. (2005) and Hauer
and Püger (2007). However, these studies assume symmetric countries and do
not consider environmental externalities.
Moreover, our paper is related to three strands of literature, studying the eects
of BCA measures on carbon leakage and/or equilibrium climate policies. The
rst strand focuses on quantifying the impact of BCAs on reducing leakage eects
and the loss of competitiveness of emission-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) indus-
tries. Most of this strand of the literature conducts numerical analyses, based on
partial or general computable equilibrium models (Babiker and Rutherford, 2005;
Böhringer et al., 2012; Branger and Quirion, 2014; Fischer and Fox, 2012). They
conclude that BCA measures eectively mitigate carbon leakage and the output
loss of rms. They provide mixed evidence about the importance of adding ex-
port rebates to carbon taris (Böhringer et al., 2012; 2014; Branger and Quirion,
2014). Those models consider only unilateral climate policies. In addition, due
to the complicated nature of these CGE-models, these studies assume exogenous
climate policy levels and hence cannot capture the strategic role of BCAs in an
endogenous policy setting as we do.
The second strand of literature also considers unilateral climate polices in the-
oretical models. The economic rationale for using trade measures to internalise
foreign emissions goes back to Markusen (1975), who shows that a combination
of a Pigouvian tax and import taris is optimal for the active and environment-
ally concerned country.2 Some recent papers have also compared a unilateral
production-based with a consumption-based carbon tax, where the latter is im-
plemented by full BCAs. However, unlike numerical models, some papers, as for
instance Jakob et al. (2013) and Eichner and Pethig (2015), conclude that full
BCAs do not necessarily lead to less carbon leakage. Jakob et al. (2013) show
that a consumption-based carbon tax may raise foreign emissions if the foreign
country shifts its production to a more carbon intensive non-exporting sector. In
a dierent context, assuming an intertemporal model, Eichner and Pethig (2015)
nd that total emissions could increase if the income eects associated with a
consumption-based tax are strong. In contrast, Yomogida and Tarui (2013) show
that a carbon tax with full BCAs necessarily reduces total emissions. Whereas
global emissions may increase without BCAs due to strong leakage eects if the
2See for instance Hoel (1996) and Copeland (1996).
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home rm has a suciently cleaner technology than the foreign rm. In such
cases, full BCAs lead to a higher unilateral optimal carbon tax level.3 Although
some of these studies show the eect of BCA-measures on the policy levels of
the home country, also these models do not allow for endogenous bilateral policy
choices.
Our paper is closely related to the third strand which also builds on theoretical
models but analyses the eect of BCA-measures in the context of bilateral endo-
genous policy choices. For instance, Sanctuary (2018) assumes perfect competition
and shows that the exporting country may react by setting a higher carbon tax
if faced with BCAs on imports. Likewise, though in an imperfect competition
model, Eyland and Zaccour (2012; 2014) show, based on numerical simulations,
that adding partial BCAs on imports lead both countries to set higher taxes on
emissions.4 None of the above studies consider export rebates which have a less ob-
vious strategic eect than carbon taris. An exception is Hecht and Peters (2018).
They show, in an imperfect competition trade model, that BCA-measures allow
the home country to impose a higher carbon tax but the foreign country responds
by a lower tax level. They consider BCAs on imports and symmetric BCAs on
imports and exports.5 Therefore, unlike Eyland and Zaccour, their study shows
that carbon taris can have a negative strategic impact on the policy level of the
foreign country. This result also contradicts the argument put forward by Helm
et al. (2012), who conclude, albeit in a highly stylized political game without
micro-foundation, that the country faced with carbon taris responds by setting
a carbon tax on its exports. The upshot of these studies is that the role of BCAs
on the climate policies of the foreign country remains inconclusive. Our paper
provide a more general framework to study the incentives of governments when
choosing their optimal climate policy under dierent BCA-regimes. In addition,
we consider two forms of export rebates: an optimal and a full rebate. Hence,
unlike Hecht and Peters (2018), we allow BCAs on imports and BCAs on exports
to be applied at dierent rates.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model. In Section 3 we derive the general structure of the optimal carbon tax
in the social optimum and in Section 4 we do so for the non-cooperative policy
regimes. In Section 5, we use specic functions in order to rank equilibrium carbon
3Nicolaï et al. (2010) show that both taris and subsidies raise the unilateral emission tax
of the home country, however, both measures are not necessarily equal to the carbon tax, hence
are not exactly reecting the idea of BCAs.
4In both studies, the authors do not consider the full adjustment on imports.
5They assume that both measures are imposed at the same rate.
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taxes across dierent regimes. Section 6 concludes and discusses possible future
research.
2 Model
We consider two countries, i = 1, 2, which interact in a strategic trade model,
which is an extended version of Brander and Spencer (1985). There are two rms,
k = 1, 2, where rm 1 is located in country 1, and rm 2 is located in country 2.
Firms are producing a homogeneous emission-intensive good x, which generates
greenhouse gas emissions. Each rm supplies the home and the foreign market;
both rms compete in outputs. The inverse demand in each country is given by:
pi (Xi) = u
′
i (Xi) , (1)
where pi is the market price and ui (Xi) represents the utility from consuming
the emission-intensive good with u
′
i > 0 and u
′′
i < 0. Hence, p
′
i (Xi) < 0. Total
consumption in country i is Xi = x1i + x2i, where x1i and x2i are the outputs
supplied by rm 1 and 2 to market i, respectively, and, hence, total production is
X = X1 +X2. We assume the two rms are identical and face a linear production
cost function, i.e., Cki(xki) = cxki for k = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2.
We solve a two-stage game. In the rst stage, governments simultaneously choose
their climate policy levels to regulate emissions. We consider dierent policy
regimes. In the second stage, rms simultaneously choose their output levels.
The game is solved by backward induction.
2.1 Second Stage
In this stage, rms choose their prot-maximising output levels for each market.
Markets are segmented. That is, rms make separate quantity decisions for the
home and the foreign market. Then, prots obtained in market 1 and market 2
are given by:
Market 1 : π11 = (p1(X1)− c− t11)x11 & π21 = (p1(X1)− c− t21)x21 , (2)
Market 2 : π12 = (p2(X2)− c− t12)x12 & π22 = (p2(X2)− c− t22)x22 , (3)
where t11 (t21) is the eective carbon tax which rm 1 (2) faces on its supply to
market 1 and t12 (t22) is the eective carbon tax which rm 1 (2) faces on its
57
supply to market 2; X1 = x11 + x21 and X2 = x12 + x22. We assume a constant
emission-output ratio across rms, which we normalise to 1 for simplicity, such
that an emission tax is de facto an output tax.























2−c−t22 = 0 . (5)
We assume that goods are strategic substitutes in market 1 and market 2. A














1 < 0, and a similar condition can be derived for market
2. That is, reaction functions of rms are negatively sloped: increasing the pro-
duction level of one rm reduces the marginal revenues of its rival which reacts
by decreasing production. Assuming that the second-order conditions hold, as
derived in Appendix A.1, and solving the rst-order conditions in (4) ((5)) sim-
ultaneously, yield the prot-maximising output levels produced of rm 1 and 2
in both markets. The prot-maximising output levels are function of the eect-
ive taxes, i.e., x1i = f (t1i, t2i) and x2i = g (t1i, t2i). Thus, the outcome of the
second stage of the game is a Nash equilibrium in output levels in each of the two
markets.6
2.2 First Stage
Given the equilibrium output levels of rms, governments choose simultaneously
the level of their carbon tax ti in the rst stage by maximising their individual wel-
fare function under dierent policy regimes. We consider ve non-cooperative re-
gimes: a bilateral production-based tax (PB-regime) and a bilateral consumption-
based tax (CB-regime) regime as well as three regimes under which country
1 imposes unilaterally border carbon adjustments (BCAs), supplementing its
production-based tax with taris and export rebates, while country 2 reacts by a
production-based tax (BCA-regimes).
6The conditions derived in Appendix A.1 ensures the existence and uniqueness of a Nash
equilibrium.
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The welfare function of country 1 and country 2 are given by:
W1 = CS1 + PS1 + TR1 −D1(e) +BCAI1 −BCAE1 , (6)
W2 = CS2 + PS2 + TR2 −D2(e) , (7)




which follows from (1), recalling that the total supply to market i is given by
Xi = x1i +x2i. PSi is the producer surplus, which is the total prots of the home
rm k, i.e., PSi = Πk = πk1 + πk2. TRi is the tax revenue of government i, where
TRi = ti (xk1 + xk2) under all regimes, except under the CB-regime where tax
revenues are given by TRi = ti (x1i + x2i).
Di are individual damages from global greenhouse gas emissions released in the
production of good x. Global damages from global emissions are D (e), e = e1 +e2
where e1 = x11 + x12 and e2 = x22 + x21. That is, as we normalise the emission-
output ratio to 1, global emissions are equal to total production which is equal to
total consumption, i.e., e = X. Countries may perceive or evaluate global damages
dierently. Therefore, the damage function faced by country 1 and country 2 is
given by:
D1 (e) = γD (e) , D2 (e) = (1− γ)D (e) γ ∈ [0.5, 1] , (8)
where D
′
(e) > 0 and D
′′
(e) ≥ 0. Because γ ∈ [0.5, 1], country 1 is at least as con-
cerned as country 2 about environmental damages, and, usually, more whenever
γ is strictly larger than 0.5.
Finally, the last two terms in the welfare function (6), BCAI1 and BCAE1, stand
for the tari revenues from a unilateral BCA-policy on imports and the expenses
from a tax rebate on exports, respectively. These two terms are only relevant
under the three non-cooperative BCA-regimes and are zero by assumption under
the PB- and the CB-regime. Given γ ∈ [0.5, 1], we assume that it is country 1
which implements a unilateral BCA-policy.
In the following, we explain the dierence between the ve non-cooperative re-
gimes and their impacts on eective carbon taxes which are summarised in Table
1.
First, we consider that both governments impose a production-based carbon tax
on their home rm (PB-regime). Hence, the eective tax which each rm faces is
equal to the tax imposed in its home country, i.e., t11 = t12 = t1 and t22 = t21 = t2.
Second, we consider border carbon adjustments on imports (BI-regime). Country
1 imposes not only a production-based tax but also a carbon tari on imports from
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country 2.7 Hence, rm 1 faces eective tax t1i = t1 as under the PB-regime, and
also rm 2 faces t22 = t2 on its supply to country 2, but faces t21 = t2+ω(t1−t2) on
its supply to country 1 if t1 > t2, with ω the border tax adjustment parameter on
imports (Eyland and Zaccour, 2012). We assume that country 1 imposes a carbon
tari which fully adjusts the dierence between the two national tax levels, i.e.,
ω = 1. On the one hand, any value of ω above 1 would violate the equal treatment
rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO).8 On the other hand, any value
of ω below 1 would not be optimal for country 1.9 This assumption implies that
both rms supplying market 1 face the same eective carbon tax. Therefore,
the term BCAI1 in (6) is given by BCAI1 = (t1 − t2) (x21) if t1 > t2, otherwise
BCAI1 = 0.
Table 1: Eective Carbon Taxes under Non-Cooperative Regimes
Eective taxes PB BI BIE BF CB
Market 1
t11 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1
t21 t2 t1 t1 t1 t1
Market 2
t12 t1 t1 t1(1−ϕ̂) 0 t2
t22 t2 t2 t2 t2 t2
Third, we consider border carbon adjustments on imports and exports (BIE-
regime). Under this regime, country 1 complements its production-based tax and
carbon tari with a rebate on exports to country 2. Hence, compared to the
previous regimes, only the eective tax rm 1 faces on its supply to country 2
will change, which is given now by t12 = t1(1 − ϕ̂) if t1 > t2, with ϕ the border
tax adjustment parameter on exports, which may also be called the export rebate
rate.10 ϕ̂ indicates that ϕ is chosen optimally. Unlike carbon taris, it is not
always optimal for country 1 to provide a full border rebate or adjustment to its
rm on its exports. However, in order to be also consistent with the WTO equal
treatment rule, we need to impose a constraint such that the eective tax rm
1 faces on its exports is at least as high as the tax of the foreign rm 2, i.e.,
t1(1− ϕ̂) ≥ t2. This implies setting a constraint on the maximum optimal rebate
7We use the terms carbon tari and BCAs on imports interchangeably.
8The General Agreement on Tari and Trade (GATT) allows WTO members to apply a
border tax adjustment at a rate which is not higher than the rate applied to domestically
produced "like" products.
9See Hecht and Peters (2018) and Weitzel et al. (2012) on this point. In other words, if ω
could be chosen optimally by country 1, it would choose a value above 1.
10Note that we cannot model BCAs on exports in the same way as on imports. That is, we
cannot assume for instance t12 = t1−ϕ(t1− t2) as this would imply that country 2, with tax t2,
imposes a tax on output of rm 1 for market 2. However, country 2 only reacts to BCA-measures
by setting a production-based tax.
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rate, which will be explained in detail in Section 4. Therefore, the term BCAE1
in (6) is given by BCAE1 = ϕ̂ t1 x12 if t1 > t2 and t1(1− ϕ̂) ≥ t2.
Fourth, we consider border carbon adjustments on imports with a full export
rebate (BF-regime). That is, this regime is similar to the previous regime, except
that we assume that ϕ is not chosen optimally but ϕ = 1 always. Therefore, rm
1 faces eective tax t12 = 0 on its supply to country 2. The BF-regime implies
de facto a unilateral consumption-based tax imposed by country 1. Again, the
WTO equal treatment rule requires that this eective tax is at least as high as
t2.
11 Because we study a bilateral endogenous policy choice, full export rebates
and full adjustments on exports are not always equivalent. This is evident by
considering the case where country 2 chooses a subsidy, i.e., t2 < 0, in which case
the fully export rebate is less than full adjustment.
Finally, we consider that both governments impose a consumption-based carbon
tax (CB-regime). Hence, both rms supplying country i face ti, i.e., t11 = t21 = t1
and t22 = t12 = t2. It is interesting to note that this regime is equivalent to
a regime in which each country imposes a production-based tax supplemented
with a tari on imports and a full export rebate. With reference to our border
adjustment parameters introduced above, this implies ωi = 1 and ϕi = 1 ∀ i = 1, 2.
In other words, the CB-regime is equivalent to a bilateral BF-regime.
3 Optimal Climate Policy: Normative Benchmark
Before turning to the non-cooperative regimes, we briey discuss the normative
benchmark of the social optimum. We assume for simplicity of exposition that
governments choose a uniform tax tS. Hence, the Nash equilibrium output levels
in the second stage are given by xS1i = x
S
2i = f (tS, tS) = g (tS, tS).
In the rst stage, governments choose the carbon tax tS by maximising the ag-
gregate welfare, W = W1 + W2.12 Assuming that the second-order condition is
satised, the socially optimal carbon tax, which is derived in Appendix A.2, can
11In our strategic context, this regime is compatible with the WTO articles if t2 ≤ 0, which
is likely to be the case as we show in our example in Section 5.
12Both BCAI1 and BCAE1 in (6) are not relevant under the cooperative solution.
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> 0, EDE = D
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< 0 with Ji > 0, which is the Jacobian matrix of the second-order conditions
in the second stage. We may recall p
′
i < 0 as the demand function is downward






as total emissions are equal to total output.
In this but also in the following section, the structure of the optimal climate
policy level is broken down into several eects: 1) the consumer surplus eect
(CSE), which is related to distortions created by underproduction associated with
imperfect competition (Barnett, 1980), 2) the producer surplus eect (PSE), which
is related to the prots of rms, and 3) the environmental damage eect (EDE)
stemming from the internalisation of damages from global emissions. The PSE is
a net eect which also considers the tax revenues of governments, i.e., PSi + TRi
which are net prots. This is because taxes paid by rms are equal to tax revenues.
In (9), the CSE is negative, hence would call for a subsidy in order to raise
production in both countries. The PSE is positive and hence would call for a
tax. That is, when governments choose their taxes cooperatively, imposing a
positive tax will raise the collective net prots of the two rms by enforcing a
monopolistic output. Finally, governments jointly internalise global damages from
emissions. Hence, the EDE is positive and would call for a tax equal to global
marginal damages. Although the CSE and the PSE have opposite signs, the CSE
dominates. Therefore, the socially optimal carbon tax level is smaller than global
marginal damages, t̂S < D
′
.13 Whether the equilibrium tax will be positive or
negative cannot be deduced at this level of generality, though it increases with
the value of global marginal damages.
13See also Kennedy (1994) and Duval and Hamilton (2002). In Conrad (1993), the cooperative
tax level is larger than global marginal damages because he assumes consumption takes place
in a third market and hence CSE=0.
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4 Non-cooperative Optimal Climate Policies
In this section, we analyse the impact of a gradual shift from a bilateral
production-based to a bilateral consumption-based tax on the three eects derived
in the previous section. Moreover, we investigate whether new eects emerge.
4.1 Bilateral Production-based Tax (PB-regime)
We start our analysis by considering the bilateral production-based tax regime
(PB-regime), which serves as reference for the later regimes. Both governments
impose a carbon tax on the production of their home rm. With reference to
Table 1, solving the second stage delivers: xPB1i = f (t1, t2) and x
PB
2i = g (t1, t2) for
i = 1, 2. We denote a country's welfare function under the PB-regime by W PBi .
All details are provided in Appendix A.3.
MaximisingW PBi with respect to the national tax level ti gives the optimal PB-tax
































































































































14The optimal taxes display the various eects that play a role when choosing taxes. They
are dierent from equilibrium taxes which would require to solve (10) and (12) simultaneously,





































































> 0 . (13)
Under the PB-regime, both carbon taxes have the same negative im-
pact on the consumer surplus in each country, ∂CSi/∂ti = ∂CSi/∂tj =






< 0. Hence, the CSE would call for a subsidy that increases
the consumer surplus in both countries. However, this leads to positive consumer
price spillovers (Hauer and Püger, 2007; Lockwood, 2001). That is, lowering
taxes in one country benets not only domestic but also foreign consumers. Since
governments do not care about foreign consumers, this reduces the incentives of
both governments to subsidise their consumers compared to the social optimum.
Since governments choose their taxes non-cooperatively, focusing exclusively on
the CSE, leads to a subsidy below the socially optimal level.
Under the non-cooperative regimes, the PSE reects the concern of governments
about the competitiveness of their rms. From (11) and (13), the production
of each rm decreases (increases) in the tax of the home (foreign) country. As
a result, the incentives related to producers are dierent from the cooperative
solution. Setting a higher carbon tax reduces the sales of the home rm at the
expenses of an expansion of the sales of the foreign rm. Hence, higher carbon
taxes decrease the net prots (prots net of tax payments) of the home rm. In
line with the analysis of Brander and Spencer (1985), each government has an
incentive to give a subsidy to its rm in order to shift prots from the foreign to
the home rm. This is known as the prot-shifting incentive. The PSE in both
countries comprises two terms that reect the incentive to shift prots in market
1 (rst term) and market 2 (second term). Under this regime, both terms are
negative, and, hence, would call for a subsidy.
Environmental damages and the problem of carbon leakage are captured by the
EDE. Dierent from the social optimum, countries internalise only their indi-
vidual damages under the non-cooperative regimes, i.e., a fraction of total dam-
ages. Both the home and the foreign PB-tax have the same eect on individual
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< 0. If we exclusively focus on the EDE, ignoring other mar-
ket distortions, the eectiveness of countries' climate policy can be measured by
the departure of the EDE from individual marginal damages. The impact of a
country's climate policy on global emissions comprises two eects: the home
emission eect (HEE) and the foreign emission eect (FEE). HEE captures the
change of emissions released by the home rm, ∂ei/∂ti, and the FEE captures
the change of emissions released by the foreign rm, ∂ej/∂ti. The latter eect
is sometimes referred to as the carbon leakage or transboundary pollution eect
(Duval and Hamilton, 2002; Kennedy, 1994). Under the PB-regime, the HEE is
negative but the FEE is positive, though overall the EDE is positive and hence the
HEE is stronger than the FEE in absolute terms. Thus, carbon leakage weakens
the EDE, which would call for a tax less than individual marginal damages, i.e.,
EDEi (PB) < D
′
i ∀i = 1, 2.15 Recalling that the CSE and PSE are negative, it is
clear that taxes under the PB-regime are set below individual marginal damages,
t̂PBi < D
′
i ∀ i = 1, 2.
In equilibrium, each government chooses its tax, given the tax level of the other
government. That is, Nash equilibrium carbon taxes are obtained by solving
∂W1/∂t1 = 0 and ∂W2/∂t2 = 0 simultaneously. It is clear that since both coun-
tries face the same demand, the CSE is the same in both countries. If both rms
were to produce the same quantities, the PSE would also be the same. Therefore,
the dierence in taxes is due to the EDE, which is higher in country 1 than coun-
try 2. Therefore, in equilibrium, country 1 will have a higher tax than country
2, i.e., tPB∗1 > t
PB∗
2 for all γ > 0.5. As a result, equilibrium quantities produced
by rm 1 are smaller than by rm 2 and, consequently, the producer surplus but
also the net producer surplus (prots net of tax revenues) is smaller in country 1
than in country 2. Again, at this level of generality, nothing can be said whether
equilibrium taxes will be positive or negative, except that, ceteris paribus, taxes
in each country increase in the valuation of its individual marginal damages. Nev-
ertheless, based on our discussion, we can state the following:
Proposition 1. In a strategic trade model, the equilibrium production-based car-
bon tax will be lower than individual marginal damages in each country, with
tPB∗1 ≥ tPB∗2 for all γ ≥ 0.5.
Given that both rms are assumed to be identical, dierent prots only stem from
15If pollution is local, the FEE will vanish and the EDE is equal to the country's marginal
damage, see for instance Kennedy (1994).
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dierences in eective taxes that rms face. Hence, rm 1 suers from a compet-
itive disadvantage, both in the home and the foreign market. Therefore, in the
subsequent analysis, we consider that country 1 complements its PB-policy with
BCAs to protect its home rm and to raise the eectiveness of its climate policy.
These regimes can be considered as a gradual shift to a unilateral consumption-
based carbon tax imposed by country 1.
4.2 Border Carbon Adjustments on Imports ( BI-regime)
Under the carbon adjustment of imports regime (BI-regime), country 1 comple-
ments its porduction-based tax with taris on imports. Tax rebates are not
considered. From Table 1, the output levels in the second stage are given by
xBI11 = x
BI
21 = f (t1, t1) = g (t1, t1) for the supply to market 1, while x
BI
12 = f (t1, t2)
and xBI22 = g (t1, t2) for the supply to market 2.
Maximising WBI1 and W
BI
2 , which are the welfare function of country 1 and coun-
try 2 under the BI-regime, with respect to own national taxes, leads to the optimal































































































































































































> 0 . (17)
The CSE has the same sign as in the previous regime in both countries. However,
t1 has now a larger eect on the consumer surplus in country 1, while t2 has no
eect, ∂CS1/∂t1 = −p
′






< 0 and ∂CS1/∂t2 = 0. Therefore,
country 1 has a stronger incentive to subsidise its consumers. For country 2, the
consumer price spillovers to country 1 are zero, and, hence also country 2 has a
stronger incentive to subsidise its consumers.
We now consider the PSE. We recall that one of the main objectives of BCAs is
to protect prots in the light of asymmetric carbon taxes. Since the BI-regime
assumes a unilateral BCA-policy imposed by country 1, we focus rst on country
1, which, by assumption, sets a higher carbon tax than country 2. The sign of the
PSE in country 1 becomes ambiguous after introducing carbon taris. In market
1, the prot-shifting incentive is eliminated and hence the rst term of the PSE
in (14) becomes now positive. BCAs on imports level the playing eld in market
1 but the second term of the PSE is still negative, as rm 1 is not protected in
market 2. Therefore, carbon taris reduce the pressure on country 1 of adjusting
taxes downward. The sign of the aggregate PSE depends on the strength of these
two eects which work in opposite directions. For a linear demand curve, the
aggregate PSE is positive and hence would call for a tax.16
For country 2, its PSE is negative but comprises now only one component. This is
because its carbon tax aects only the prots of its home rm in market 2, while
16See Appendix A.4 for details.
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it has no eect on the prots obtained from exports to market 1 (as rm 2 de
facto faces t1 on its exports). Therefore, the prot-shifting incentive of country 2
in market 1 disappears and only that in market 2 remains.17
We now consider the EDE. With taris, the impact of country 1's tax t1 on
global emissions and carbon leakage becomes larger while the impact of country
2's tax t2 becomes smaller. Whereas under the PB-regime, we had a symmetric










, now under the BI-



















both countries, the HEE remains negative. For country 2, also the FEE remains
positive due to carbon leakage, however, the FEE in country 1 is now dierent.
The FEE has two terms with opposite sign: dxBI21 /dt1 < 0 and dx
BI
22 /dt1 > 0. The
rst term may be viewed as anti-leakage, and, hence, irrespective of the sign of
the overall FEE, carbon leakage can be better controlled by country 1. Hence,
country 1 faces less pressure to reduce taxes to avoid leakage. Nevertheless, the
EDE would still call for a tax lower than individual marginal damages in country
1. For country 2, an increase in its carbon tax raises only foreign emissions in
market 2, while there is no eect on market 1. Hence, the FEE in country 2 stems
only from dxBI12 /dt2 > 0. As a result, although carbon leakage is less sever under
the BI-regime, also the EDE in country 2 would call for a tax below marginal
damages. Hence, together, we have EDEi (BI) < D
′
i ∀ i = 1, 2.
Finally, introducing BCAs on imports creates a new strategic incentive in both
countries, which we call the BCAI-eect, abbreviated BCAIE. Recall that the
eective carbon tari rate depends on the dierence between the two national
taxes. Through the tari, country 1 de facto taxes foreign production, which is
a new source of revenues. This provides an incentive for country 1 to increase
taxes. In contrast, country 2 has an incentive to tax exports of its rm in order
to capture a larger part of its tax revenues. This constitutes a kind of a 'race to
the top' in carbon taxes.
For country 1, the BCAIE comprises two terms. The rst term, −x21/ΛBI1 , is






/ΛBI1 , depends on
the tax level of country 2. If t2 ≥ 0, the BCAIE in country 1 is unambiguously
positive. However, if t2 < 0, the sign of the second term is negative. The overall
BCAIE could be negative but only if t2 is negative and very small (i.e., large in
absolute terms), implying a large subsidy. In such cases, if country 1 imposes a
positive tax, the dierence between the two national tax levels is large, implying
17It is not straightforward to conrm at this general level that the PSE in country 2 will
strictly decrease because the absolute value of the denominator also decreases.
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a large eective tari rate, which may erode the BCA revenues in the sense of the
Laer curve. However, it is very likely that, overall, the BCAIE is positive, simply
because if tax dierence becomes too large, no interior equilibrium in output levels
exists.
For country 2, the BCAIE is unambiguously positive and would call for taxing
emissions. This is in line with the argument presented in Helm et al. (2012) who
argue that the country facing a tari reacts by imposing a carbon adjustment on
exports.
Proposition 2. In a strategic trade model, BCAs on imports create a new in-
centive for the country on which taris are levied on its exports to raise its tax.
For the country which imposes taris, the pressure to lower taxes in order to shift
prots and to countervail leakage eects is reduced.
Although introducing BCAs changes some incentives towards a higher carbon
tax in both countries, we cannot compare taxes across regimes at this level of
generality. Also, comparing the two national taxes under this regime becomes
ambiguous. As will be demonstrated later, even using specic functions, we have
to impose a constraint such that tBI∗1 > t
BI∗
2 in equilibrium.
Adding BCAs on imports eliminates the dierence in prots of rms when supply-
ing market 1. However, rm 1 still faces a competitive disadvantage in market 2.
Therefore, we consider that country 1 will complement its BCA-policy on imports
with a policy on exports.
4.3 Border Carbon Adjustments on Imports and Exports
Adding export rebates implies that rm 1 faces eective tax t1(1 − ϕ) on its
supply to market 2 with ϕ the rebate rate. We recall that WTO regulations
require that t1(1 − ϕ) ≥ t2. We consider two forms of BCAs on exports. The
BIE-regime assumes an optimal export adjustment/rebate parameter ϕ, which
can be positive or negative and can be smaller or larger than 1, as explained in
detail in Appendix A.5. The BF-regime assumes a full export rebate, i.e., ϕ = 1,
and, hence, ϕ is not chosen optimally.
4.3.1 BCAs on Imports with Optimal Export Rebate (BIE-regime)
Under the BIE-regime, the output levels from the second stage are xBIE11 = x
BIE
21 =
f (t1, t1) = g (t1, t1) in market 1, and xBIE12 = f (t1, t2, ϕ) and x
BIE
22 = g (t1, t2, ϕ) in
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market 2 (see Table 1). Let WBIE1 and W
BIE
2 be the welfare function of country
1 and country 2, respectively, under this regime.
We derive the structure of the optimal export rebate rate by maximising WBIE1
with respect to ϕ:


























































> 0 . (19)
For simplicity, the signs in (18) and (19) as well as the subsequent interpretation
assume positive values of t1. See Appendix A.5 for further details and also for the
case of negative values of t1.18
The optimal export rebate rate depends on two opposing eects: the PSE, which
calls for a large rebate rate to shift prots to rm 1 in market 2, and the EDE,
which calls for a small rebate rate in order to reduce production and hence global
emissions. From (18) it is evident that the optimal export rebate rate can be
less than, equal or greater than a full rebate, i.e., ϕ̂ Q 1. The larger the EDE
compared to the PSE, the smaller will be the optimal export rebate rate. A full
rebate, i.e., ϕ̂ = 1, implying a unilateral consumption-based carbon tax, is only
optimal if the PSE is equal to the EDE. Subsequently, we will rst analyse the
case of an optimal export rebate, ignoring the possibility of ϕ̂ = 1 for simplicity,
as this case is covered under the next regime below. We recall that the optimal
rebate rate can be larger than a full rebate if the climate policy level of country
2 is a subsidy.
Maximising WBIE1 and W
BIE
2 with respect to the national tax levels, delivers the
18In the example which we consider in Section 5, it will turn out that in equilibrium, t1 > 0.
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and the eect of t2 on outputs is similar












(1− ϕ)2 < 0.
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> 0 . (23)
Adding BCAs on exports aects the prot-shifting incentive of country 1 in market
2, which is the second term in the PSE in (20). On the one hand, if ϕ̂ < 1,
the prot-shifting incentive in market 2 is negative, and, hence would call for a
subsidy similar to the BI-regime. However, a higher t1 will now induce a smaller
increase in the market share of rm 2 in market 2, which, consequently, may
reduce the incentive to shift prots by means of a low tax t1. On the other hand,
if ϕ̂ > 1, the second term in the PSE becomes positive, and, hence, would call
for a tax. That is, the prot-shifting role works through exports rebates and rm
1 is overcompensated in its endeavour of competing in the foreign market.20 In
such cases, the overall PSE would be strictly positive, and, hence, would call for
a higher tax than under the BI-regime.
The impact of complementing taris with an optimal export rebate is not straight-
forward on the EDE because export rebates raise the emissions of the home rm.
We distinguish between two cases. First, if ϕ̂ < 1, a higher carbon tax in country
1 leads to a reduction in total emissions of the home rm. Hence, as usual, the
HEE is negative. If the rebate rate is suciently large, the positive eect of t1
on x22 is small so that it most likely to be oset by the negative eect of t1 on
x21, such that the total emissions of rm 2 decrease and the FEE is also negative.
Hence, we have ∂eBIE1 /∂t1 < 0 and ∂e
BIE
2 /∂t1 < 0, and the EDE could call for
a tax larger than the individual marginal damages, i.e., EDE1 > D
′
1 is possible.
In other words, adding export rebates may lead to an overinternalisation of indi-
vidual damages in country 1 in the absence of other eects. Second, if ϕ̂ > 1, a
higher carbon tax in country 1 always reduces total emissions of the foreign coun-
try, i.e., the FEE is strictly negative. However, if ϕ̂ is suciently large, the HEE
could become positive. That is, total emissions released by rm 1 could increase
in t1 due to a high export rebate. At the extreme, global emissions could even
increase in t1 such that the EDE is negative. Obviously, these eects support the
argument that adding export rebates may not address the environmental problem,
at least if they are chosen too high.
20Overcompensating rms is not uncommon. For example, Martin et al. (2014) show that
the free allocation of emission permits under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU-ETS) resulted in a sizeable overcompensation of emission-intensive industries.
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The structure of the optimal climate policy of country 2 does not change after
adding export rebates. However, as will be shown later, its equilibrium tax may
well change due to the change of the reaction function of country 1.
4.3.2 BCAs on Imports with Full Export Rebate (BF-regime)
The only dierence to the BIE-regime is that under the BF-regime the export
rebate is set to ϕ = 1, which is equivalent to a unilateral consumption-based
carbon policy. The output levels from the second stage are given by xBF11 =
xBF21 = f (t1, t1) = g (t1, t1) in market 1 and x
BF
12 = f (0, t2) and x
BF
22 = g (0, t2) in
market 2.
Maximising the welfare functions of country 1 and 2,WBF1 andW
BF
2 , with respect

























































< 0, EDE1 = γ D
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> 0 . (27)
Under the BF-regime, the tax of each country targets only at the consumers in
the home country. Hence, t1 has no eect on the consumers in country 2, which
raises the incentive of country 1 to subsidise its consumers, ∂CS2/∂t1 = 0. The
PSE in country 1 comprises now only one term, which would call for a tax to
raise the net prots of the home rm obtained in market 1, while the eect of
t1 on market 2 vanishes. Therefore, the prot-shifting incentive has disappeared.
In addition, country 1 completely controls the emissions released in the process
of supplying its home market 1, without being oset by larger emissions released
in the process of supplying market 2, either by its home or the foreign rm.
Therefore, ∂eBF1 /∂t1 = ∂e
BF
2 /∂t1 = p
′
1/J1 < 0. That is, the HEE and the FEE
are equal and strictly negative. As a result, under this regime, the EDE in country
1 would call for a tax equal to its marginal damages, EDE1 (BF ) = D
′
1.
Whether the optimal carbon tax of country 1 under this regime is equal to its
individual marginal damages, depends on the demand curve and the tax level of
country 2. It is clear from (24) that if the demand curve was linear (p
′′
1 = 0), and
if country 2 was passive (t2 = 0), full BCAs would restore the eectiveness of the
carbon tax of country 1, where its optimal tax becomes equal to its individual
marginal damages. However, if country 2 subsidises its production, t2 < 0, also
country will choose a tax below its marginal damage.
Proposition 3. A production-based carbon tax supplemented by full BCAs is de
facto a unilateral consumption-based tax, which corrects for both, the prot-shifting
and carbon leakage distortions. The environmental damage eect calls for a tax
equal to individual marginal damages in the environmentally more concerned coun-
try. The optimal tax level is positively correlated to the production-based carbon
tax of the environmentally less concerned country.
The optimal tax structure of country 2 is similar to the two previous BCA-regimes,
implying that the structure of the optimal climate policy of country 2 is similar
under the three BCA-regimes. However, the equilibrium tax level may neverthe-
less be dierent, depending on the reaction function of country 1 under the three
BCA-regimes, as will become apparent in Section 5.
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4.4 Bilateral Consumption-based Tax (CB-regime)
Finally, under the CB-regime, both countries impose a carbon tax on consumption,
irrespective of the location of production. Therefore, the equilibrium output levels
obtained from the second stage are xCB11 = x
CB
21 = f (t1, t1) = g (t1, t1) for the
supply of market 1 and xCB12 = x
CB
22 = f (t2, t2) = g (t2, t2) for the supply of
market 2. Let WCB1 and W
CB
2 be the welfare function of country 1 and country 2
under the CB-regime. (Details are provided in Appendix A.7.)
Maximising WCB1 and W
CB
















































< 0, EDE1 = γ D
′






























































< 0, EDE2 = (1 − γ)D
′


















< 0 . (31)
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Under the CB-regime, there are no consumer price spillovers and the CSE would
call for a subsidy which internalises the distortions stemming from underproduc-
tion eciently (Hauer et al., 2005). That is, the CSE under the CB-regime and
in the social optimum are the same (see (9), (28) and (30)).21 In addition, the
prot-shifting incentive in both countries is eliminated and the PSE is positive,
calling to tax producers. The rst term is the positive eect of a higher tax on the
net prots of the home rm supplying the home market. The second term reects
the incentive of each country to shift tax revenues, recalling that the tax base
under this regime is now x1i + x2i. Therefore, the competitiveness issue in both
countries is totally solved under the CB-tax, where both rms share each market
equally and prots of rms are equalised. Furthermore, the HEE and the FEE are
also equalised implying that the climate policy in each country is eective to fully
internalise own damages. That is, the EDE calls for consumption-based taxes
which are equal to individual marginal damages, EDEi (CB) = D
′
i ∀ i = 1, 2.
The optimal level of a consumption-based tax in these models depends on the
opposing incentives to care for consumers and producers. These in turn depend
on the demand curvature as shown in Proposition 1 in Hauer et al. (2005).
That is, if the demand curve is concave (convex), the incentive to tax producers
(subsidise consumers) dominates, while the two incentives cancel out each other
in the case of a linear demand curve.
Proposition 4. While bilateral production-based carbon taxes are always set below
individual marginal damages (t̂PBi < D
′
i), bilateral consumption-based carbon taxes
are set above (below) individual marginal damages if the demand curve is concave




i < (>) 0, and equal to individual marginal damages







Clearly, the dierence between a unilateral consumption-based tax in (24) under
the BF-regime and a bilateral consumption-based tax in (28) under the CB-regime
for country 1 is due to the eect of the foreign climate policy level t2, which are





To sum up, we showed in this section that a gradual shift from bilateral
production-based carbon tax, along a unilateral consumption-based carbon tax
to a bilateral consumption-based tax can partially or completely correct some
distortions aecting the choice of carbon taxes. This concerns in particular the
prot-shifting and carbon leakage eect. However, the incentives of governments
21The CSE in (9) is 2p
′
ixki, and the CSE1 in (28) is 2p
′
1xk1 given x11 = x21. Similarly, the
CSE1 in (30) is 2p
′
2xk2 given x12 = x22.
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to subsidise consumers increases along this line. Hence, it is not possible to com-
pare equilibrium carbon taxes at this level of generality. Therefore, in the next
section, we use specic functions in order to rank equilibrium taxes across regimes.
5 Comparison of Equilibrium Climate Policies
across Regimes
We assume a quadratic utility function ui (Xi) = aXi − 12X
2
i , and, consequently,
the inverse demand function for each country i is given by:
pi = a−Xi , ∀i = 1, 2 , (32)
where a > 0 is the chock-o price.





where d > 0 is a global damage parameter.
We provide all details of solving the two stages in Appendix B, including the
derivation of the range of feasible parameter values for interior solutions under
all regimes and the non-violation of WTO-rules under the three unilateral BCA-
regimes, which are summarised in Table A.1.
The comparison of equilibrium carbon taxes depends only on two parameter values
of the model; in particular, on the steepness of the global and individual marginal
damage function related to parameter d, and the degree of asymmetry of damages
among countries related to parameter γ.
Proposition 5. Ranking of Equilibrium Climate Policy Levels
1. For country 1:








1 ≤ (>) tBF∗1 if ϕ∗ ≤ (>) 1.




1 for all γ ≥ γ̊ = 0.73.
2. For country 2:








2 ≥ (<) tBF∗2 if ϕ∗ ≤ (>) 1.22
22We have tBIE∗2 = t
BF∗
2 = 0 if γ = 0.5 irrespective of ϕ
∗
77




2 if either γ > γ̈ ' 0.67 or if γ ≤ γ̈ and the damage
parameter d is suciently small, i.e., d < d̈ (γ).






i ∀ i = 1, 2.








i ∀ i = 1, 2 if the damage parameter d is
suciently low d < d̃ (γ) and countries are suciently asymmetric, i.e.,
γ ≥ γ̃ ' 0.77.
Proof. See Appendix B, including the precise denition of d̃ (γ) and d̈ (γ).
The rst result in (a) shows that the equilibrium carbon tax of country 1 increases
gradually from the bilateral production-based tax to the unilateral BCA-regimes.
If the equilibrium export rebate rate is less than a full rebate under the BIE-
regime, i.e., ϕ∗ < 1, the full export rebate under the BF-regime implies a larger
carbon tax level in country 1, i.e., tBIE∗1 < t
BF∗
1 , and, vice-versa, if ϕ
∗ > 1,
we have tBIE∗1 > t
BF∗
1 . As shown in Section 4, BCA measures reduce the rent
shifting incentive of country 1, which reduces the pressure on country 1 to adjust
its taxes downward. In addition, carbon leakage eect is mitigated, also reducing
the pressure on country 1 to set low taxes. Furthermore, carbon taris are a new
source of governmental income for country 1. Export rebates provide country 1
even with more control over carbon leakage, which explains that taxes under the
BIE- and BF-regime are higher than under the BI-regime.
It is important to note that the ranking of taxes of country 1 are only the eective
taxes rm 1 faces on its supply to country 1 under all regimes, i.e., t11 = t1 as
shown in Table 1. This is dierent for the eective tax rm 1 faces on its supply
to country 2, t12, under the BIE- and BF-regime, which depends on the rebate
rate. This is immediately evident under the BF-regime with a full rebate, ϕ = 1,





as tBIE∗1 > 0 and ϕ
∗ > 0 (see Appendix B.4), and, by denition, we have tBIE∗12 =
tBIE∗1 (1− ϕ∗).
It is also important to note that under the three BCA-regimes, t21 = t1 (see
Table 1) implying that eective carbon tax rm 2 faces on its supply to country
1 increases gradually under the three BCA-regimes. Therefore, by adding export
rebates, country 1 shifts the cost of reducing emissions from the home to the
foreign rm.
Whether in equilibrium the bilateral consumption-based tax (CB-regime) is lar-
ger than the partial or full unilateral consumption-based tax (BI-,BIE- and BF-
regime) in country 1 depends on the parameters of the model, as shown in the
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rst result in (b). If countries are suciently asymmetric, i.e., if γ > γ̊, the CB-
tax of country 1 is larger than under the BCA-regimes. This is even the case for
γ ∈ [0.61, 0.73], provided d is suciently small.23
The second result shows the strategic role of BCAs on the carbon policy level
of country 2. If countries are suciently asymmetric, i.e., γ > γ̈, country 2
sets a higher carbon tax under all BCA-regimes compared to the PB-regime. As
mentioned above, under the BCA-regimes, the eective tax rm 2 faces on its
supply to country 1 are those in country 1, t21 = t1 (see Table 1). From the






1 ≤ (>) tBF∗1 if ϕ∗ ≤ (>) 1. In
order to mitigate the negative eect of those taxes on rm 2, country 2 reacts by
matching higher taxes t1 with lower taxes t2, which are the eective taxes its rm
faces in its home market, i.e., t22 = t2 (see Table 1). Hence, the ranking in the
second result in (a) for the BCA-regimes is just the reverse of country 1. Thus,
import taris only are better suited to induce country 2 to implement a higher
carbon tax, whereas adding export rebates weakens this incentive. Therefore, our
results show that adding export rebates not only raises emissions of rm 1 from
exports, but also weakens the positive strategic eect induced by carbon taris
on the equilibrium climate policy of country 2. Again, this suggests to consider
export rebates cautiously. Interestingly, moving from a unilateral to a bilateral
consumption-based tax implies higher taxes in country 2.
The last two results in Proposition 5 show that the PB-taxes are always set be-
low the socially optimal tax and the CB-taxes in both countries. Although the
incentive to subsidise consumers is lower under the PB-regime than under the CB-
regime and in the social optimum, the absence of the prot-shifting eect and the
full internalisation of individual (under the CB-regime) and global (in the social
optimum) damages work in the opposite direction and are stronger. However, un-
der the BCA- and the CB-regime, taxes in both countries may exceed the socially
optimal tax level, though this is not generally the case. A sucient condition
for such a ranking as stated in Proposition 5 is that the individual and global
marginal damage functions are not very steep (i.e., the value of parameter d is
small) and countries are suciently asymmetric (i.e., the value of parameter γ is
suciently large). In such cases, the EDE is less important in the social optimum
compared to the CSE. Put dierently, if governments behave non-cooperatively,
the incentive to tax foreign production and/or to avoid carbon taris may lead to
a 'race to the top' in non-cooperative taxes.
23Note that if we assumed a linear damage function, the CB-tax would always be larger than
the taxes under the BCA-regimes in equilibrium.
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6 Conclusions
Non-cooperative climate policies which regulate emissions by imposing a price
of carbon through a production-based tax raises concerns about carbon leakage
eects and the loss of competitiveness of home industries. In strategic trade
models, it has been shown that these two concerns distort environmental policies
to be ineciently lax. In this paper, we analysed the eect of moving from a
bilateral production-based carbon tax to a bilateral consumption-based tax, by
considering in between partial and full unilateral consumption-based taxes, in the
form of border carbon adjustments on imports (taris) and exports (rebates), on
these distortions and equilibrium carbon taxes.
Apart from the social optimum, corresponding to fully cooperative regime, we
considered ve non-cooperative regimes. First, a bilateral production-based car-
bon tax, which is imposed by each government on its home rm (PB-regime).
We then assumed that country 1, which gives a higher weight to environmental
damages in our model, shifts gradually to a unilateral consumption-based tax us-
ing three forms of border carbon adjustments (BCAs), including carbon taris
on imports (BI-regime) and carbon taris supplemented by export rebates, where
the latter can be chosen optimally (BIE-regime) or chosen to be a full rebate (BF-
regime). Under all three BCA-regimes, country 2 continues to impose its carbon
tax on its home rm, choosing its tax optimally and strategically. Finally, we con-
sidered a bilateral consumption-based carbon tax (CB-regime). For each regime,
we solved a two-stage game in which two countries rst choose their carbon taxes,
and then rms choose their equilibrium outputs, competing in both markets in a
Nash-Cournot fashion.
We rst derived the general optimal tax structure for both countries. We showed
that BCA-measures, import taris and export rebates, could support more ambi-
tious non-cooperative climate policies through three eects: 1) the prot-shifting
incentives are reduced and/or eliminated, 2) carbon taris create a new incentive
for both governments to tax emissions and 3) carbon leakage become less sever
or even negative. We found that only BCAs on imports with a full export rebate
could restore the eectiveness of country 1's carbon tax by fully internalising its
own damages. However, there are two eects which point in the other direction.
Import taris increase the incentive in both countries to subsidise their consumers
as price spillover eects are reduced. Moreover, due to the strategic interaction
among countries, government 2 responds to export rebates by reducing its tax and
even choosing a subsidy level which, in equilibrium, could lead country 1 to set its
tax below individual marginal damages. Country 2, which faces BCA-measures,
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always chooses its tax below its marginal damages. Only a bilateral consumption-
based tax under the CB-regime implied that carbon taxes could be set equal or
even above individual marginal damages.
We then ranked equilibrium carbon taxes across dierent regimes. For this, we
had to assume specic functions. We found that the PB-taxes always fall short of
the socially optimal tax, while both governments could impose non-cooperative
carbon taxes under all other regimes including a bilateral consumption-based tax
above those in the social optimum. However, this is only the case if countries
are highly asymmetric in their perception of environmental damages and perceive
environmental damages to be generally low. More important, if countries are
suciently asymmetric, the three BCA-regimes implied that both countries set
their carbon tax at a higher level than under the PB-regime. Although adding
export rebates to import taris supports a higher carbon tax in country 1, though
the reverse is true for country 2, which questions the eectiveness of export rebates
for the internalisation of global damages.
Despite the fact that a bilateral consumption-based carbon tax eliminates both
the concern about a loss of competitiveness and carbon leakage, an agreement
is needed among countries to switch to this regime. However, this might face
a coordination problem, similar to switching from a non-cooperative to cooper-
ative carbon tax regime, which may face objections by the environmentally less
concerned government. Therefore, it might be expected that a shift to unilateral
consumption-based taxes through BCA-measures is more likely to come about in
the future. Furthermore, we showed that the strategic role of BCAs to support
a stricter non-cooperative policy level in country 2 is triggered by carbon taris,
whereas export rebates weaken this role.
Several extensions could be considered in future work. First, it might be inter-
esting to examine under which conditions the CB-regime constitutes a Pareto-
improvement to both governments compared to the PB-regime. Second, we con-
sidered in this paper the eect of dierent forms of BCAs on non-cooperative
carbon taxes. However, one could also examine the eect of these measures on
enforcing cooperation among countries. Third, we assume the location of rms
to be xed. Hence, we considered the eect of BCAs on one channel of carbon
leakage which is the relocation of production through trade. However, rms may
completely close down and relocate their production facilities abroad to countries
with less strict climate policies. Therefore, a possible extension is to allow for the
endogenous choice of the location of rms along the lines proposed by Markusen
et al. (1995) and Hoel (1997).
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Appendix
A General Functions
A.1 The Second Stage




























2 < 0 ,
which we assume to hold. Together with the condition imposed in the paper for




































2(x12 + x22)) > 0 for market 2.
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The above conditions ensure the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium
(Eichberger, 1993; Friedman, 1986) in the second stage. If those conditions hold
globally, they are also sucient for the Routh-Hurwitz stability condition to be
satised (Brander and Spencer, 1985).
A.2 Social Optimum
From the second stage, both rms face a uniform tax to supply each market, i.e.,
xS1i = x
S
2i = f (tS, tS) = g (tS, tS).




= p1 + x11p
′
1 − c− tS = 0 & ∂π21∂x21 = p1 + x21p
′
1 − c− tS = 0 .
In order to derive the eect of tS on equilibrium output of rms, we totally dif-


















dtS = 0 .













































































< 0 given x21 = x11 and J1 > 0.










The aggregate welfare function is given by:
W = u1 (X1)− p1X1 + u2 (X2)− p2X2 + Π1 + Π2 (A.1)
+ tS (x11 + x12) + tS (x22 + x21)−D1 (e)−D2 (e) .


















































































The national carbon tax has three eects on the prots of the home rm: a change
in production, a change in prices and a change of tax payments. The eect of
the tax on prices is through the domestic sales and imports. In the cooperative
solution, an increase in the socially optimal tax reduces both, the domestic and
the foreign production. From (4) and (5), (p1 − c− tS) = −xk1p
′
1 and, similarly,
(p2 − c− tS) = −xk2p
′
2. A reduction in domestic production and an increase in


























































, where e = X = X1 +X2
and ∂e
∂X
= 1, given that we normalise the emission output coecient to 1.
Since both rms produce the same amount, each rm divides its production for








Therefore, the rst-order condition derived from maximising (A.1) with respect







































= 0, which leads to equation
(9) in the text.
A.3 PB-regime
The rst-order conditions of prot-maximisation in (4) and (5) can be written as:
∂π11
∂x11
= p1 + x11p
′
1 − c− t1 = 0 & ∂π21∂x21 = p1 + x21p
′
1 − c− t2 = 0 ,
∂π12
∂x12
= p2 + x12p
′
2 − c− t1 = 0 & ∂π22∂x22 = p2 + x22p
′
2 − c− t2 = 0 .
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The eect of t1 on production levels are given by total dierentiation of the above


















dt1 = 0 .
From Appendix A.1 and by substituting ∂
2π11
∂x11∂t1
= −1 and ∂2π21
∂x21∂t1









































































































dt1 = 0 .
From Appendix A.1, and by substituting ∂
2π12
∂x12∂t1
= −1 and ∂2π22
∂x22∂t1























































































These are the eects of t1 on both markets as given in (11) in the text. The eect
of t2 on market 1 and 2 in (13) is obtained in a similar way.
The welfare function of each country is given by :
W PBi = ui (Xi)− piXi + Πk + ti (xk1 + xk2)−Di (e) . (A.3)
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as stated above, the































































. Again, from (A.5), we
have
(















, and, hence, the






















The rst-order conditions of prot-maximisation in (4) and (5) can be written as:
∂π11
∂x11
= p1 + x11p
′
1 − c− t1 = 0 & ∂π21∂x21 = p1 + x21p
′
1 − c− t1 = 0 ,
∂π12
∂x12
= p2 + x12p
′
2 − c− t1 = 0 & ∂π22∂x22 = p2 + x22p
′
2 − c− t2 = 0 .
The eect of t1 on market 1 follows from total dierentiation of the rst-order


















dt1 = 0 .






























































< 0, given x11 = x21 and









































The eect of t2 on market 1 is obviously zero.
The eect of t1 and t2 on market 2 is the same as under the PB-regime.
The welfare function of country 1 and 2 under this regime are given by:
WBI1 = u1 (X1)− p1X1 + Π1 + t1 (x11 + x12) + (t1 − t2)x21 −D1 (e) , (A.6)
WBI2 = u2 (X2)− p2X2 + Π2 + t2 (x22 + x21)−D2 (e) . (A.7)





































= 0 . (A.8)













































and solving for t1 gives the optimal carbon tax in (14) in the text. From the above

















































noting that x11 > x12 and t1 > t2 because t1 has a larger negative eect on x12






































+ x21 − (1− γ)D
′ ∂e
∂t2
= 0 . (A.9)



















































+ x22 + x21. Furthermore, from the above equation, it is clear that the











In models assuming imperfect competition, the equilibrium carbon tax can be
positive or negative. Therefore, the feasible values of the rebate rate depends
on the equilibrium policy in country 1 and 2. If t1 > 0, ϕ > 0 , and we have
0 < ϕ ≤ ϕ = t1−t2
t1
, where the maximum allowable rebate rate ϕ is ϕ ≤ 1 if
t1 > t2 ≥ 0, while ϕ > 1 if t2 < 0. However, if 0 > t1 > t2, ϕ < 0. In this case,
the feasible values for ϕ is 0 > ϕ ≥ ϕ = t1−t2
t1
. This can be illustrated as follows:
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The rst-order conditions of prot-maximisation in (4) and (5) can be written as:
∂π11
∂x11
= p1 + x11p
′
1 − c− t1 = 0 & ∂π21∂x21 = p1 + x21p
′
1 − c− t1 = 0 ,
∂π12
∂x12
= p2 + x12p
′
2 − c− t1(1− ϕ) = 0 & ∂π22∂x22 = p2 + x22p
′
2 − c− t2 = 0 .
The eect of t1 on market 1 and the eect of t2 on market 1 and market 2 are the
same as in the previous regime. The only change under this regime is the eect


















dt1 = 0 .
From Appendix A.1 and by substituting ∂
2π12
∂x12∂t1




































































































dϕ = 0 .
From Appendix A.1 and by substituting ∂
2π12
∂x12∂ϕ
= t1 and ∂
2π22
∂x22∂ϕ






























































































> 0 if t1 > 0< 0 if t1 < 0 .
Note that these eects can be explained in the case of a subsidy, i.e., t1 < 0,
as follows: if t1 < 0, ϕ < 0 and hence higher ϕ means a lower subsidy and the
exports of rm 1 decrease. The sign of the PSE1 and the EDE1 in (18) in the
text will just be reversed if t1 < 0.
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The welfare function of country 1 and 2 are given by :
WBIE1 = u1 (X1)−p1X1+Π1+t1 (x11 + x12)+(t1−t2)x21−ϕt1x12−D1 (e) , (A.10)
and
WBIE2 = u2 (X2)− p2X2 + Π2 + t2 (x22 + x21)−D2 (e) . (A.11)





































Solving the above rst-order condition for ϕ leads to the optimal export rebate rate












































We now derive the optimal taxes of countries.




























+ (1− ϕ) dx12
dt1
)











































































Solving the above condition for t1 leads to the optimal tax in (20), where the eect














− x11 − x12 + ϕx12.
The dierentiation with respect to country 2 is the same as in the previous regime
in (A.9), so the formula of the optimal tax in (22) is the same as in (16).
A.6 BF-regime
The rst-order conditions of prot-maximisation in (4) and (5) can be written as:
∂π11
∂x11
= p1 + x11p
′
1 − c− t1 = 0 & ∂π21∂x21 = p1 + x21p
′
1 − c− t1 = 0 ,
∂π12
∂x12
= p2 + x12p
′
2 − c = 0 & ∂π22∂x22 = p2 + x22p
′
2 − c− t2 = 0 .
The eect of t1 on market 1 and the eect of t2 on market 1 and market 2 are the


















dt1 = 0 .
From Appendix A.1 and by substituting ∂
2π12
∂x12∂t1
= 0 and ∂
2π22
∂x22∂t1




























































/J2 = 0 .
The welfare function of country 1 and 2 are given by:
WBF1 = u1 (X1)−p1X1 +Π1 +t1 (x11 + x12)+(t1−t2)x21−t1x12−D1 (e) , (A.13)
and
WBF2 = u2 (X2)− p2X2 + Π2 + t2 (x22 + x21)−D2 (e) . (A.14)





























= 0 . (A.15)
Solving this rst-order condition for t1 gives the optimal carbon tax of country 1



























































) + γD′ , which leads to the simplied
formula in (24), and under this regime the EDE1 = γD
′
as follows directly from
(A.15).
The rst-order condition of country 2 is the same as under the previous BCA-
regimes, and, hence, also the optimal tax structure.
A.7 CB-regime
The rst-order conditions of prot-maximisation in (4) and (5) can be written as:
∂π11
∂x11
= p1 + x11p
′
1 − c− t1 = 0 & ∂π21∂x21 = p1 + x21p
′
1 − c− t1 = 0 ,
∂π12
∂x12
= p2 + x12p
′
2 − c− t2 = 0 & ∂π22∂x22 = p2 + x22p
′
2 − c− t2 = 0 .
The eect of t1 on both markets are similar to the previous regime, hence the


















dt2 = 0 .
From Appendix A.1 and by substituting ∂
2π12
∂x12∂t2
= −1 and ∂2π22
∂x22∂t2


































































































The welfare function of each country under this regime is given by:
WCB1 = u1 (X1)− p1X1 + Π1 + t1 (x11 + x21)−D1 (e) , (A.16)
WCB2 = u2 (X2)− p2X2 + Π2 + t2 (x22 + x12)−D2 (e) . (A.17)
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+ x21 = 0 . (A.18)


























+ x12 = 0 . (A.19)
Solving the above rst-order condition for ti, gives the optimal CB-tax of country
1 and country 2 in (28) and (30), respectively. The simplied formula can be
obtained in the same manner as under the BF-regime in the previous appendix,











) disappears because country 2 does not tax its
exports under the CB-regime.
B Specic Functions
From the linear demand function in (32) in Section 5, we have p
′
i = −1 and p
′′
i = 0.
Hence, Ji = 3. For the damage function in (33), we have D′ = de.
The outcome of the second stage is given by:
x∗1i =
A− 2t1i + t2i
3
& x∗2i =
A− 2t2i + t1i
3
∀ i = 1, 2 , (A.20)
with A = a− c > 0, which we interpret as a market size, or, as a proxy of the net
benets of production and consumption.
In the rst stage, taking the above equilibrium output levels as a given, the































+ t2(x22 + x21)︸ ︷︷ ︸
TR2





Note that under the CB-regime, TRi = ti (x1i + x2i).
Countries choose their tax levels cooperatively (in the social optimum) or non-
cooperatively under the other regimes as explained in the text. The equilibrium
tax levels are then inserted in the equilibrium output levels in (A.20). The feasible
range for the parameters values is determined by two constraints: a non-negativity
(NN) constraint, which ensures positive production levels by both rms in the two
markets. This constraint implies that the damage parameter d is not too large,
i.e., d < d (γ). In addition, because we assume that BCA-measures are imposed
by country 1, a BCA-constraint is needed to ensure that t1 > t2 and t1(1−ϕ) ≥ t2.
The BCA-constraint implies that the damage parameter d is not too small, i.e.,
d > d (γ).
B.1. Social Optimum




Inserting equilibrium outputs into the aggregate welfare function W S = W1 +W2










(1 + 2d) < 0.





Consequently, x∗Ski = A/ (2 + 4d), where no NN-constraint is needed.
B.2. PB-regime











. Inserting outputs into (A.21)




























− 4A− 7t2 − t1
)
= 0.










































> 0, which ensures a unique and stable
equilibrium.
Solving the above two rst-order conditions simultaneously, the equilibrium PB-
taxes are given by:
tPB∗1 =




A (3d− 4γd− 1)
d+ 2
. (A.25)
Inserting these taxes into equilibrium outputs shows that the NN-constraint under
this regime is given by d < 1
2(2γ−1) if γ > 0.5 and no constraint is needed if γ = 0.5.
B.3. BI-regime












(see Table 1). By inserting outputs into (A.21) and (A.22), the


























− t1 − t2
)
= 0,








































> 0, which ensures a unique and stable
equilibrium.
Solving the rst-order conditions, equilibrium carbon taxes are given by:
tBI∗1 =
A (29γd+ 7d− 3)
36 + 2d (γ + 8)
, (A.26)
tBI∗2 =
A (43d− 79γd+ 3)
36 + 2d (γ + 8)
. (A.27)
It can be shown that the most restrictive NN-constraint requires d < 1
3γ−1 . Since
the dierence between the two national tax levels is ambiguous, we need to impose
a constraint on the parameters such that tBI∗1 > t
BI∗
2 , which requires the BCA-
constraint d > 1
6(3γ−1) .
B.4. BIE-regime



























(A+ 10t1 − 2t2) + 19ϕ











































− t1 + 13t1ϕ
)
− t1 − t2
)
= 0.
Solving the rst order conditions simultaneously, we have:
tBIE∗1 =
17Ad (γ + 1)
36 + d (5γ + 14)
> 0 , (A.28)
tBIE∗2 =
68Ad (1/2− γ)
36 + d (5γ + 14)
≤ 0 , (A.29)
ϕ∗ =
d (29− 37γ) + 9
17d (γ + 1)










































0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and d > 0.
Inserting equilibrium taxes into outputs, it turns out that the most restrictive
NN-constraint requires d < 6
19γ−8 . We also need to impose a BCA-constraint
such that tBIE∗1 (1− ϕ∗) ≥ tBIE∗2 or, equivalently, ϕ∗ ≤
tBIE∗1 −tBIE∗2
tBIE∗1
, which leads to
d ≥ 9
2(61γ−23) . ϕ
∗ > 0 follows directly for all d > 0 and γ ≤ 29
37
' 0.78, but is also
true for γ > 0.78 if d < 9
37γ−29 , which holds due to the NN-constraint. Hence,
ϕ∗ > 0 is always true.
B.5. BF-regime














































































> 0 ∀ γ ≤ 2.
98
Solving the rst-order conditions, equilibrium taxes are given by:
tBF∗1 =
−4Ad (γ + 1)
d (2γ − 4)− 9
> 0 , (A.31)
tBF∗2 =
8Ad (2γ − 1)
d (2γ − 4)− 9
≤ 0 . (A.32)
Inserting equilibrium taxes into outputs, it turns out that the most restrictive
NN-constraint requires d < 3
2γ





1 (1− ϕ) = 0 ≥ tBF∗2 always hold.
B.6. CB-regime





















































































Inserting equilibrium taxes into outputs, the NN-constraint requires d < 3
4γ−2 if
γ > 0.5 and if γ = 0.5 no constraint is required.
B.7. Ranges of Parameter Values
We summarise the conditions that satisfy the NN-constraint and the BCA-
constraint in the following table and restrict our feasible range of parameter values
to the most strict condition if we conduct a comparison across regimes.
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Table A.1: Feasible Range of the Parameters Values
Regime/Constraint NN-constraint BCA-constraint
Social Optimum / /
PB d < 1
2(2γ−1) /








BF d < 3
2γ
/
CB d < 3
4γ−2 /
Feasible Range d < d (γ) = 1
3γ−1 d ≥ d (γ) =
9
2(61γ−23)
B.8. Proof of Proposition 5
Using the equilibrium tax levels from (A.23) to (A.34) and the feasible ranges for
the parameter values from Table A.1, we conduct the following comparisons.
1. For country 1, (a) we have tBI∗1 > t
PB∗
1 for all γ ≤ 0.607 and if d <√
8016γ2−6624γ+1209+63−84γ
2(8γ2+33γ−23) for all γ > 0.607, where the NN-constraint is suf-
cient for this condition to hold. tBIE∗1 > t
BI∗
1 for all γ ≤ 2937 ≈ 0.783 and
if d < 9
37γ−29 for all γ > 0.783, where also this condition holds as long
as the NN-constraint holds. In addition, tBF∗1 > t
BI∗
1 for all d > 0. Fi-
nally, tBF∗1 ≥ tBIE∗1 if d ≥ 32(9γ−2) , which implies that ϕ
∗ ≤ 1. However, if
d < 3
2(9γ−2) , ϕ
∗ > 1, and we have tBIE∗1 > t
BF∗
1 .
(b) tCB∗1 > t
BF∗
1 if d <
3(2γ−1)
2(γ2−γ+1) , where the NN-constraint is sucient to
guarantee this condition for all γ ≥ γ̊ = 0.73 which leads to the rank-
ing in Proposition 5. Furthermore, tCB∗1 > t
BIE∗
1 for all γ ≥ 0.865 and if
d < − 3(31γ−17)
2(10γ2+11γ−17) for all γ < 0.865. However, also the NN-constraint is
sucient to guarantee this condition for all 0.66 ≤ γ < 0.865. In addi-
tion, this ranking also holds if γ ∈ [0.61, 0.73) if d < 3(2γ−1)
2(γ2−γ+1) . However, if
γ < 0.61, the tax under BCA-regimes may be larger than the CB-tax.
2. For country 2, (a) we have tBI∗2 > t
BIE∗
2 if d >
9




0.78, and if γ = 0.78, and if d < 9
37γ−29 for all γ > 0.78 which must hold due
to the NN-constraint. In addition, tBI∗2 > t
BF∗
2 is always true for all d > 0.




2 . We also have t
BF∗
2 ≥ tBIE∗2 if d ≤ 32(9γ−2) , which
implies that ϕ∗ ≥ 1. If d > 3
2(9γ−2) , i.e. ϕ
∗ < 1, we have tBIE∗2 > t
BF∗
2 . Note
that tBIE∗2 = t
BF∗
2 = 0 if γ = 0.5, irrespective of ϕ
∗.
In addition, tBI∗2 > t
CB∗





4(4γ2−51γ+11) , which violates the
BCA-constraint for all values of γ. Hence, we have tBI∗2 < t
CB∗
2 , which leads
to the ranking in (a).
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(b) Comparing the equilibrium tax level under the PB-regime with the BCA-
regimes leads to the following:
i. tBI∗2 > t
PB∗
2 if d < d̆ = −
√
3600γ−1200γ2+849−12γ−3
2(8γ2−21γ−5) . The NN-constraint is
sucient for this condition to hold for all γ > 0.57, while if d ≥ d̆ for all
γ ≤ 0.57, we have tBI∗2 ≤ tPB∗2 .
ii. tBIE∗2 > t
PB∗





2(20γ2−27γ−8) . This condition
must hold for all γ ≥ 0.66 as long the NN-constraint, i.e. d < d (γ), holds,
while we could have tBIE∗2 ≤ tPB∗2 if d ≥
...
d for all γ < 0.66.
ii. tBF∗2 > t
PB∗




4(4γ2−3γ+2) , where the NN-constraint,
d < d (γ), is sucient for this condition to hold for all γ > γ̈ = 0.673, while
if γ ≤ γ̈, we could have tBF∗2 ≤ tPB∗2 if d ≥ d̈.
We have d̆ >
...
d > d̈.
Therefore, we choose the most strict condition, i.e. d < d̈ as a sucient
condition for the ranking provided in Proposition 5.
3. t∗S > t
PB∗
1 if γ = 0.5 and if d < −
8γ−13
8(2γ−1) for all γ > 0.5. The NN-constraint
(either the most restrictive or the one under the PB-regime only) is sucient
for this condition to hold. Similarly, t∗S > t
PB∗
2 if γ = 0.5 and if d > −
5+8γ
16γ−8
for all γ > 0.5 which must hold as the right hand side term is negative and
d is a positive parameter.
tCB∗1 > t
PB∗
1 if d <
3
4γ−2 for all γ > 0.5. This is exactly the NN-constraint
under the CB-regime (see table A.1), and, hence, must hold. For γ = 0.5,
tPB∗1 < t
CB∗




2 if d > − 34γ−2 for all
γ > 0.5. which must hold as d is a positive parameter. Again, for γ = 0.5,
tCB∗2 > t
PB∗
2 is easily checked.
4. In order to obtain a sucient condition for the ranking in the fourth res-
ult in Proposition 5, we need to compare the lowest non-cooperative tax
level with the socially optimal tax. Since taxes of country 1 are always
larger than that of country 2 under all regimes, we will choose the low-
est tax level country 2 could set to compare with the socially optimal tax.
It turns out, that the most strict condition follows from: tBIE∗2 > t
∗
S if
d < d̃ (γ) =
√
17161γ2+58292γ−7676−131γ−62
8(73γ−20) . However, this condition violates
the BCA-constraint for all γ < γ̃ ≈ 0.77, while for γ ≥ γ̃, we need d < d̃ (γ),





1 as shown above.
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cing a fully cooperative agreement. We start from the assumption that mov-
ing from non-cooperative and non-uniform production-based carbon taxes
to a uniform socially optimal tax is not attractive to the environmentally
less concerned country. We then test whether the threat to impose BCA-
measures, in the form of import taris only or complemented by export
rebates, will enforce cooperation. We show that import taris are the least
distortionary policy instrument but the weakest punishment, and import
taris with a full export rebate is the most distortionary instrument if im-
plemented but the harshest punishment to enforce cooperation. In an es-
calating penalty game, we determine the subgame-perfect equilibrium path
in which threats must be deterrent but also credible. We show that BCA-
measures help to enforce cooperation and are welfare improving if they need
to be implemented. However, whenever full cooperation is be expected to
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1 Introduction
An eective solution to climate change requires cooperation among all countries
in reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. However, strong free-rider incentives
constitute a major stumbling block to reach a global agreement. Furthermore,
the eectiveness of unilateral actions by some environmentally friendly countries
is weakened by carbon leakage. One of the channels of carbon leakage is through
the relocation of the production of rms, in particular in emission-intensive trade-
exposed (EITE) industries, to countries with less strict climate policies. As a
result, rms operating in countries with a stricter climate policy lose market shares
in the domestic and international markets.
In order to both address carbon leakage and incentivise higher carbon taxes glob-
ally, border carbon adjustments (BCAs) have been proposed (Elliott et al., 2010;
Helm et al., 2012; Ismer and Neuho, 2007; Stiglitz, 2006). BCAs are trade meas-
ures complementing climate policies. These measures are imposed against less
regulated countries and may take the form of (i) BCAs on imports whereby a
carbon tari is levied on imports or (ii) BCAs on exports whereby a rebate is
given on exports or (iii) both BCAs on imports and exports which is sometimes
referred to as full BCAs.1
Trade measures to support environmental policies can be defended in theory, based
on economic eciency, as a second-best solution that corrects distortions resulting
from the failure of internalising damages of transboundary pollution (Copeland,
1996; Helm et al., 2012; Hoel, 1996; Markusen, 1975; Tsakiris et al., 2014; Yonez-
awa et al., 2012). In the absence of global action, e.g., Markusen (1975) shows
that, from a purely national perspective, the optimal combination of policies is a
Pigouvian tax on domestic production and a tari on imports. Even in a cooper-
ative setting, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) show that some forms of BCAs are
required to achieve global Pareto-eciency.
In this paper, we focus on the strategic role of BCAs in inuencing countries'
actions on climate change. In an intra-industry trade model, we are interested
to show whether and under which conditions an escalating sequence of BCA-
measures, including carbon taris and export rebates, could be successful in en-
forcing a fully cooperative agreement among two countries which dier in their
perception of environmental damages.
1Output-based rebating is a variant of this and is also sometimes suggested as an anti-leakage
measure which implies giving rebates on output produced domestically, regardless whether con-
sumed domestically or exported (Fischer and Fox, 2012).
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Our paper contributes to the game-theoretic studies in particular to the strategic
environmental-trade policy literature. We solve a three-stage game. In the rst
stage, we assume that countries decide whether to cooperate on mitigating global
emissions based on a multi-stage bargaining game. The environmentally more
concerned country takes the initiative, and uses a sequence of escalating threats
to enforce cooperation against the environmentally less concerned country. The
BCAs threats include not only carbon taris, but we also consider complementing
carbon taris with export rebates. The eect of adding export rebates on the
endogenous and strategic decision of countries and on global and individual welfare
as well as on global emissions is a prior not evident. Therefore, in this paper, we
extend the set up of BCAs on imports, which has been put forward by Eyland
and Zaccour (2012; 2014), and add BCAs on exports. We dierentiate between
two forms of export rebates: optimal and full rebates. Although it is always in the
best interest of environmentally concerned governments to impose carbon taris,
it is not always in their best interest to provide their exporting rms with a full
rebate as rebates cost tax payers money. In the second stage, governments choose
their climate policy levels under dierent tax regimes, and, in the third stage,
rms choose their equilibrium output levels.
We start our analysis with an initial situation in which two governments impose
non-cooperatively a production-based carbon tax on their producers (PB-regime).
We rst show that only if the individual evaluation of environmental damages in
the two countries is similar will both countries be better o under full cooperation
(FC-regime). If full cooperation cannot be achieved, we ask whether the environ-
mentally more concerned country can enforce the FC-regime through a sequence
of threats leading gradually to a unilateral consumption-based carbon tax. In an
escalating penalty game, we consider three threats which constitute various forms
of BCAs: (1) a carbon tari which fully adjusts the dierence between the two
national tax levels (BI-threat); (2) in addition to carbon taris, export rebates
where the rebate rate is chosen optimally and hence may not be a full rebate (BIE-
threat); (3) carbon taris are combined with a full export rebate which implies
de facto a unilateral consumption-based tax (BF-threat).
We show under which conditions a weaker punishment is sucient to establish
cooperation and under which conditions penalties need to be escalated. Moreover,
we derive conditions such that penalties are credible for the country which tries
to enforce cooperation. We show that BCAs can be global welfare distorting, but
only under those conditions when they help to enforce cooperation. The harsher a
BCA-threat and hence the more eective a BCA-threat is to enforce cooperation,
the more distortionary it would be if implemented compared to the FC-regime.
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We conrm the paradox of cooperation as derived already by Barrett (1994)
in our context with trade and BCAs, namely that whenever the global gains
from cooperation are expected to be rather signicant, BCAs are not sucient to
enforce cooperation.
A wide strand of literature focuses on assessing the eectiveness of BCA-measures
in mitigating carbon leakage and the competitive loss of EITE industries operat-
ing in countries which impose a carbon price (Babiker and Rutherford, 2005;
Böhringer et al., 2012a; Branger and Quirion, 2014; Fischer and Fox, 2012;
Winchester, 2011).2 Most of this literature employs partial or computable general
equilibrium (CGE) climate models and concludes that BCAs can eectively mit-
igate carbon leakage and reduce the output loss of EITE industries, yet they have
a small eect on reducing the global costs of mitigation. However, they provide
mixed evidence about the importance of adding export rebates to carbon taris
(Böhringer et al., 2012a; 2014; Branger and Quirion, 2014). Because of assuming
unilateral climate policies, these studies do not capture the impact of BCAs in a
strategic context. In addition, they assume an exogenous carbon price and hence
do not show how climate policy levels would change with BCAs.
This paper is related to three strands of literature, studying the strategic eects
of BCAs on the decisions of countries towards mitigating climate change. Broadly
speaking, analysing the impact of introducing BCA-measures can be modelled in
a two-stage game.3 In the rst stage, countries decide whether to join or comply
with a climate agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and in the second
stage they decide on their carbon policy level which we can typically think of as
a carbon tax.
The rst strand of the literature focuses on the rst stage of the game. This strand
analyses whether the threat of imposing BCAs is eective to enforce cooperation
or compliance with a climate agreement using CGE models (Böhringer et al., 2016;
Irfanoglu et al., 2015; Weitzel et al., 2012). For instance, Weitzel et al. (2012),
assuming a model of nine regions, analyse whether full BCAs (comprising both
carbon taris and export rebates) would allow a grand coalition which includes
all regions to be stable. They nd that BCAs may not be sucient to induce
countries such as China to cooperate. In contrast, Böhringer et al. (2016) consider
only carbon taris and show that China and Russia respond by cooperation.
2There are certain studies that focus on the legal issues of designing and implementing BCAs.
See for instance Cosbey et al. (2019) for a recent survey on this issue.
3Certain studies, including our paper, consider a three-stage game, where rms choose their
production levels in the third stage.
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Similarly, though considering three regions only, Irfanoglu et al. (2015) show that
imposing carbon taris by the United States could be a credible and eective
threat to enforce compliance of China with a climate agreement. Due to the
complicated nature of the CGE models, these studies consider an endogenous
choice of strategies only in the rst stage of the game. However, the carbon
tax in those countries imposing BCAs is assumed to be exogenous in the second
stage. In addition, the optimal response by countries which face BCAs in terms
of their policy choice is not modelled. That is, if countries decide not to join
the agreement, they remain inactive. Ignoring the optimal choice of carbon taxes
undermines some strategic aspects of BCAs.
In contrast to the rst strand, the studies in the second strand of the literature
focus only on the second stage of the game, i.e. on the endogenous choice of
carbon taxes (Eyland and Zaccour, 2012; 2014; Hecht and Peters, 2018; Sanctu-
ary, 2018). However, those studies assume a non-cooperative outcome in the rst
stage. Most of the studies in this strand are based on theoretical two-country par-
tial equilibrium models. Both Sanctuary (2018), assuming perfect competition,
and Eyland and Zaccour (2014), assuming imperfect competition, consider only
BCAs on imports which have shown to be eective in pushing both countries to
adjust their carbon tax upward. In contrast, Hecht and Peters (2018), assuming
also imperfect competition, nd that BCA-measures allow the country which im-
poses these measures to set a higher carbon tax, while the optimal response of the
other country is to adjust its tax downward. Their results hold for both BCAs
on imports and symmetric BCAs on imports and exports.4 Therefore, the results
related to the policy level of the country which faces BCAs is not clear-cut. Al-
though the political game-theoretic analysis of Helm et al. (2012) abstracts from
explicit micro-foundation, Helm et al. show that exporting countries on which
carbon taris are imposed would respond by taxing their exports rather than
remaining inactive or retaliating.
Our paper is closely related to the third strand of the literature which allows
the endogenous choice of strategies in both the rst and the second stage of the
game (Al Khourdajie and Finus, 2018; Anouliés, 2015; Baksi and Chaudhuri,
2017). These studies are based on theoretical models, in particular on strategic
imperfect-competition trade model. Al Khourdajie and Finus (2018) show in n-
symmetric coalition model that BCAs on imports is an eective measure to reach
larger stable climate agreements.5 Similarly, both Anouliés (2015) and Baksi and
4They assume that both measures are imposed at the same rate.
5Barrett (1997) also shows in n-symmetric country model that trade bans could lead to full
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Chaudhuri (2017) examine the role of BCAs on imports to enforce cooperation,
though between two asymmetric countries. Anouliés (2015) assumes that carbon
taris can be imposed only by the country which unilaterally complies with the co-
operative target. She nds that both countries defect from the agreement without
BCAs, while carbon taris guarantee the compliance of at least one country. For
an equal distribution of population between countries, she concludes that BCAs
may lead to full cooperation only if countries are nearly symmetric in their environ-
mental damage evaluation. In an innitely repeated game, Baksi and Chaudhuri
(2017) analyse the sustainability of cooperation between the North and South us-
ing trigger strategies. They conclude that if the North imposes carbon taris only
if the South defects from the agreement, BCAs will enhance cooperation if coun-
tries are not highly asymmetric in their marginal damages. However, if the North
defects and is allowed to implement carbon taris, BCAs will hinder cooperation
that could be achieved without BCAs. This suggests that BCAs should be imple-
mented only if cooperation cannot be established, a point which we consider in
our analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model. In Section 3, we solve for third stage, in Section 4 for the second stage and
in Section 5 for the rst stage of our three-stage game. In each stage, we derive
positive and normative conclusions. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses
possible future research.
2 Model
We consider two countries, respectively, their governments, i = 1, 2, which interact
in a strategic trade model. There are two rms, k = 1, 2, producing a homogeneous
emission-intensive good x which generates greenhouse gas emissions. Firm 1 is
located in country 1, and rm 2 is located in country 2. The two rms compete
in outputs, i.e., in a Cournot-fashion, and each rm supplies the home and the
foreign market. The inverse demand function in market i is given by:
pi(Xi) = a−Xi , ∀ i = 1, 2 , (1)
where pi is the market price in market i and parameter a > 0 is the chock-o
price. Total consumption in country i is Xi = x1i + x2i, where x1i and x2i are the
outputs supplied by rm 1 and 2 to market i, respectively.
cooperation, though trade bans are very dierent from BCAs.
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We solve a three-stage game by backward induction.
In the rst stage, countries decide whether to implement a cooperative or non-
cooperative climate policy. The cooperative policy corresponds to the implement-
ation of a socially optimal emission tax. The non-cooperative policy comprises
four possible regimes: a nationally implemented production-based tax as well
as three dierent designs of border carbon adjustment regimes (BCA-regimes).
This stage is modelled as a sequential bargaining game. Country 1, which is the
environmentally more concerned country in our model, proposes a cooperative
agreement. It uses a sequence of escalating penalties in order to force country 2
to accept its proposal. Those penalties correspond to various forms of unilateral
BCA-policies. The details are provided in Section 5.
In the second stage, governments simultaneously choose their climate policy levels
cooperatively or non-cooperatively under the dierent regimes. The analysis of
this stage comprises the slopes of best reply functions in the two countries, the
ranking of equilibrium tax levels as well as the comparison across regimes regarding
global and individual welfare levels.
In the third stage, rms simultaneously choose their output levels for both mar-
kets. Those outputs are a function of taxes in both countries, which dier across
regimes. The analysis of this stage comprises the relation between taxes and out-
put for the various markets, the relation of producer and consumer surplus in
the two countries as well as the eect of taxes on output and hence on global
emissions.
In the remainder of this section, we briey derive equilibrium output of rms in
the third stage as a function of what we call eective taxes. Then we explain the
various components of countries' welfare functions, relate those to the dierent
policy regimes and explain what it means for eective and equilibrium taxes.
The outcome of the third stage is a Nash equilibrium in output levels in each of
the two markets. We assume completely identical rms with a linear production
cost function, i.e., Cki(xki) = cxki with k = 1, 2 indicating the location of rm k
and i = 1, 2 the market for which the good is produced. Markets are segmented.
That is, rms make separate quantity decisions for both the home and the foreign
market. The prots of rms obtained in market 1 and market 2 are given by:
Market 1 : π11 = (p1(X1)− c− t11)x11 & π21 = (p1(X1)− c− t21)x21 , (2)
Market 2 : π12 = (p2(X2)− c− t12)x12 & π22 = (p2(X2)− c− t22)x22 , (3)
where t11 (t21) is the eective carbon tax which rm 1 (2) faces on its supply to
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market 1 and t12 (t22) is the eective carbon tax which rm 1 (2) faces on its
supply to market 2; X1 = x11 + x21 and X2 = x12 + x22. We assume a constant
emission-output ratio across rms, which we normalise to 1, such that an emission
tax is de facto an output tax.
The simultaneous maximisation of prots obtained in market 1 in (2) and market
2 in (3) by both rms gives the Nash equilibrium quantities supplied by rm 1
and 2:6
Market 1 : x∗11 =
A− 2t11 + t21
3
& x∗21 =
A− 2t21 + t11
3
, (4)
Market 2 : x∗12 =
A− 2t12 + t22
3
& x∗22 =
A− 2t22 + t12
3
, (5)
with A = a − c, which we interpret as a market size parameter. Accordingly,
prots of each rm k are given by the sum of prots obtained in market 1 and


















In the second stage, governments choose simultaneously the level of their carbon
tax ti based on the following welfare functions:
W1 = CS1 + PS1 + TR1 −D1(e) +BCAI1 −BCAE1 , (7)
W2 = CS2 + PS2 + TR2 −D2(e) , (8)
where CSi is the consumer surplus in country i, with the consumer surplus being
given by CSi =
X2i
2
which follows from (1), recalling that the total supply to
market i is given by Xi = x1i + x2i. PSi is the producer surplus, which is the
total prots of rm k based in country i, i.e., PSi = Π∗i , as given in equation (6).
TRi is the tax revenue of government i imposed on the production in its country,
where TRi = ti (xk1 + xk2).
Di are individual damages from global greenhouse gas emissions released in the
production of good x.Global damages from emissions areD (e), where e = X1+X2
as we normalise the emission-output coecient to 1. Hence, global emissions are
6The Nash equilibrium output levels always exist and are unique in each market. See Ap-
pendix A. Moreover, output levels need to be positive for equilibrium tax levels under the
various regimes. The sucient conditions are derived in Appendix A.
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equal to total production, which is equal to total consumption. That is,
D (e) = de, D1 = γD(e), D2 = (1− γ)D(e), γ ∈ [0.5, 1] , (9)
with d > 0 a damage parameter, reecting global marginal damages. We allow for
the possibility that countries perceive or evaluate global damages from emissions
dierently. We assume γ ∈ [0.5, 1]. That is, country 1 is at least as concerned as
country 2 about environmental damages and usually more whenever γ is strictly
larger than 0.5.
The other terms in the welfare function of country 1 in (7) are introduced in the
course of the subsequent discussion of the dierent policy regimes as they are
only relevant under the three non-cooperative BCA-regimes. The implications for
eective and equilibrium taxes are illustrated in Table 1.
If countries fully cooperate (FC-regime), they maximise W1 +W2 with respect to
a uniform tax t, ignoring the BCAI1 and BCAE1 term in (7). All eective taxes
are the same and the equilibrium tax is tFC∗, as shown in Table 1.
The cooperative regime is contrasted with four non-cooperative regimes in this
paper.
First, in the production-based regime (PB-regime), each government imposes a
carbon tax on the production of its home rm. Hence, the eective tax which
each rm faces in both markets is equal to the tax imposed by its home country
(see Table 1). We denote the corresponding equilibrium taxes by tPB∗1 and t
PB∗
2 .
As we will show later, tPB∗1 > t
PB∗
2 if γ > 0.5, i.e., the environmentally more
concerned country 1 imposes a higher production-based tax.
Table 1: Eective and Equilibrium Carbon Taxes under Cooperative and Non-
Cooperative Regimes
Eective Taxes FC PB BI BIE BF
Market 1
t11 t t1 t1 t1 t1
t21 t t2 t1 t1 t1
Market 2
t12 t t1 t1 t1(1− ϕ∗) 0
t22 t t2 t2 t2 t2
Equilibrium Taxes ∀ i = 1, 2 t = tFC∗ ti = tPB∗i ti = tBI∗i ti = tBIE∗i ti = tBF∗1
Second, in the border carbon adjustment on imports regime (BI-regime), addi-
tionally to a production-based tax, country 1 imposes a tari on imports from
country 2. Thus, rm 1 faces the eective tax t1 = t11 = t12 as under the PB-
regime, and also rm 2 faces t22 = t2 on its supply to country 2 as above but the
eective tax t21 on its export to country 1 is now given by t21 = t2 + ω(t1 − t2).
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Country 1 is only allowed to impose the tari provided t1 > t2 with ω the border
tax adjustment parameter on imports (Eyland and Zaccour, 2012). That is, under
the BI-regime, the term BCAI1 is included in country 1's welfare function with
BCAI1 = ω (t1 − t2) (x21) if t1 > t2, otherwise BCAI1 = 0. We assume henceforth
ω = 1 for two reasons. Any value of ω above 1 would be illegal under the rules
of the World Trade Organization (WTO).7 Additionally, given the opportunity of
using carbon taris, any value smaller than 1 would not be optimal for country
1.8 This assumption implies that both rms supplying market 1 face the same ef-
fective carbon tax. (see Table 1). Therefore, BCAs on imports always constitutes
full adjustment on imports. Equilibrium taxes, which follow from maximisation




Third, in the border carbon adjustments on imports and exports regime (BIE-
regime), country 1 complements its production-based tax and carbon tari on
imports with a rebate on its rm's exports to country 2. We assume that the ex-
port adjustment/rebate rate ϕ is chosen optimally by the government. Compared
to the BI-regime, the eective tax on exports of rm 1 to country 2, t12, is now
given by t12 = t1(1− ϕ), again, only if t1 > t2, with ϕ the border tax adjustment
parameter on exports, or, equivalently the export rebate rate.9 According to the
WTO-rule of non-discrimination, t1(1 − ϕ) ≥ t2 must hold. Generally speaking,
the optimal ϕ, which we denote by ϕ∗ can be positive or negative and can be
smaller or larger than 1. Later we clarify the range of ϕ∗. At this stage it suces
to point out that it is neither obvious that ϕ∗ is chosen such that t1(1− ϕ∗) = 0
(full rebate) nor such that t1(1 − ϕ∗) = t2 (full adjustment) because subsidising
exports is costly. Under the BIE-regime, the term BCAE1 is included in country
1's welfare function with BCAE1 = ϕ t1 x12 if t1 > t2 and t1(1 − ϕ) ≥ t2, other-
wise BCAE1 = 0. Equilibrium taxes follow from the individual maximisation of
welfare functions with respect to own taxes, leading to tBIE∗1 and t
BIE∗
2 .
Fourth, the border carbon adjustments on imports with full export rebate regime
(BF-regime) is similar to the BIE-regime, except that the rebate rate on exports
ϕ is not chosen optimally but set to one, i.e., ϕ= 1. Hence, rm 1 faces eective
tax t12 = 0 on its exports. Equilibrium taxes are given by tBF∗1 and t
BF∗
2 .
7The General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT) allows WTO members to apply a
border tax adjustment at a rate, which is not higher than the rate applied to domestically
produced "like" products.
8See Hecht and Peters (2018) and Weitzel et al. (2012). That is, if ω could be chosen
endogenously under the restriction ω ≤ 1, ω∗ = 1.
9Note that we cannot model BCAs on exports in the same way as on imports because country
2 does not tax rm 1. That is, we cannot assume for instance t12 = t1 − ϕ(t1 − t2).
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3 Third Stage
In this section, we have a closer look at the eect of taxes on equilibrium output
levels. These eects are straightforward in the fully cooperative regime with a
uniform tax. All output levels for each market are the same. Increasing taxes
gradually lowers all outputs uniformly, and decreases prots and consumer surplus,
also all uniformly. The benets are uniformly higher tax revenues and lower
damages, even though, country 1 benets more than country 2 from lower damages
as long as γ > 0.5.
In the non-cooperative policy regimes, taxes in country 1 and 2 will be dierent,
with t1 ≥ t2 and strict inequality if γ > 0.5. Also, the eects of taxes will be
dierent from those under the cooperative regime.
Proposition 1. The Eect of Non-Cooperative Taxes on Equilibrium
Production and Consumption
i. The production of rm 1 (rm 2) for market 1:
 decreases (increases) in the tax of country 1, while increases (decreases) in
the tax of country 2 under the PB-regime;
 decreases (decreases) in the tax of country 1 and is independent (independ-
ent) of the tax of country 2 under all BCA-regimes.
ii. The production of rm 1 (rm 2) for market 2:
 increases (decreases) in the tax of country 2 under all regimes;
 decreases (increases) in the tax of country 1 under the PB- and the BI-
regime, and under the BIE-regime if ϕ∗ < 1;
 increases (decreases) in the tax of country 1 under the BIE-regime if ϕ∗ > 1;
 is independent (independent) of the tax of country 1 under the BF-regime.
iii. The consumption in both markets:
 decreases in the tax of both countries under the PB-regime;
 Under all BCA-regimes:
 the consumption in market 1 decreases in the tax of country 1, while it
is independent of the tax of country 2;
114
 the consumption in market 2 always decreases in the carbon tax of coun-
try 2, decreases (increases) in the tax of country 1 if ϕ∗ < 1 (ϕ∗ > 1)
under the BIE-regime, and is independent of the tax of country 1 under
the BF-regime.
Proof. Follows from inserting the eective taxes in Table 1 into (4) and (5) and
dierentiating output with respect to tax levels.
Under the PB-regime, the standard eects as known from the literature hold: the
production of each rm decreases in its domestic tax level while it increases in
the foreign tax level. Consumption levels in both markets are negatively aected
by both taxes. Therefore, facing a higher carbon tax, rm 1 is less competitive in
both markets, though the consumer surplus is the same in both countries.
With an import tari, which is part of all three BCA-regimes (BI-, BIE- and BF-
regime), country 1 fully controls the output supplied to its country. Taxes on the
supply to country 1 are fully adjusted through import taris. Hence, all outputs
produced for market 1 (and hence also consumption in country 1) are negatively
aected by tax t1 and are independent of tax t2. Thus, prots in market 1 are the
same for both rms, though prots in market 2 are still lower for rm 1 than rm
2 (because t1 > t2 if γ > 0.5). It is also clear that consumers in country 1 enjoy a
lower consumer surplus because the supply to market 1 is lower than to country
2.
If a carbon tari is supplemented by an export rebate under the BIE- and BF-
regime, the output of rm 1 (rm 2) sold to market 2 is still negatively (posit-
ively) aected by the tax in country 1 if ϕ∗ < 1 (which is one possibility under
the BIE-regime) though to a lesser extent than under the PB- and BI-regime
and is unaected by the tax in country 1 if ϕ = 1 as under the BF-regime and
even increases (decreases) in t1 if ϕ∗ > 1 (which is another possibility under the
BIE-regime).10 The same relations are found for total consumption in market
2. However, regardless of the value of ϕ, rm 1's prots will be (weakly) lower
than rm 2's prots in market 2 because we always have: t1(1 − ϕ) ≥ t2. Thus,
export rebates will usually not level the playing eld in market 2, though it lowers
the dierence in prots between the two rms. Accordingly, also the dierence
in consumer surpluses in the two countries as observed under the BI-regime will
10Overcompensating rms is not uncommon. For example, Martin et al. (2014) show that
the free allocation of emission permits under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU-ETS) resulted in sizeable overcompensation of emission-intensive industries.
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remain, and in fact may be become even larger as exports to market 2 are sub-
sidised under the BIE- and BF-regime. Interestingly, under the BF-regime which
is de facto a unilateral consumption-based tax, the consumption in each market
is independent of the foreign country tax level.
Thus, moving from the PB-regime to the BI-regime, raises prots of rm 1 in
market 1, but disadvantages consumers in country 1. Moving from the BI-regime
to the two regimes with export rebates (BIE- and BF-regime), improves upon the
prots of rm 1 in market 2, but drives a further wedge between the consumer
surplus enjoyed in market 1 and 2. Of course, in order to understand how the
dierent regimes impact on the welfare levels of both countries, equilibrium tax
levels need to be considered, which is part of the second stage of the three stage
game and treated in Section 4. Moreover, taxes, taris and rebates do not only
aect producers and consumers, but also aect revenues of governments. Finally,
one motivation of BCAs is the possibility of reducing environmental damages. On
the way of clarifying this issue, we oer Proposition 2.









 The carbon tax of country 1 has the largest impact on reducing global emis-
sions under the BI-regime if ϕ∗ > 0:
i.
∣∣∣∂ePB∂t1 ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∂eBF∂t1 ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∂eBIE∂t1 ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∂eBI∂t1 ∣∣∣ < 0 if ϕ∗ ≤ 1,
ii.




≥ 0 if ϕ∗ ≥ 3.
 The carbon tax of country 2 has a lower impact on reducing global emis-
sions under the BCA-regimes than under the PB-regime:
∣∣∣∂eBF∂t2 ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∂eBIE∂t2 ∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∂eBI∂t2 ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∂ePB∂t2 ∣∣∣ < 0.
Proof. Follows from inserting the eective taxes in Table 1 into (4) and (5), and
dierentiating total output with respect to taxes, recalling that we assume a
constant emission-output ratio equal to 1.
Under the PB-regime, the climate policy of both governments has the same impact
on reducing global emissions. However, moving from the PB- to the BI-regime,
the climate policy in country 1 has a stronger impact on global emissions as it now
controls not only its domestic production but also imports. Adding export rebates
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may partially (if ϕ < 1) or completely (if ϕ = 1) oset the eect of carbon taris on
taxes in country 1 to reduce global emissions. In fact, for ϕ > 1, the eect of taxes
t1 in reducing global emissions is even lower than under the PB-regime. Hence,
complementing carbon taris with export rebates reduces the eectiveness of taxes
in country 1 in reducing global emissions. Moreover, BCA-measures generally
weakens the impact of climate policy in country 2 on global emissions. Thus,
in order to have the full picture how the dierent regimes impact on producers,
consumers, revenues and damages, and hence on the strategic interaction among
the two countries including leakage eects, we need to consider the second stage.
4 Second Stage
In the second stage, governments choose their climate policy level cooperatively
or non-cooperatively. In Appendix A, we derive equilibrium taxes under the full
cooperative regime (FC-regime) and the four non-cooperative regimes (PB-, BI-,
BIE- and BF-regime). We establish existence and uniqueness of equilibria and
also derive what we call non-negativity constraints (NN-constraints) and border
carbon adjustment constraints (BCA-constraints) that impose conditions on the
parameters of our model. NN-constraints are simply conditions such that all
output levels are positive and hence establish interior solutions. Typically, they
require β to be larger than some threshold say β̌ with β = A
d
and A = a − c.
We recall that A is a measure of the market size of our model, or, a proxy of
the net benets of production and consumption whereas d is the parameter that
evaluates damages. Hence, if d would be too large in relation to A, taxes would
imply negative outputs. BCA-constraints ensure that equilibrium taxes in country
1 are higher than in country 2. Such conditions can also be expressed in terms of β
to be smaller than some threshold say β̂(γ). Whenever we conduct a comparison
across regimes, we assume the most restrictive NN- and BCA-constraints to hold.
In Appendix A, we also derive reaction functions under the non-cooperative re-
gimes, which are illustrated in Figure 1. We refer to country 1's reaction function
as RF1 and that of country 2 as RF2. Figure 1 assumes particular parameter val-
ues, though the sign of the slope of the reaction functions (though not the slope
itself) would be the same for other parameter values.
In panel (a) in Figure 1, reaction functions under the PB-regime are shown. As
expected, reaction functions are downward sloping implying that taxes are stra-
tegic substitutes. In panel (b) and (c) reaction functions under the three BCA-
regimes are drawn. The reaction function of country 2, the country on which the
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(a) PB-regime (b) BI-regime
(c) BIE- and BF-regime
Figure 1: Reaction Functions of Countries under Non-cooperative Regimes
*The reaction functions are drawn for: A = 10, d = 3, and γ = 0.7.
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BCA-measures are unilaterally imposed, remains downward sloping. In contrast,
country 1' reaction function becomes upward sloping for all t1 > t2, which is the
region below the 45◦-line.
Under all BCA-regimes, not only country 1's but also country 2's reaction function
is a piecewise reaction function with a jump at the 45◦-line. For country 1, with
RF1 := t1(t2), increasing t2 gradually, there is a level of t̄2 for which matching
taxes, i.e., t1(t̄2) = t̄2, is a best response. At this point, and for any higher tax
t2, the reaction function jumps from the BCA-regime to the PB-regime as now
t1(t2) ≤ t2. A similar explanations applies to the reaction function of country 2,
RF2 := t2(t1) (see details in Appendix A.7).
Adding taris to the PB-regime, as done under the BI-regime, implies that car-
bon taxes become strategic complements for country 1. The intuition is as follows.
First, unlike under the PB-regime, a higher level of t2 has no eect on the con-
sumption in country 1. Second, the impact of t2 on global emissions become
smaller compared to the PB-regime (and the impact of t1 larger; see Proposition
2). Hence, a higher level of t2 is not sucient to reduce damages in country 1 and
hence country 1 responds by raising its tax. Third, carbon taris revenues create
a new incentive for country 1 to tax emissions. Recalling that tari revenues de-
pend on the dierence between the two tax levels, country 1 raises its tax level if
t2 increases in order to obtain higher tari revenues.
The reaction function of country 2, RF2, remains downward sloping, though it
becomes steeper under the BI-regime for t1 suciently large, i.e. below the 45◦-
line. For a given t1, country 2 has an incentive to raise its carbon tax level in order
to protect its tax revenues captured by country 1. However, an increase in t1 also
harms consumers in country 2. Moreover, it reduces the prots of rm 2 obtained
in market 1 as rm 2 faces t1 on its exports. The overall eect is that country 2
reduces its tax more strongly than under the PB-regime for any marginal increase
of t1.
The slope of country 1's reaction function RF1 is also upward sloping after comple-
menting carbon taris with export rebates under the BIE-and BF-regime. How-
ever, after adding export rebates, RF1 becomes atter in panel (c) than in panel
(b) and the slope decreases as ϕ increases in the t2-t1-space if ϕ is not suciently
high (i.e., ∂RF1/∂t2 becomes larger and increases in ϕ).11 For a marginal increase
of t2, country 1 has a larger incentive to raise its tax level with export rebates
which allows country 1 to address the competitive loss of its rm in market 2.
11See Appendix A.7.
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Moreover, facing less carbon leakage raises the eectiveness of country 1's carbon
tax, aiming at internalising its damages from global emissions. For country 2's
reaction function, export rebates make no dierence. The intersection of RF2
with the atter RF1 leads to a higher tax level in country 1 under the BIE- and
BF-regime compared to the BI-regime. However, because taxes are strategic sub-
stitutes for country 2, this country responds with a less stringent climate policy.
A higher level of t1 means lower prots of country 2' rm obtained in market 1.
Additionally, export rebates reduce the market share of rm 2 in its home market
in country 2. Hence, country 2 sets a lower tax t2 to protect the competitiveness
of its home rm in market 2.
We conclude the above discussion with Proposition 3, which ranks the Nash equi-
librium climate policy levels across the dierent regimes.
Proposition 3. Ranking of Equilibrium Carbon Taxes












 Under the BIE-regime, ϕ∗ > 0, and ϕ∗ ≤ (>)1 if β ≤ (>)β̈(γ) with β̈(γ)
increasing in γ and β = A
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 The eective taxes of country 1 in market 1 are the equilibrium taxes in







The eective taxes of country 1 in market 2 can be ranked, depending on the
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∗ ≤ (>)1, and iii. tBF∗12 < tPB∗12 < tBIE∗12 < tBI∗12 .
 The eective taxes of country 2 in market 2 are the equilibrium taxes in







Except for the PB-regime, the eective taxes of country 2 in market 1 are







 The socially optimal tax level is always larger than the non-cooperative taxes
under the PB-regime: tPB∗i < t
FC∗ ∀ i = 1, 2. However, under the BCA-
regimes, tFC∗ < tBI,BIE,BF∗i is possible for one or both countries if global
marginal damages d are relatively small to the market size A, and countries
are suciently asymmetric, i.e., γ is suciently large.
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Proof. See Appendix A.8.
Proposition 3 makes a distinction between equilibrium taxes and eective taxes.12
The reason is that rm 2 faces de facto not tax t2 but tax t1 on all exports to market
1 under all BCA-regimes. Moreover, rm 1 faces de facto not t1 but t1(1− ϕ) on
all exports to market 2 under the BIE- and BF-regime with ϕ = ϕ∗ > 0 as we
learn from Proposition 3 under the BIE-regime and ϕ = 1 by assumption in the
BF-regime. That is, the eective tax of country 1 levied on its rm on exports is
lower than the equilibrium tax.
Proposition 3 clearly shows that country 1 chooses higher equilibrium taxes if
BCA-measures are available. BCA-measures improve the competitiveness of its
rm. Moreover, it controls a larger share of global emissions. That is, country
1 can better address carbon leakage, and, hence, country 1 is more eective in
internalising its environmental damages. Additionally, taris provide a source for
revenues.
The eective tax of country 1 in market 1 is higher under the BIE- and BF-
regime than under the BI-regime, but in market 2 this is reversed. Thus, country
1 compensates higher eective taxes in market 1 with lower eective taxes in
market 2 if export rebates are available. Since the eective tax of country 1 in
market 2 is zero under the BF-regime, i.e., tBF∗12 = 0, it is possible that it is even
lower than under the PB-regime, tBF∗12 < t
PB∗
12 .
The ranking of the eective taxes of country 1 in market 2 under the BIE- and
BF-regime simply depends on whether ϕ∗ is larger or smaller than 1 under the
BIE-regime, where we recall that ϕ = 1 under the BF-regime. As Proposition
3 suggests, if damages are suciently large compared to the net benets from
production and consumption, i.e., β is suciently small (β < β̈(γ)), ϕ∗ will be
smaller than 1. Apart from balancing net benets and damages when choosing
ϕ∗, export rebates are costly to country 1.
Country 2 also chooses higher taxes under the BCA-regimes, suggesting that BCAs
help to reduce global emissions. Of course, the eective taxes in market 1 are those
of country 1, but even eective taxes in market 2 are higher under the BCA-
regimes than under the PB-regime. Export rebates reduce the push on country 2
to adjust its taxes upward compared to import taris only, as country 2 tries to
protect the competitiveness of its rm in its home market.
12The fact that equilibrium taxes under the BIE- and BF-regime are equal is a result of our
assumption of a linear damage function.
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Finally, full cooperation among countries always leads to setting a higher carbon
tax than under no cooperation without BCAs. However, since BCAs create in-
centives for both countries towards setting higher taxes, equilibrium taxes may
even be higher than under full cooperation. Important for the understanding of
this result is that the socially optimal tax is not equal to global marginal damages
due to imperfect competition (this result is well-known in the literature, see, e.g.
Barnett (1980); Kennedy (1994) and Duval and Hamilton (2002)). A sucient
condition for both governments to set higher taxes under the BCA-regimes than
in the social optimum is when global marginal damages d are low compared to
the net benets from production and consumption A and countries are suciently
asymmetric, i.e., γ is suciently large.13 In such cases, socially optimal taxes will
be low but BCAs still provide an opportunity to protect markets, increase tari
revenues and protect tax revenues.
It is obvious from the above results that global emission levels generally decrease
with BCAs compared to the PB-regime. However, the eect of adding export
rebates to carbon taris is a priori ambiguous. The following Proposition ranks
the global emission levels across the BCA-regimes.
Proposition 4. Ranking of Equilibrium Global Emissions
 BCA-regimes vs PB-regime: eBI,BIE,BF∗ < ePB∗.
 Across the BCA-regimes:
 eBI∗ < eBIE∗ and eBI∗ ≷ eBF∗;
 eBIE∗ ≤ (>)eBF∗ if ϕ∗ ≤ (>)1.
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
Despite export rebates support the climate policy of country 1, larger supply by
rm 1 in market 2 leads to higher global emissions under the BIE-regime com-
pared to the BI-regime. This result conrms the main argument against export
rebates. They are less eective in reducing global emissions. An exception is
when the relative importance of global marginal damage d is low compared to the
net benets from production and consumption A and if countries are suciently
asymmetric (see Appendix A.9). In such cases, a lower consumption level in coun-
try 1, driven by a higher carbon tax under the BF- than BI-regime, compensates
13More precisely, it can be shown that if β > (5 + 8γ)∀ γ > 0.72, taxes of both countries
under all BCA-regimes are higher than in the social optimum. For a qualitatively similar result,
see Baksi and Chaudhuri (2017) for the case of carbon taris though under dierent conditions.
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for the eect of adding export rebates. As expected, the relation between global
emissions under the BIE and BF-regime depends on the optimal value of ϕ∗.
Although studying the eects of BCAs on global emissions is important, given that
these measures have been proposed for environmental reasons, it is also important
to investigate the impacts of these measures on welfare. From a normative point
of view, it is important because BCAs do not only aect environmental damages,
but also production and consumption. Moreover, in order to understand the
incentive of countries if implementing a cooperative climate policy, the eects on
individual countries also are important. Given that BCAs are unilateral measures,
one intuitively expects that eects for the two countries are dierent, and, may
even go in opposite direction (e.g., Babiker and Rutherford 2005, Böhringer et al.
2012b and Mattoo et al. 2009). Hence, if there are winners and losers, BCAs may
lead to an ambiguous eect on global welfare.
Proposition 5. Ranking of Equilibrium Global Welfare
Let W ∗ = W ∗1 +W
∗
2 be equilibrium global welfare and recall β =
A
d
and A = a− c.
1) FC-regime vs PB-regime:




2 ≥ (<)W PB∗2 if γ ≤ (>)γ = 4164 w 0.64.
Let ∆W = W FC∗ −W PB∗, then ∆W decreases in β.
2) BCA-regimes vs PB-regime:
 WBI∗ > W PB∗ except if β > βBI
W
(γ) ∀γ > γ1.
 WBIE∗ > W PB∗ except if β > βBIE
W
(γ) ∀γ > γ2.
 WBF∗ > W PB∗ except if β > βBF
W







and γ1 > γ2 > γ3.
 Compared to the PB-regime, country 1 is better o under all BCA-regimes
and country 2 is better o if γ is suciently small and worse o if γ is
suciently large.
3) Across the BCA-regimes:
 WBI∗ > WBIE∗ and WBI∗ > WBF∗.
 WBIE∗ ≥ (<)WBF∗ if ϕ∗ ≤ (>) 1.
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Proof. See Appendix A.10.
Regarding the rst part of Proposition 5, axiomatically, global welfare in the social
optimum is strictly larger than under any other regime. Given our assumption
of γ ∈ [0.5, 1], it is not surprising that if γ is larger than some threshold, i.e. if
the damage evaluation in country 2, (1 − γ), is not suciently high, country 2
would be worse o under full cooperation compared to the PB-regime. In Section
5, we take this as dening feature why cooperation is dicult to implement, i.e.,
we assume γ > γ as the starting point of our analysis. At this point, it suces to
demonstrate that moving from a non-cooperative production-based tax to a fully
cooperative production-based tax, the potential global gain from cooperation ∆W
decreases in β. That is, full cooperation would matter if the damage parameter
d is large compared to the net benets from the production and consumption
parameter A.
The second part of Proposition 5 highlights that global welfare generally increases
if country 1 imposes BCA-measures compared to the PB-scenario, though there
are exceptions. As country 1 is always better o with the implementation of BCA-
measures than in the PB-regime, those exceptions occur if country 2 is worse o
under the BCA- than PB-regime. Country 2 is always worse o if its damage
evaluation is low, i.e., γ is high, as it benets very little from the reduction of
global emissions under the BCA-regimes in the form of reduced damages. For
intermediate values of γ, country 2 is also worse o if β is suciently large, as
the reduction of damages cannot compensate for the loss of the net benets from
production and consumption. Only for very low values of γ and hence countries
are nearly symmetric, will also country 2 be better o under the BCA- than
PB-regime. (For details, see Appendix A.10). All together, BCAs increase global
welfare compared to the PB-regime if β is not too large, i.e., under those conditions
when the potential gains from full cooperation are not very small.






and γ1 > γ2 > γ3 in the second
part and the third part of Proposition 5 suggests that the implementation of the
BI-regime causes less global welfare distortions than the two BCA-regimes with
export rebates. Moreover, as long as ϕ∗ < 1, the BIE-regime causes less distor-
tions than the BF-regime with a full rebate.14 Thus, when enforcing cooperation
through a threat of escalating penalties, one should proceed along the sequence
BI-, BIE- and BF-regime in order to minimise the distortions in case those threats
14Even if ϕ∗ > 1, we may have a situation where WBIE∗ > WBF∗ as shown in Appendix
A.10.
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need to be implemented, an idea that we take up in Section 5.
5 First Stage
5.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we solve the rst stage of the game. We ask the question under
which conditions BCAs can enforce full cooperation and under which conditions
this is not possible. We derive the equilibrium path of an escalating penalty game
in subsection 5.2, and evaluate equilibria from a global welfare perspective in
subsection 5.3.
The escalating game we have in mind is a sequential game with multiple stages
as shown in Figure 2. In each stage, country 1 moves rst and then country 2. In
order to render the analysis interesting, we make the following assumption.
Assumption:
Country 2 has no incentive to fully cooperate if the alternative is the PB-regime.
That is, γ > γ with γ as dened in Proposition 5.
That is, in stage 0, the proposal cooperation by country 1 is not accepted by
country 2. Recall that country 1 is always better o under full cooperation than
the PB-regime (see Proposition 5). Hence, the equilibrium path in stage 0 is the
bold highlighted branch which directly leads to stage I. That is, the interesting
part of the game starts in stage I.
In stage I, the escalating penalty game starts. Country 1 threats with implement-
ing import taris under the BI-regime if country 2 does not accept cooperation.
If country 2 accepts, the game ends in node 4 in Figure 2. If country 2 declines,
the game proceeds to stage II.
In stage II, country 1 can implement its threat, i.e. the BI-regime, and the game
ends at node 5, or, can instead escalate the threat which is the threat to implement
the BIE-regime with the aim to enforce cooperation. Country 2 can either give in
to the BIE-threat and cooperate in which case we end up in node 6 or it refuses
and the game proceeds to stage III.
In stage III, country 1 either implements the BIE-threat and the game terminates
at node 7 or escalates the threat to the BF-threat. If country 2 gives in,
cooperation is established at node 8. If country 2 still refuses, country 1 will
implement the BF-threat and the game ends at node 9. Alternatively, country 1
125
will implement its most preferred BCA-regime, which, as we will show later, will
depend on the parameters of the model.
Figure 2: Escalating Penalty Game
As will be evident from the analysis below, there is a unique equilibrium path for
each possible parameter range in our model. The sequence depicted in Figure 2 is
motivated by our analysis in Section 4, in particular Proposition 5. The enforce-
ment game starts with the least distortionary threat should it be implemented
and only escalates the threat should this prove necessary, i.e., country 2 does not
accept cooperation. In Appendix B.4, we show that the same equilibrium out-
comes would emerge in a one-stage game in which country 1 chooses its action
rst and country 2 subsequently, though there exist parameter ranges for which
the equilibrium is not unique. We solve both games by backward induction in
order to derive the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
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5.2 The Equilibrium Escalating Penalty Path
For the analysis of the equilibrium path, two features are central. The rst feature
relates to escalating penalties. We ask the question under which conditions will
country 2 accept cooperation for a particular threat and under which conditions
will it refuse to cooperate. The second feature is the credibility of threats. We
ask the question whether and under which conditions country 1 has an incentive
to escalate penalties. The rst question is answered in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The Eect of BCAs on the Incentive of Country 2 to Co-
operate
i. Under the threat of BCAs with taris on imports (BI-threat), country 2 is
willing to cooperate if β ≥ β1 (γ).
ii. Under the threat of BCAs with a tari on imports and an optimal export rebate
(BIE-threat), country 2 is willing to cooperate if β ≥ β2 (γ).
iii. Under the threat of BCAs with a tari on imports and a full export rebate
(BF-threat), country 2 is willing to cooperate if β ≥ β3 (γ).
We have: β1 (γ) > β2 (γ) > β3 (γ) with β = Ad .
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Lemma 1 is illustrated in Figure 3. On the vertical axis we have parameter β and
on the horizontal axis parameter γ. The upward sloping straight line 'BCA-C' is
the BCA-constraint, implying that only values below this line satisfy the BCA-
constraint. The upward sloping straight line 'NN-C', starting at γ ≈ γ = 0.64,
is the non-negativity constraint, implying that only parameter values above this
line satisfy this condition.
The black area denoted by PB implies that country 2 would cooperate if faced
with the alternative of the PB-regime. We know this would only happen if γ ≤ γ,
which we have ruled out by assumption. The blue area denoted by BI is the
parameter range in which the BI-threat enforces cooperation, i.e., condition i
holds in Lemma 1. The green area denoted by BIE is the additional parameter
space that can enforce cooperation with the BIE-threat. That is, condition ii in
Lemma 1 holds in the green and blue area and hence comprises a larger parameter
space. The red area is the additional parameter space in which the BF-threat is
successful to establish cooperation. Hence, condition iii in Lemma 1 comprises the
red, green and blue area. Finally, the grey area is the parameter space in which
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condition iii in Lemma 1 does not hold. Thus, Lemma 1 conrms the logic that
escalation proceeds along the BI-, BIE- and BF-threat.
Unlike the PB-regime, the decision of country 2 to cooperate if faces the BCA-
threats depends on both β and γ. BCAs are successful in enforcing cooperation of
country 2 if damages are not suciently high compared to the net benets from
production and consumption, i.e., if β (γ) is not suciently small. In addition, as
is clearly shown in Figure 3, the dierence between the three thresholds, β1 (γ),
β2 (γ) and β3 (γ) decreases as γ increases, implying that escalating BCA-threats
through adding export rebates becomes less eective when countries are highly
asymmetric. Taken together, if β (γ) is suciently large, country 2 may accept
cooperation if the alternative is any of the BCA-regimes, irrespective of its
evaluation of damages. Whereas if β (γ) is not too large, country 2 is more
likely to accept cooperation only if the alternative is the BIE- or BF-regime if its
damage evaluation (1− γ) is high.
Figure 3: The Eect of BCAs on the Incentive of the Environmentally Less Con-
cerned Country to Cooperate
*BCA-C and NN-C are the BCA-constraint and the non-negativity constraint, respectively.
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The second issue that we need to address is the credibility of threats, which takes
a look at welfare of country 1. That is, in stage I, country 1 must be better o
under full cooperation than under the PB-regime in order for the BI-threat to be
credible. With reference to Figure 2, country 1's welfare at node 4 must be higher
than at node 3, otherwise country 1 would not threaten with the implementation
of the BI-regime. As we know from Proposition 5, country 1 is always better o
under full cooperation than under the PB-regime. This piece of information which
is repeated for convenience is condition i in Lemma 2 below.
Similarly, suppose the BI-threat is not successful to establish cooperation. Coun-
try 1 will use the BIE-threat but only if it is better o under full cooperation than
under the BI-regime. That is, country 1's welfare must be higher at node 6 than
node 5. This is condition ii in Lemma 2 below.
Moreover, country 1 should be better o under full cooperation than under the
BIE-regime for the BF-threat to be credible. Hence, country 1's welfare at node
8 must be higher than at node 7. This is condition iii in Lemma 2 below. Fi-
nally, should country 1 not be successful with the BF-threat, it must be better
o implementing any of the BCA-threats than under the PB-regime, which we
know is true from Proposition 5. Again, this piece of information is repeated for
convenience in condition iv in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. The Credibility of BCA-threats by Country 1
i. Credibility of BI-threat: country 1 is better o under full cooperation than under
the PB-regime.
ii. Credibility of BIE-threat: country 1 is better o under full cooperation than
under the BI-regime if β ≤ β1 (γ).
iii. Credibility of BF-threat: country 1 is better o under full cooperation than
under the BIE-regime if β ≤ β2 (γ).
We have: β1 (γ) > β2 (γ).
iv. Country 1 is better o under all three BCA-regimes than under the PB-regime.
Proof. See Appendix B.2 and Proposition 5.
In contrast to country 2, country 1 is better o under full cooperation than under
the BCA-regimes if damages are suciently high relative to the net benets from
production and consumption, i.e. if β is not too large. Moreover, Lemma 2 shows
that country 1 would have less incentive to fully cooperate if it is equipped with
both carbon taris and export rebates compared to carbon taris only. Note
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also that the two thresholds β1 (γ) and β2 (γ) under which country 1 prefers full
cooperation over the BI- and the BIE-regime increase in γ, i.e. in its individual
marginal damages.
Finally, we need to combine Lemma 1 and 2 in order to determine the equilibrium
path. For instance, in stage III in Figure 2, we note from Lemma 1 that we
only proceeded to stage III because β < β2 (γ). That is, previous attempts to
enforce cooperation have failed. Suppose, the BF-threat is successful in stage III,
i.e., β ≥ β3 (γ). Hence, we have together β2 (γ) > β ≥ β3 (γ). From Lemma 2,
condition iii, we know that the credibility of the BF-threat requires β ≤ β2 (γ).
Now since we can show that β2(γ) < β2(γ), cooperation is an equilibrium path if
β2(γ) > β ≥ β3(γ). That is, if the enforcement condition of Lemma 1 for stage
III holds, the corresponding credibility condition in stage III holds as well. The
same procedure is applied to stage I and II with similar conclusions which are
summarised in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the Escalating
Penalty Game
1) Stability Region
 If β ≥ β1(γ): full cooperation is achieved along the path:
Cooperation→No Cooperation→BI→Cooperation, and the game ends in
stage I at node 4 in Figure 2.
 If β1(γ) > β ≥ β2(γ): full cooperation is achieved along the path:
Cooperation → No Cooperation → BI →No Cooperation →BIE → Cooper-
ation, and the game ends in stage II at node 6 in Figure 2.
 If β2(γ) > β ≥ β3(γ): full cooperation is achieved along the path:
Cooperation→ No Cooperation → BI →No Cooperation→BIE →No
Cooperation→BF→Cooperation, and the game ends in stage III at node 8
in Figure 2.
2) Instability Region
 If β3(γ) > β, either the BF-regime is implemented following the BF-threat
or if country 1 implements its most preferred BCA regime, then either (a)
or (b) below:
(a) If β3(γ) > β > 2γ, there is no cooperation and the BIE-regime is
implemented with an export rebate which is not a full rebate (ϕ∗ < 1):
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Cooperation→No Cooperation→BI→No Cooperation→BIE, and the game
ends in stage III at node 7 in Figure 2.
(b) If 2γ ≥ β, there is no cooperation and the BI-regime is implemented:
Cooperation→No Cooperation→BI, and the game ends in stage II at node
5 in Figure 2.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
In the stability region, full cooperation is established based on the threat by
country 1 to impose BCA-measures. Hence, there are three paths to reach full
cooperation. If β ≥ β1(γ), country 2 cooperates as a reaction to the BI-threat.
If β1(γ) > β ≥ β2(γ), the BIE-threat works and if β2(γ) > β ≥ β3(γ) only the
BF-threat works. Since the potential gains from cooperation decrease in β as we
know from Proposition 5, this implies that if the potential gains from cooperation
would be large, only harsh punishment works if at all but fails for β3(γ) > β.
For β3(γ) > β, although country 1 would be better o under full cooperation
than any of the BCA-regimes, none of these threats are successful to enforce full
cooperation. Hence, country 1 decides which BCA-measure to implement. The
instability region is divided into two sub-regions, in which either the BIE-regime
or the BI-regime is implemented, depending on the parameter range, or instead,
the BF-regime if one argues that the last threat must be implemented. In any
case, the three BCA-regimes are preferred to the PB-regime by country 1.
If we considered an alternative penalty game with only one stage in which country
1 moves rst and can choose among the three BCA-threats right from the begin-
ning as discussed in Appendix B.4, we nd that full cooperation is the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium following a BF-threat for β2(γ) > β ≥ β3(γ). However,
for β1(γ) > β ≥ β2(γ), we have two subgame-perfect equilibria following a BIE-
and BF-threat and for β ≥ β1(γ), we have three subgame-perfect equilibria fol-
lowing a BI-, BIE- and BF-threat. Hence, our escalating penalty game in Figure 2
may be considered as an equilibrium renement to the game in B.4 with a unique
equilibrium for each parameter range.
5.3 Normative Analysis of the Cooperation Stage
In this subsection, we briey evaluate our results from a normative perspective.
We showed in Proposition 5 that BCAs, under some conditions, would cause
a global welfare loss compared to the non-cooperative PB-regime. Hence, it is
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important to understand whether the implementation of BCAs threats if they
were not successful causes a global welfare loss compared to the PB-regime.
Corollary 1. Compared to the PB-regime, if BCAs are associated with a global
welfare loss, they are used only as threats and are not implemented (stability re-
gions), while if they are implemented they improve global welfare (instability re-
gion).
Proof. Follows from comparing the threshold levels for which BCAs lead to a
global welfare loss in Proposition 5 with the threshold levels for which full cooper-
ation is achieved in Proposition 6 where βBF
W
> β1 ∀ γ.
Thus, the negative impact of BCA-measures on global welfare are avoided due to
its strategic role to enforce cooperation. However, if they need to be implemented,
they lead to higher global welfare. That is, we nd that all parameter values for
which BCAs lead to a global welfare loss fall in the stability region. However, it
is also worthwhile to recall that country 1 has no incentive to implement BCA-
measures along any equilibrium path in the stability region because cooperation
is preferred to BCA-measures.
Another observation which we made above in Proposition 5 was that the potential
gains from cooperation, ∆W = W FC∗−W PB∗ would be large if β was small. From
Proposition 6 we know that if β is suciently small, i.e., β3(γ) > β, none of the
BCA-regimes enforce cooperation. Combining both results, we ask the question
to which extent do BCAs when implemented in the instability region close the
gap ∆W . In order to answer this question, we employ a relative measure called








Corollary 2. BCAs and the Global Welfare Gap
i. The larger the potential global gains from cooperation, the less eective are
BCA-measures to enforce full cooperation.
ii. In the instability region, CGIBIW and CGI
BIE
W are decreasing when lowering β
whereas the global welfare gap ∆W is increasing.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 5 and 6 and Appendix B.5.
On the one hand, BCAs close the global welfare gap fully through their strategic
role for all β ≥ β3, i.e., in the stability region. However, if β is suciently small,
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β < β3, full cooperation cannot be achieved. (As the BF-regime leads to lower
global welfare than the other two BCA-regimes, it has been ignored in the analysis
above.) On the other hand, the lower β, the larger would be the global gains from
full cooperation. Hence, whenever cooperation would be needed most, BCAs do
not enforce cooperation. Moreover, the larger the potential gains from cooperation
are expected to be, the smaller the success of BCAs implementation. This result is
in line with Barrett (1994) who referred to this as the 'paradox of cooperation'.15
6 Conclusions
The absence of a global policy to mitigate climate change raises concerns about
carbon leakage which undermines the eectiveness of unilateral actions. Econom-
ists and policy makers have suggested border carbon adjustments (BCAs) as a
measure both to address leakage eects and enforce cooperative climate agree-
ments. In this paper, we assessed the eectiveness of three forms of BCAs in an
intra-industry trade model and solved a strategic carbon tax competition game
between two countries which dier in their perception of environmental damages.
Our game comprises three stages: countries play an enforcement game in stage 1,
choose their carbon taxes in stage 2 and rms choose their output in stage 3.
We assumed that country 1 is more concerned about environmental damages and
gives a higher weight to damages than country 2. In the enforcement stage, we
considered the damage evaluation of country 2 not to be too high. In such cases,
it becomes worse o under full cooperation with a uniform socially optimal tax
than under the non-cooperative PB-regime with bilateral production-based taxes.
The benets of reduced damages from global emission reduction and higher tax
revenues does not compensate country 2 for the loss of producer and consumer
surplus.
Apart from the PB-regime, we considered three designs of BCAs. a) BCAs on
imports, implying that country 1 imposes unilaterally a tari on imports from
country 2, where this tari fully adjusts the dierence between the carbon taxes
in the two countries (BI-regime). b) BCAs on imports are complemented by
country 1 giving rebates to its rm on its exports to country 2 where the rebate
rate is chosen optimally (BIE-regime). c) The same as b, though the export rebate
15Barrett (1994) proposed this term in an environmental agreement game without trade. In
his context, either only small agreements are stable or if large agreements are stable, then the
global gains from cooperation are small.
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is not chosen optimally but is a full rebate, which de facto means that country 1
imposes a unilateral consumption-based tax (BF-regime).
We showed that carbon taris and export rebates protect the competitiveness of
country 1's rm in the home and the foreign market, respectively. Country 1
can better control output and hence global emissions through BCAs as leakage
eects are much lower. However, taris disadvantage consumers in country 1
and export rebates are costly, which explained that if country 1 can choose its
rebate optimally, it may not choose a full rebate. However, possible disadvantages
of BCAs for country 1 are oset by the benets to which also tari revenues
contribute. Essentially, taris shift tax revenues from country 2 to country 1.
A comparison across the four non-cooperative regimes, PB-, BI-, BIE- and BF-,
showed the following. First, all the BCA-regimes reduce global emissions com-
pared to the PB-regime. Second, the BI-regime with only taris reduces global
emissions more than the two BCA-regimes with export rebates (BIE- and BF-
regime). Third, compared to the social optimum, the BI-regime is the least dis-
tortionary regime in global welfare terms should BCAs be implemented. Fourth,
BCAs may lead to a global welfare loss compared to the PB-regime, though this
occurs only if the global gains from full cooperation are small, i.e., global dam-
ages compared to the net benets from production and consumption are small.
The rst four results suggest that BCA-measures should be used with caution,
should ideally not be implemented and only be used as a threat to enforce co-
operation. However, if implemented, the BI-regime is superior to the BIE- and
BF-regime. Fifth, country 1 is always better o implementing unilaterally BCA-
measures compared to the PB-regime, but for country 2 this is normally not the
case. The BF-regime is the least attractive of the three BCA-regimes in terms of
global welfare, but also for country 2, which formed the basis for our escalating
penalty game in stage 1.
In stage 1, we assumed country 2 will not agree to a fully cooperative agreement
as it is worse o than under the non-cooperative PB-regime. We then tested un-
der which conditions the incentives of country 2 will change when faced with the
threat by country 1 to implement unilateral BCA-measures. Our results showed
that the higher environmental damages are compared to the net benets from pro-
duction and consumption, i.e., the larger are the potential gains from cooperation,
the harsher must be the threat of punishment by country 1 to enforce cooperation.
We showed that the sequence of escalating penalties is deterrent but also credible
and proceeds from the BI-, BIE- to the BF-regime. We demonstrated that this
sequence is an equilibrium path (subgame-perfect equilibrium) and can be suc-
cessful in enforcing cooperation. However, whenever the potential gains from full
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cooperation are expected to be really large, even the harshest punishment fails to
establish cooperation. We argued that this has some resemblance with Barrett's
paradox of cooperation (Barrett, 1994).
In this paper, we considered one aspect of asymmetry among countries, which
was the evaluation of environmental damages. One could also look at other as-
pects, as for instance dierent carbon intensities across countries (Fischer and Fox,
2012; Mattoo et al., 2009; Weitzel et al., 2012). Another possible extension could
be to extend this model to an n-player asymmetric agreement formation game
which tests for coalition stability along the lines in Al Khourdajie and Finus
(2018). Finally, one could analyse possible transfer mechanisms between the two
heterogeneous countries along the lines of the literature on agreement formation,
asymmetric countries and optimal transfers (Finus and McGinty, 2019; Pavlova
and De Zeeuw, 2013) by adding trade and BCAs to these models.
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A Appendix of Section 4






= −1 < 0, which guarantees a unique Nash equilibrium in output













=3 > 0 ∀ k 6= `.




























+ t2(x22 + x21)︸ ︷︷ ︸
TR2
− (1− γ) de︸ ︷︷ ︸
D2
(A.2)
We dene β = A
d
. We recall, A = a − c is a proxy for the market size or the net
benets of production and consumption and d is the global damage parameter.
Due to lack of space, the subsequent proofs are a sketch; detailed computations
are available from the authors upon request.
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A.1 FC-Regime




∀ i = 1, 2 and k = 1, 2. Inserting equilibrium outputs into the
aggregate welfare function W FC = W FC1 +W
FC
2 , dierentiating with respect to t





(A+ 2t) + 4
3





< 0. Solving for the socially














, and W FC∗ = (A− d)2. In order to have positive pro-
duction levels (i.e., an interior solution), we impose the non-negativity constraint
(NN- constraint) A > d or, using β = A
d
, β > 1.
Note that this constraint as well as those required under the other regimes are
summarised in Table A.1 at the end of Appendix A.
A.2 PB-Regime










. Inserting these outputs into (A.1) and (A.2) and





(4A+ 7t1 + t2) +
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(4A+ 7t2 + t1) +
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> 0, which ensures a unique Nash equilib-
rium. These conditions are are also sucient for the Routh-Hurwitz stability
condition to be satised (Brander and Spencer, 1985). The slope of the reac-







2 = −17 < 0,
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and reaction functions are given by RF PB1 := t1(t2) = −17 (4A+ t2 − 6γd) and
RF PB2 := t2(t1) = −17 (4A+ t1 − 6 (1− γ) d).
Inserting equilibrium taxes into outputs, we obtain equilibrium outputs, equilib-
rium welfare levels W PB∗1 and W
PB∗
2 with W





and ePB∗ = 2A − 1
2
d. From equilibrium outputs, the NN-constraint under this
regime is given by β > 1
4

















. Inserting these outputs into (A.1) and (A.2)
and setting BCAE1 = 0, we obtain WBI1 and W
BI
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> 0, which ensures a unique and stable equilibrium.


















2 = −1 < 0, and the reaction





t2 and RFBI2 := t2(t1) = (1− γ)d− t1.
Inserting equilibrium taxes into outputs, it turns out that the most restrictive
NN-constraint requires β > 1
5




Since the dierence between the two equilibrium taxes is ambiguous, we need to
impose a BCA-constraint such that tBI∗1 > t
BI∗
2 . The BCA-constraint requires
β < 13γ − 4. Inserting tBI∗1 and tBI∗2 into welfare functions, gives WBI∗1 , WBI∗2 ,





In models with imperfect competition, generally, the equilibrium tax can be pos-
itive or negative (in which case it is a subsidy). Therefore, the feasible values of
the rebate rate depends on the equilibrium taxes in country 1 and 2. Moreover,
we need to consider t1 > t2 and t1(1− ϕ) ≥ t2.
If t1 > 0, ϕ > 0 , we have 0 < ϕ ≤ ϕ = t1−t2t1 , where for the maximum allowable
rebate rate ϕ, ϕ ≤ 1 holds if t1 > t2 ≥ 0, while ϕ > 1 if t2 < 0. If 0 > t1 > t2,
then ϕ < 0. In such cases, the feasible values for ϕ is 0 > ϕ ≥ ϕ = t1−t2
t1
. This
can be illustrated as follows:













these outputs into (A.1) and (A.2) gives the welfare function of each country under
this regime.





(A+ 10t1 + 4t1ϕ










(t1 + t2) +
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= 0 simultaneously, the Nash equilib-








d (1− 2γ) ≤ 0 , (A.9)
and the optimal export rebate rate is given by:
ϕ∗ =
3 (A+ d (2− 3γ))
4 d (γ + 1)
> 0 , (A.10)
noting that ϕ∗ ≤ (>)1 if β ≤ (>)β̈(γ) = 1
3
(13γ − 2), with the second order













































t21< 0∀t1 6= 0.




2(2ϕ2−4ϕ+5) > 0 ∀ ϕ > 0
and ∂t2(t1)
∂t1
= −1 < 0 and the reaction functions by: RFBIE1 := t1(t2) =
t2(ϕ+2)−A+9γd+ϕ(A−3γd)
2(2ϕ2−4ϕ+5) , and RF
BIE
2 := t2(t1) = (1− γ)d− t1.
Inserting equilibrium taxes into outputs, it turns out that the most restrictive
NN-constraint requires β > 1
3
(7γ − 2). Global emissions are eBIE∗ = 51A−d(5γ−14)
36
.
We also need to impose a BCA-constraint such that tBIE∗1 (1−ϕ∗) ≥ tBIE∗2 , which
leads to β ≤ 1
3
(29γ − 10). Note that tBIE∗1 >tBIE∗2 always holds. Inserting tBIE∗1




















. Inserting these outputs into (A.1) and












(t1 + t2) +
1
3
(1− γ)d = 0, which


















d (1− 2γ) ≤ 0 , (A.12)
































> 0 . The




> 0 and ∂t2(t1)
∂t1
= −1 < 0
and the reaction functions by: RFBF1 := t1(t2) =
1
2
t2 + γd and RFBF2 := t2(t1) =
(1− γ)d− t1.
Inserting equilibrium taxes into outputs, the most restrictive NN-constraint re-
quires β > 1
3
(γ + 1). Global emissions are given by eBF∗ = 12A+2d(γ−2)
9
.





1 (1− ϕ) = 0 ≥ tBF∗2 with (=) if only γ = 0.5.
Inserting equilibrium taxes into welfare functions gives WBF∗1 and W
BF∗
2 and





We summarise the conditions that satisfy the NN-constraint and the BCA-
constraint in the following table. For comparisons across regimes, we use the
most restrictive condition, which is summarised under Feasible Range.
Table A.1: Feasible Range of Parameters Values
Regime/Constraint NN-constraint BCA-constraint
FC β > 1 /
PB β > 1
4
(8γ − 3) /
BI β > 1
5
(11γ − 2) β < 13γ − 4
BIE β > 1
3
(7γ − 2) β ≤ 1
3
(29γ − 10)
BF β > 1
3
(γ + 1) /
Feasible Range β > β̌ = 1 for all γ < 0.6363 β ≤ β̂ = 1
3
(29γ − 10)
β > β̌ = 1
5
(11γ − 2) for all γ > 0.6363
A.7 Reaction Functions
As shown in Figure 1 (b) and (c), the reaction functions of both countries under
the BCA-regimes are piecewise. For instance in Figure 1 panel (b), RFBI1 := t1(t2),
which is given in Appendix A.3, intersects with the 45◦-line at t̄2 = 18 (9γd− A).
At this tax level, matching taxes t1(t̄2) = t̄2 is a best response of country 1. For
any tax level t2 ≥ t̄2, the reaction function jumps to RF PB1 := t1(t2), given in
Appendix A.2. Similarly for country 2, RFBI2 := t2(t1) intersects with the 45
◦-
line at t̄1 = 12d (1− γ). For any tax level t1 ≤ t̄1, country 2's reaction function
jumps to RF PB2 := t2(t1). Taken together, the constraint needed for t2 < t̄2 and
t1 > t̄1 is the BCA-constraint stated in Appendix A.3. There are two possibilities
for the reaction functions to intersect above the 45◦-line: the intersection of the
RFs under the PB-regime and the intersection of the RFs under the BI-regime.
The rst possibility is not possible for all γ ≥ 0.5 which we assume in our model,
while the second possibility is ruled out by the BCA-constraint. Hence, the unique
solution is the intersection of the RFs under the BI-regime below the 45◦-line.
Similar analysis applies to Figure 1 panel (c). As shown above, the RF2 under
the three BCA-regimes is the same, and, hence, we have the same intersection
points with the 45◦-line as above. For country 1, the reaction function RFBIE1
and RFBF1 ,which are given in Appendix A.4 and A.5, respectively, intersect with
the 45◦-line at t̄2 =
ϕ(A−3γd)+9γd−A
4ϕ2−9ϕ+8 under the BIE-regime and at t̄2 = 2γd under
the BF-regime. For any t2 ≥ t̄2, the reaction function of country 1 jumps to the
PB-regime.
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By comparing the slopes of the reaction functions of country 1 under the three
BCA-regimes, we nd that the reaction function of country 1 under the BI-regime
is always steeper than under BF-regime and is also steeper than under the BIE-





, which is satised as long as the BCA-constraints hold.
The reaction function under the BIE-regime is steeper than under the BF-regime






, while the reaction function is atter





. For ϕ = 1,
they have the same slope.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 3
The ranking of equilibrium tax levels follows directly from comparing the taxes
provided in (A.3) to (A.12), using the NN-and BCA-constraints in the feasible
range in Table A.1, i.e. β̌ < β ≤ β̂. From Appendix A.4, we have tBIE∗1 > 0 and
ϕ∗ > 0. Thus, the eective tax tBIE∗12 = t
BIE∗








12 , which are the equilibrium taxes under the PB-and the






12 always hold as long as
the NN-constraints hold. Whether t12 is larger under the BIE- than under the
BF-regime depends on the value of the export rebates. Hence, tBF∗12 ≤ (>) tBIE∗12
if ϕ∗ ≤ (>)1, where tBF∗12 is de facto zero. Finally, we could have tBF∗12 ≤ tPB∗12 if
β ≤ 2γ − 1
4
d. However, this condition violates the constraint β > β̌ = 1 for all
γ ≤ 0.625 and violates the constraint β > β̌ = 1
5
(11γ − 2) for all γ ≥ 0.75. Hence,
if β ≤ 2γ − 1
4







because in such cases, ϕ∗ < 1.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 4
We compare global emission levels which are given in Appendix A.2 to A.5. Recall
that we use below the NN- and BCA-constraints in the Feasible Range listed in
Table A.1 above.
 Comparison with the PB-regime:
ePB∗ < eBI∗ if β < 1
11
(1− γ), ePB∗ < eBIE∗ if β < 1
21
(4− 5γ), and ePB∗ <






, where all the above conditions can be shown to violate
the NN-constraints. Hence, we have eBI∗, eBIE∗, eBF∗ < ePB∗.
 Across the BCA-regimes:
eBIE∗ ≤ eBI∗ if β ≤ 3γ − 2, which violates the NN-constraints. Hence, we
have eBIE∗ > eBI∗.
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eBF∗ ≤ eBI∗ if β ≥ 5γ , which violates the BCA-constraint only if γ < 0.714.
Note that if β ≥ 5γ, this implies that ϕ∗ > 1.
eBIE∗ ≤ (>)eBF∗ if β ≤ (>)β̈(γ) = 1
3
(13γ − 2), i.e., if the optimal rebate is
less than or equal (larger than) a full rebate, i.e., ϕ∗ ≤ (>) 1.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 5
Using Appendices from A.1 to A.5, and upon substitution of equilibrium taxes
and outputs in country's welfare function, equilibrium welfare is obtained.
1) The global welfare gap between the FC- and the PB-regime is ∆W = W FC∗−
W PB∗ = 9
16
d2.
2) BCA-regimes vs PB-regime
 WBI∗ ≤ W PB∗ if β ≥ (or ≤) 1
61
(γ + 152) + (−) 9
122
√
1034− 256γ (γ − 1).
The rst condition violates the BCA-constraint for all γ ≤ 0.853, while the
second condition violates the NN-constraints. Therefore, WBI∗ > W PB∗




(γ + 152) +
√
1034− 256γ (γ − 1) for all γ >
γ1 = 0.853.
 WBIE∗ ≤ W PB∗ if β ≥ (or ≤) 1
75
(202− 23γ) + (−) 3
25
√
434− 16γ (2 + γ).
The rst condition violates the BCA-constraint for all γ ≤ 0.843, while the





(202− 23γ) + 3
25
√
434− 16γ (2 + γ) for all γ > γ2 = 0.843.
 WBF∗ ≤ W PB∗ if β ≥ (or ≤) 1
3
(γ + 7) + (−)1
4
√
81− 16γ2. The rst con-
dition violates the BCA-constraint for all γ ≤ 0.83, while the second con-
dition violates the NN-constraints. Therefore, WBF∗ > W PB∗ except if
β > β
W
(BF ) = 1
3
(γ + 7) + 1
4
√
81− 16γ2 for all γ > γ3 = 0.83.






(BF ) for all γ > 0.58, and from
the results above, a global welfare loss under any of the BCA-regimes can
only be incurred if γ > 0.83.




64γ (49γ − 10)− 113 for all γ > 0.317. The rst inequality violates
the NN-constraints and the second inequality violates the BCA-constraint.
Therefore, we have WBI∗1 > W
PB∗
1 . Similar results are obtained by com-
paring the welfare level of country 1 under the PB-regime with the BIE- and



























, where these conditions must hold given our NN-
and BCA-constraints.
 For country 2, WBI∗2 > W
PB∗
2 if and only if ψ − ξ < β < ψ + ξ, where ψ =
1
11





32γ (49γ − 71) + 843. The NN-constraints
guarantee the satisfaction of the rst part of the above condition ψ−ξ < β,
which does not violate the BCA-constraint. With respect to the second part
of the above condition, we have the following: a) the BCA-constraint assures
the satisfaction of this condition β < ψ + ξ for all γ ∈ [0.5, 0.6275], b) for
γ ∈ (0.6275, 0.72503) country 2 might be better o if and only if the second
part of the above condition holds, i.e. if β < ψ+ξ, c) for all γ ∈ [0.72503, 1],
this condition violates the NN-constraint. Hence, WBI∗2 > W
PB∗
2 for all
γ ∈ [0.5, 0.6275], while WBI∗2 < W PB∗2 for all γ ∈ [0.72503, 1]. For the other
two BCA-regimes, we have similar conditions, for instance WBIE∗2 > W
PB∗
2
for all γ ∈ [0.5, 0.59], while WBIE∗2 < W PB∗2 for all γ ∈ [0.7, 1], and WBF∗2 >
W PB∗2 for all γ ∈ [0.5, 0.595], while WBF∗2 < W PB∗2 for all γ ∈ [0.655, 1].
3) Across BCAs regimes:
 WBIE∗ ≥ WBI∗ if β ≤ 3γ − 2 or if β ≥ 1
19
(89γ + 42). The rst condition
violates the NN-constraints, while the second condition violates the BCA-
constraint. Therefore, WBIE∗ < WBI∗. In addition, we nd that WBF∗ <
WBI∗ for all values of γ.
 WBF∗ > WBIE∗ if 1
3
(13γ − 2) = β̈ < β < 1
21
(19γ + 58) for all γ < 1. The
rst part of the inequality implies that the optimal rebate is larger than a full
rebate ϕ∗ > 1, and the second inequality is satised by the BCA-constraint
for all γ < 0.7. Therefore, WBF∗ ≤ WBIE∗ if β ≤ β̈, i.e. if ϕ∗ ≤ 1, and if
β ≥ 1
21
(19γ + 58) for all γ ≥ 0.7.
B Appendix of Section 5
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
i. From Appendix A.1 and A.3: W FC∗2 ≥ WBI∗2 if β ≥ β1 (γ) = 111(28− γ) and/or
if β ≤ 14− 23γ ∀ γ ≥ 0.5. The NN-constraints are not sucient to guarantee the
satisfaction of the rst condition, thus it needs to hold. However, this condition
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violates the BCA-constraint for all γ < 0.6025. Recall that we consider only
the range in which cooperation cannot be achieved under the PB-regime, i.e.,
γ > γ = 0.6406 from Proposition 5. Therefore, the rst condition does not violate
the BCA-constraint in our range. The second condition violates the NN-constraint
for all γ ≥ 0.57. Hence, this condition is not relevant for the parameter range
which we consider γ > γ. As a result, if country 1 imposes the BI-threat, we have
W FC∗2 ≥ WBI∗2 if β ≥ β1 (γ), where
∂β1
∂γ
< 0 for all γ.
ii. From Appendix A.1 and A.4: W FC∗2 ≥ WBIE∗2 if (a) γ < 0.59 and (b) if








for all γ ≥ 0.59. We consider the
range: γ > γ = 0.6406. The NN-constraints are not sucient to guarantee
the rst condition in (b) and it also does not violate the BCA-constraint. As a
result, this condition needs to hold. The second condition in (b) violates the NN-
constraints. Therefore, for the range γ > γ, if country 1 imposes the BIE-threat,














all γ > 0.59.
iii. W FC∗2 ≥ WBF∗2 if (a) γ < 0.627 and (b) if β ≥ (or ≤)13 (16− 20γ) +
(−)
√
γ (46γ − 40) + 7 for all γ ≥ 0.627. We consider the range: γ > γ = 0.6406.
The NN-constraints are not sucient to guarantee the rst condition in (b) and
it also does not violate the BCA-constraint, thus this condition needs to hold.
The second condition in (b) violates the NN-constraints for all γ ≥ 0.628 and
hence is not relevant here. Therefore, for the range γ > γ, if country 1 imposes
the BF-threat, W FC∗2 ≥ WBF∗2 if β ≥ β3 (γ) = 13 (16− 20γ) +
√




> 0 for all γ > 0.627.
In addition, we have β1 (γ) > β2 (γ) > β2 (γ) for all γ > γ.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
i. As mentioned in Proposition 5, W FC∗1 ≥ W PB∗1 for all γ ≥ 2364 ' 0.36, which
must hold as we assume γ ≥ 0.5.
ii. From Appendix A.1 and A.3: W FC∗1 ≥ WBI∗1 if (a) β ≤ β1 (γ) = 113(γ + 32)
and/or (b) if β ≥ 13γ − 4 for all γ ≥ 0.5. The inequality in (a) does not violate
the NN-constraints, but the BCA-constraint is not sucient to guarantee this
condition for all γ ≥ 0.6. Hence, for all γ > γ, the inequality in (a) needs to hold.
The inequality in (b) violates the BCA-constraint. Therefore, W FC∗1 ≥ WBI∗1 if
β ≤ β1 (γ), where ∂β1∂γ > 0.






53γ2 − 44γ + 11. The rst condition does not violate the NN-
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constraints and can be satised as long as the BCA-constraint holds if γ ≤ 0.548.
However, for all γ > γ, the BCA-constraint is not sucient and this condi-
tion needs to hold. The second condition violates the BCA-constraint for all
γ. Therefore, for all γ > γ, we have W FC∗1 ≥ WBIE∗1 if β ≤ β2 (γ) =
1
3





53γ2 − 44γ + 11, where ∂β2
∂γ
> 0.
iv. See Appendix A.10 point 2.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we solve the game by backward induction. We
start with the stability region, i.e., cooperation can be established with one of
the BCA-threats and then consider the instability region, i.e., cooperation cannot
be established. Recall that the escalating penalty game starts from γ > γ (see
Assumption 1).
1) Stability Region
In stage III, country 2 faces the BF-threat and can either cooperate or not. Coun-
try 2 cooperates if β ≥ β3 and ends at node 8 in Figure 2. Country 1 will only
use the BF-threat to establish cooperation if it is better o under cooperation
than if it implemented the BIE-regime earlier (on node 7). That is, we must
have: W FC∗1 ≥ WBIE∗1 , which is true if β ≤ β2 (γ). Finally, country 1 would only
implement the BIE-regime if the BIE-threat did not lead to cooperation. That
is, β < β2. In other words, the game has progressed to stage III. Thus, in stage
III, in order for cooperation to be an equilibrium path, we need β2 > β ≥ β3
and β ≤ β2 (γ). Since we have β2 < β2, cooperation is an equilibrium path if
β2 > β ≥ β3.
In stage II, country 2 faces the BIE-threat and can either cooperate or not. Coun-
try 2 chooses no cooperation if β < β2, and we end up in Stage III as described
above. Instead, country 2 chooses cooperation in stage II if β ≥ β2, and we end
up in node 6. Country 1 will only use the BIE-threat to establish cooperation if
it is better o under cooperation than if it implemented the BI-regime earlier on
(node 5). That is, we must have: W FC∗1 ≥ WBI∗1 , which is true if β ≤ β1 (γ).
Finally, country 1 would only implement the BI-regime if the BI-threat did not
lead to cooperation. That is, β < β1. This means the game has progressed to
stage II. Thus, in stage II, in order for cooperation to be an equilibrium path,
we need β1 > β ≥ β2 and β ≤ β1 (γ). Since we have β1 < β1, cooperation is an
equilibrium path if β1 > β ≥ β2.
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In stage I, country 2 faces the BI-threat and can either cooperate or not. Country
2 chooses no cooperation if β < β1, and we end up in stage II as described above.
Instead, country 2 chooses cooperation in stage I if β ≥ β1, and we end up in
node 4 in Figure 2. Country 1 will only use the BI-threat to establish cooperation
if it is better o under cooperation than if it implemented the PB-regime earlier
on (node 3). That is, we must have: W FC∗1 ≥ W PB∗1 , which we know it always
holds (see Lemma 2). Finally, country 1 would only implement the BI-threat if
country 2 did not accept its proposal for cooperation in stage 0, which was our
starting point as we assume γ > γ. Thus, in stage I, in order for cooperation to
be an equilibrium path, we need β ≥ β1 (γ) and γ > γ.
2) Instability Region
First, we have shown in Proposition 5 and Lemma 2 that country 1 is better o
under any of the BCA-regimes than under the PB-regime. Hence, node 3 is never
an equilibrium outcome in the instability region.
Second, solving WBIE∗1 ≥ WBI∗1 gives two conditions: (a) β ≤ 3γ − 2 and (b)
β ≥ 2γ. The rst condition violates the NN-constraints. The second condition
does not violate the BCA-constraint, but the NN-constraints are not sucient to
guarantee this condition, thus it needs to hold. Therefore, WBIE∗1 > (≤)WBI∗1 if
β > (≤) 2γ.
Third, the BF-regime is dominated by the BIE-regime, and, hence, if β3 > β > 2γ,
country 1 chooses the BIE-regime, while if β ≤ 2γ , country 1 chooses the BI-
regime.
Note that if β = 2γ, country 1 is indierent between the BI- and the BIE-regime.
Therefore, we assume that country 1 chooses the BI-regime according to the
Pareto-criterion. That is, we nd WBIE∗2 > W
BI∗
2 if and only if
7
29
(γ − 6) <
β < (3γ − 2). The rst inequality is satised as long as β > 0, however, the
second inequality violates the NN-constraints. Therefore, WBIE∗2 < W
BI∗
2 .
B.4 One-stage Penalty Game
Suppose stages I, II, and III do not take place sequentially according to the es-
calating penalty path depicted in Figure 2, but are reduced to stage I as in the
Figure below. That is, country 1 can choose either of the three BCA-regimes to
enforce cooperation. That is, the game tree would be as follows:
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As mentioned in the text, country 1 starts to use the BCA-threats if country
2 refuses the proposal 'cooperation' in stage 0 which is our starting point as



















If β ≥ β1 (γ), cooperation (C) is established by the three BCA-measures and
we have three subgame-perfect Nash equilibria: BI→C, BIE→C and BF→C,
corresponding to endnodes 2, 4 and 6. If β1 (γ) > β ≥ β2 (γ), we have two
subgame-perfect equilibria: BIE→C and BF→C, corresponding to endnodes 4
and 6 and nally for β2 > β ≥ β3 (γ), the subgame-perfect equilibrium is BF→C
with endnode 6. For β < β3, the outcome is no cooperation (NC), with endnode
5 if β3 > β > 2γ because WBIE∗1 > W
BI∗
1 , whereas if 2γ ≥ β , endnode 3 would
emerge because WBIE∗1 ≤ WBI∗1 . Thus, only for β < β2 would we have a unique
equilibrium, but not for β ≥ β2. However, qualitatively, results would be the same
as in Proposition 6.
B.5 Proof of Corollary 2
i. As shown in Appendix A.10, the global welfare gap, ∆W = 9
16
d2, increases in
d at an increasing rate. We showed in Proposition 6 that full cooperation cannot
be achieved if β3 (γ) > β, i.e., if Ad is low or equivalently if d is high given any
value of A.













> 1 if β < 179
75
' 2.386. The
BIE-regime is implemented if β < β3, and we have β3 < 17975 for all γ. Hence,
∂CGIBIW
∂d
< 0 in the instability region.













< 0 if β < 152
61
' 2.492. The
BI-regime is implemented if β ≤ 2γ, where 2γ < 152
61





< 0 in the instability region.
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Carbon leakage and the relocation of rms is one of the main concerns
of governments when choosing ambitious climate policy measures. In a
strategic trade model with endogenous plant location, we study the eect of
border carbon adjustments (BCAs) on equilibrium emission taxes in a non-
cooperative policy game between two asymmetric countries. For this, we
compare a No-BCA with a BCA regime for two scenarios: a simultaneous
and a sequential game associated with the notions of Nash equilibrium and
Stackelberg equilibrium, respectively. Without BCAs, a 'race to the bottom'
is the Nash equilibrium. In a Stackelberg equilibrium, a second less negative
`chicken equilibrium' may emerge, which constitutes a Pareto-improvement
not only for the leader but also the follower. In this chicken equilibrium, the
Stackelberg leader gives in, letting his/her rms relocate to face a higher
tax than in the race-to-the-bottom equilibrium. With BCAs, the race-to-
the-bottom in carbon taxes can be avoided in the Nash equilibrium, even
though global emissions are higher and global welfare is lower than in the
social optimum. However, a Nash equilibrium under the BCA regime may
not exist due to the discontinuity and multivaluedness of best response
functions, even though it exists if the potential gains from cooperation would
be large. In contrast, Stackelberg equilibria always exist, but due to the
strategic interaction among countries, BCAs may not always constitute a
Pareto-improvement, though they always reduce global emissions and in
most cases increase global welfare.
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1 Introduction
The history of climate change negotiations suggests that it is dicult to imple-
ment eective measures to reduce greenhouse gases signicantly. Eective global
actions are hampered by free-rider incentives and sub-global actions are not eect-
ive as they are undermined by `carbon leakage'. That is, emission reductions by
some environmentally concerned countries are partly or completely oset by higher
emissions in environmentally less concerned countries. One important channel of
carbon leakage is the relocation of the production of emission-intensive industries
to countries with laxer environmental policies. This phenomenon has been known
as the `pollution haven hypothesis'(PHH). Although there is mixed empirical evid-
ence to support the PHH, the threat of relocation of rms, associated with the
loss of jobs and investment, is an important argument in the policy debate.1
Recently, border carbon adjustments (BCAs) have been proposed to address the
concern of carbon leakage in general and the concern of a loss of competitive-
ness of domestic industries in particular (Böhringer et al., 2012; Branger and
Quirion, 2014; Fischer and Fox, 2012; Stiglitz, 2006; Wooders et al., 2009). Typ-
ically, BCAs comprise an import tari or an export rebate or both. Even ignoring
strategic considerations by adopting a pure welfare perspective, trade measures,
complementing environmental policies, can be justied as already demonstrated
by Markusen (1975). He shows that in the absence of global action, the internal-
isation of the externality caused by a global pollutant requires a combination of
a Pigouvian tax and import taris.2 That is, BCAs correct distortions and hence
are not considered as disguised trade barriers (Helm et al., 2012).
In this paper, we are interested in whether and under which conditions BCAs
can support the implementation of more ambitious climate policies. Our model
takes into account that rms cannot only relocate parts of their production but
even their entire production facilities abroad (endogenous plant location) and that
governments engage in a strategic emission tax competition game (bilateral and
endogenous policy choices) and may perceive global damages from greenhouse
gases dierently (asymmetric countries).
We model an emission tax competition game between two governments that strive
1For example, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) and Manderson and Kneller (2012), among
others, nd no evidence of the PHH. In contrast, Fredriksson et al. (2003), Xing and Kolstad
(2002) and Kellenberg (2009) report signicant eects of environmental policies on the location
of rms.
2See also Hoel (1996) and Copeland (1996) for similar results. These models assume perfect
competition.
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to attract the plants of two rms in an intra-industry trade model. Both rms
produce a homogeneous emission-intensive good and compete in a Nash-Cournot
fashion. Governments evaluate damages from global emissions dierently. The
game comprises three stages: in stage 1, governments choose their policies; in
stage 2, rms choose their location and in stage 3 rms choose their output. We
solve our game under two dierent policy regimes. Under the No-BCA regime,
each government imposes a carbon tax on the production of those plants, which
are located within its national boundaries. Under the BCA regime, the country
that sets a higher carbon tax can additionally impose a tari on imports from
plants located abroad. Export rebates are not considered. As mentioned by
Markusen et al. (1995), endogenous plant location may lead to a discontinuity
of welfare functions with respect to tax levels as rms may change their location
abruptly above a threshold. In our model, this leads to non-continuous best
response functions under the BCA regime, which implies that a Nash equilibrium
may not exist. Therefore, as Stackelberg equilibria always exist, we also consider
the possibility that governments choose their taxes sequentially. Apart from this
technical point, a sequential policy choice also gives rise to new interesting results.
Under the No-BCA regime, we nd that if countries choose their policies simul-
taneously, we end up in a race-to-the-bottom with no relocation of rms. Dierent
from papers that assume local pollution, this is the only pure strategy Nash equi-
librium in our model, irrespective of the degree of asymmetry among countries. In
contrast, if governments move sequentially, the Stackelberg leader may be able to
avoid being stuck at the bottom. The leader may act as a `wise chicken', imposing
a higher carbon tax than the follower so that all rms move to the follower (total
relocation of rms). This Stackelberg equilibrium is Pareto-improving not only
for the leader but also the follower and leads to lower global emissions than in the
Nash equilibrium.
Under the BCA regime, we show that a Nash equilibrium may not exist, though
it exists when the potential gains from cooperation are expected to be large. If
the Nash equilibrium exists, a BCA-policy is an eective measure to eliminate the
race-to-the-bottom, resulting in higher global welfare and lower global emissions,
though global welfare falls short and global emissions exceed those in the social
optimum. The location equilibrium entails partial relocation of plants from the
more to the less environmentally concerned country. Both countries adjust their
taxes upward compared to the race-to-the-bottom equilibrium. The more con-
cerned country imposes a higher emission tax, which is complemented by BCAs
such as to avoid the total relocation of its rm.
The eect of BCAs on Stackelberg equilibria depends greatly on the identity
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of the leader and the parameters values of our model. However, one common
result is that a race-to-the-bottom becomes less likely to emerge as an equilibrium.
Furthermore, global emissions are reduced, global welfare usually increases, even
though the country on which BCAs are imposed may not always be better o.
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature on strategic environmental-
trade policies, which all build on the strategic imperfect-competition trade model
due to Brander and Spencer (1985) by adding environmental damages (and some-
times consumer utility) in governments welfare function.
The rst strand of the literature studies strategic environmental policies as-
suming xed plant location (immobile rms). This includes for instance Con-
rad (1993), Barrett (1994) and Kennedy (1994). This literature concludes for
Cournot-competition that if environmental policy is the only instrument avail-
able to governments, environmental taxes are set below marginal damages. That
is, governments have an incentive to provide their rms with a strategic advant-
age over their rivals. In Eyland and Zaccour (2014), Anouliés (2015), Baksi and
Chaudhuri (2017), and Hecht and Peters (2018), BCAs are added to the tax
competition game. In a two-country model, Eyland and Zaccour (2014) show,
based on numerical simulations, that BCAs allow countries to set higher carbon
taxes in the non-cooperative equilibrium. This has been conrmed by Hecht and
Peters (2018) for the country which imposes BCAs, while the country on which
BCAs are imposed responds by a lower carbon tax. Anouliés (2015) and Baksi
and Chaudhuri (2017) demonstrate that BCAs are helpful as a threat to enforce
cooperation among asymmetric countries. The environmentally less concerned
country is more likely to engage in a cooperative agreement as its non-cooperative
outside payo is reduced through BCAs.
The second strand of the literature assumes mobile rms, and analyses the eect
of environmental policies on the location of rms. Two types of models have
emerged: the market share game and the location game where the dierence lies
in the sequence of the game.3 In market share games, rms choose rst their
location and then governments choose their policies, also called ex-post policy
game. By construction, governments cannot aect the location of their rms and
hence these type of games are less interesting for our analysis.4 In contrast, in
location games, governments move rst and then rms choose their location, also
3See for instance Ulph and Valentini (2001) and Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003) for a detailed
comparison between the two types of games.
4For examples of market share type of games, see for instance Eerola (2006), De Santis and
Stähler (2009) and Dijkstra et al. (2011).
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called ex-ante policy game. Our model belongs to this class of models.
Some of the early studies of location games include for instance Markusen et al.
(1993) and Motta and Thisse (1994). However, these papers, similar to the more
recent paper by Sanna-Randaccio et al. (2017), assume an exogenous policy level,
and, hence, ignore the eect of rm mobility on the incentives of governments
to set their environmental policies strategically. A simple extension to address
this shortcoming are plant location games that assume a unilateral endogenous
climate policy, as for instance in Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003) and Ikefuji et al.
(2016). However, governments hardly choose their policies in isolation. Hence, a
more sophisticated extension allows for endogenous bilateral policy choices similar
to that in Markusen et al. (1995), Rauscher (1995), Hoel (1997), and Ulph and
Valentini (2001). For instance, Markusen et al. (1995) shows that there are two
possible Nash equilibria, which depend on the evaluation of the damages from
local pollution: i) a low evaluation leads to low environmental regulation with
a `race to the bottom', and ii) a high evaluation leads to strict environmental
regulation with a `race to the top', also called ` not in my backyard', implying
that rms exit the market or moving to other regions. Both Rauscher (1995) and
Hoel (1997) simplify the assumptions made by Markusen et al. (1995) by ignoring
transportation and set-up costs, and obtain similar qualitative results but do not
have to rely on simulations.
All of the papers based on location games do not consider BCAs, most assume
local pollution5, and a monopolistic market structure. Clearly, none of these
assumptions is useful in our context as BCAs are proposed to achieve two object-
ives. First, they aim at internalising a global externality (environmental object-
ive). Second, they aim at reducing leakage eects by levelling the playing eld
for domestic and foreign rms (competitiveness objective). Therefore, we assume
a global pollutant, implying that a not-in-my-backyard argument is not rational
for governments. In fact, the argument may just be reversed: keeping rms in
the own backyard may be a rational policy if rms face lower environmental taxes
abroad. Moreover, in order to capture the competitiveness argument, we assume
an oligopolistic market structure.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present our
model, discuss important features and solve the second and third stage of the
model. In Sections 3 and 4, we solve the rst stage of our game and derive the
climate policy equilibria under the two alternative policy regimes, respectively. In
Section 5, we compare equilibria in order to show the eect of BCAs. Section 6
5Rauscher (1995) considers the possibility of transboundary pollution as an extension.
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concludes and discusses possible future research.
2 Model
First, we present the model. Subsequently, we discuss the main features and
assumptions of the model. Then we briey comment on possible location equilib-
ria. Finally, we derive the socially optimal tax levels as a normative benchmark,
against which we compare non-cooperative equilibria in our subsequent analysis.
2.1 Basic Ingredients
We consider two countries, respectively, two governments, i = 1, 2, which interact
strategically. The game unfolds in three stages, which is solved by backward
induction. In the rst stage, governments choose their policy levels, in the second
stage rms choose their location and in the third stage rms choose their outputs.
In the last stage, there are two rms, k = 1, 2, which produce a homogeneous
good x and compete in outputs in a Cournot-fashion. Firm 1 is initially located
in country 1, and rm 2 is initially located in country 2. Each rm has two plants,
one plant supplying the home market in country i, the other plant supplying the
foreign market j. Markets are segmented. The inverse demand function in market
i is given by:
pi(Xi) = a−Xi ∀ i = 1, 2 , (1)
where pi is the market price in market i and parameter a > 0 is the chock-o
price. Xi = x1i + x2i is total consumption in country i where x1i and x2i are the
outputs supplied by rm 1 and 2 to market i, respectively. For simplicity, we
assume identical rms with a linear production cost function, i.e., Cki(xki) = cxki
for k = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2.
Good x is an emission intensive good such as cement or steel which generates
greenhouse gas emissions, for example, due to its use and combustion of energy in
the production process. Without loss of generality, we assume a constant emission-
output ratio across rms, which we normalise to 1, such that an emission tax is
de facto an output tax. Hence, prots of rm 1 and 2 obtained in market i are
given by
π1i = (pi(Xi)− c− t1i)x1i & π2i = (pi(Xi)− c− t2i)x2i ∀ i = 1, 2 , (2)
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where t1i is the eective tax which rm 1 faces on its supply to market i and t2i
is the eective tax which rm 2 faces on its supply to market i.
We consider two policy regimes: the No-BCA regime and the BCA regime. In
order to illustrate the dierence between the two regimes, suppose rm k produces
with one of its plants for market i. This plant faces an eective tax tki. Now there
are two possible location choices. 1) The plant locates in country i, and, hence,
faces tax tki= ti. 2) The plant locates in country j . Under the No-BCA regime,
the plant will simply face the tax imposed by country j, i.e., tki= tj. Under the
BCA regime, the same is true as long as ti ≤ tj. However, if ti > tj, then under
the BCA regime, this rm faces the eective tax tki = tj +ω(ti− tj) on its exports
to country i, with ω the border tax adjustment parameter (Eyland and Zaccour,
2014).
The simultaneous maximisation of prots obtained in market i by both rms
(π1i is maximised with respect to output x1i and π2i with respect to x2i), gives
equilibrium quantities (denoted by an asterisk) supplied by rm 1 and 2 in market
i
x∗1i =
A− 2t1i + t2i
3
& x∗2i =
A− 2t2i + t1i
3
, ∀ i = 1, 2 , (3)
with A = a− c, which we interpret as a market size parameter. It is also a proxy
for the net benets from production and consumption. Clearly, output levels need
to be non-negative. We will test this later for each location equilibrium. Each rm
takes separate quantity decisions for the supply to the home and foreign market.




2 & π∗2i = (x
∗
2i)
2 ∀ i = 1, 2 . (4)
Thus, the nal stage of the three stage game is a Nash equilibrium in output
levels in each of the two markets. As both rms are assumed to be identical in all
respects, and, as will be explained below, there are neither xed nor transportation
costs, dierent prots only stem from dierences in eective taxes that rms face.
In the second stage, rms choose their location for each of their two plants sim-
ultaneously. That is, they take a decision for each market separately. Generally
speaking, rm k supplying market i, compares its prot from locating in country
i πki(i) with its prot locating in country j πki(j). As this comparison will gen-
erally depend on where the competitor rm ` locates, the comparison for market
i is based on computing ∆πki = πki(i, `) − πki(j, `), ` = i, j , with the rst entry
in brackets indicating the location of rm k, and the second entry the location of
the competitor rm `. For a given location of rm ` , rm k will locate in country
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i if ∆πki > 0 and will locate in country j if ∆πki < 0. In case of indierence,
∆πki = 0, we assume that a rm´s plant locates in the country of origin. The
equilibrium location choice implies mutual best replies by rm k and ` with re-
spect to their plants supplying market i. That is, the solution of the second stage
is a Nash equilibrium of location choices of plants supplying a particular market.
As each rm has two plants, each rm takes two location decisions.
In the rst stage, governments choose the level of their emission/output tax ti
based on the following welfare function:
Wi = CSi + PSi + Ti −Di +BCAi , (5)
where CSi is the consumer surplus in country i, with the consumer surplus being
given by CSi =
X2i
2
which follows from (1), recalling that the total supply to market
i is given by Xi = x1i + x2i. PSi is the producer surplus, which is equal to the
sum of prots of plants located in country i. Ti is the tax revenue of government i
where Ti = tiX i and X i is the sum of output levels produced in country i. Di are
damages from pollution that are released in the production of good x.We assume
a global pollutant and hence damages in country i depend on total emissions, E,
regardless of the location of the source of emissions. Hence, damages in country i




Xi. That is, as we normalise the emission-output
coecient to 1, global emissions are equal to total production, which is equal to
total consumption. More specically, we assume:
D (E) = dE, D1 = γD(E), D2 = (1− γ)D(E), γ ∈ [0.5, 1] , (6)
with d > 0 a damage parameter, reecting global marginal damages. Hence,
country 1 suers a portion γ and country 2 a portion (1 − γ) of global damages
where we allow for the possibility that countries perceive or evaluate those dam-
ages dierently. Given γ ∈ [0.5, 1], country 1 is at least as concerned as country
2 about environmental damages and normally more whenever γ is strictly larger
than 0.5. This gives us two benchmarks: a) γ= 0.5 implies a symmetric damage
evaluation in both countries and b) γ= 1 implies that country 2 is not concerned
at all about environmental damages.
Finally, the last term in the welfare function, BCAi, stands for the tari rev-
enues obtained from a border carbon adjustment policy. This term is dier-
ent for our two policy regimes. Under the No-BCA regime, this term is zero
by assumption. Under the BCA regime, this term is positive for the govern-
ment which imposes a tari but zero for the other government. Generally,
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BCAi = ω (ti − tj) [xki(j) + x`i(j)] if and only if ti > tj, otherwise BCAi = 0.
That is, generally, one plant or two plants supplying market i could be located in
country j.
We assume ω = 1, not only for simplicity but for two other reasons. First, any
value of ω above 1 would not be compatible with the equal treatment rule under
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Second, any value smaller than 1 would
not be optimal for country i if it has the option to use BCAs.6
2.2 Basic Features of the Model
In this subsection, we discuss the main assumptions of the model with a closer
look at the welfare components mentioned above.
First, we assume that consumption takes place in the two countries that stra-
tegically interact, and, hence, consumers matter in our model. This is not only
important because a crucial feature of BCAs, which are import taris, is their
negative impact on consumers, but, even more fundamentally, without consumers,
there are no imports on which BCAs could be applied.7
Second, BCAs are mainly proposed to internalise global externalities. Hence, we
assume a global and not a local pollutant.
Third, we assume that prots of plants located in a country as well as the tax
revenues obtained from these plants matter for governments. This is in line with
Ulph and Valentini (2001) and Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003), who assume that
prots and tax revenues go to the country in which production takes place. A
wider interpretation is that prots are an indicator of the importance of domestic
production and associated jobs. This captures the main argument put forward
by governments and lobby groups in favour of not implementing a too ambitious
climate policy.8 Moreover, excluding prots from governments´ welfare functions
implies that tax competition between governments would only be driven by tax
6It is straightforward to show that if country i was to choose ω endogenously, it would choose
a value strictly larger than 1. See also Hecht and Peters (2018).
7Under the No-BCA regime and if production was sold to a third market, the incentive to
set lax environmental standards/low taxes would be reduced in our model. See, for example,
Ulph and Valentini (2001).
8Some papers do not consider prots in the welfare function of governments or assume full
repatriation of prots. For instance, Markusen et al. (1995) assume that prots are distributed
throughout the world, whereas Rauscher (1995) considers that prots accrue to a foreign investor.
Both Motta and Thisse (1994) and Eerola (2006) assume that prots accrue to the country in
which the headquarter of a company is located. Clearly, excluding prots from governments'
welfare functions would weaken the incentives to set low taxes. See Janeba (1998) and Ulph
and Valentini (2001) on this point.
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revenue considerations of governments, which is probably not very plausible, as
mentioned by Rauscher (1995). Furthermore, the race-to-the-bottom phenomenon
could not be explained for other types of environmental regulations such as envir-
onmental standards which do not generate revenues to governments.
Fourth, we assume that location choices of rms depend only on tax dierentials.
That is, we abstract from transportation and set-up costs. This is not only because
of their obvious eects,9 but also because they do not aect the qualitative results,
though they would add greatly to the complexity of the analysis.10
Fifth, revenues from border carbon adjustments, i.e., the term BCAi in welfare
function (5), only appears under the BCA regime and only in the welfare function
of the country that imposes a higher carbon tax. Given our assumption that
BCAs fully adjust the dierence between the two taxes (i.e., the eective tax of
rm k being located in country j and supplying market i, tki = tj + ω(ti − tj), is
simply tki = ti for ω = 1), they can make a dierence to the home market i. Not
only the home rm´s but also the foreign rm´s supply to the home market i faces
the same tax ti provided ti > tj. This implies that all plants supplying country i
are subject to the same carbon tax, irrespective of the location of production. In
other words, BCAs partially protect the home rm´s prot by levelling the playing
eld in market i. It is only partial protection because in the foreign market j,
the foreign rm will have a competitive advantage over the home rm provided
ti > tj. Of course, the home rm can circumvent this disadvantage by relocating
its plant to the foreign country j for the supply of this market (and hence facing
tj instead of ti for its supply to market j).
Finally, as it will become evident, modeling plant location as an endogenous choice
of rms poses some analytical diculties. It causes not only discontinuous location
choices of rms as a function of taxes, but, more importantly, may also causes
best response functions of governments to be discontinuous, which, in our model,
may lead to the non-existence of a Nash equilibrium under the BCA regime. It
is for this reason that apart from Nash equilibria, we also determine Stackelberg
equilibria in this rst stage of our three stage game. Moreover, for expositional
simplicity, we consider only the possibility of a unilateral BCA-policy that is
9Fixed costs or set-up costs of plants reduce the incentive of plant relocation. In contrast,
transportation costs increase the incentive of relocation of the plant that supplies the foreign
market. For a detailed analysis of the eect of these costs on plant location, see for instance
Markusen et al.(1993;1995), Motta and Thisse (1994) and Sanna-Randaccio et al. (2017).
10For instance, Markusen et al. (1995) consider transportation and set-up costs and hence rely
on numerical simulations. In contrast, Rauscher (1995) and Hoel (1997) abstract from those
costs and obtain similar analytical results.
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imposed by country 1, the country which is more concerned about environmental
damages in our model. The general possibility of a bilateral BCA-policy where
country 2 could also impose a tari if ti < tj is considered in Appendix E where
it is shown that all qualitative conclusions continue to hold.
2.3 Location Equilibria
Firms choose the location of their plants in the second stage based on the carbon
taxes chosen by governments in the rst stage. Given that we abstract from trans-
portation and set-up costs, the decision of rms depends only on tax dierentials
as demonstrated in more details in Appendix A.
Under the No-BCA regime, only the location of production matters, which gives
rise to three location equilibria. 1) `No relocation' (NR) if t1 = t2. Each rm
remains with its two plants in the country of origin. 2) Total relocation of rm
1 (TR1) if t1 > t2. Firm 1, originally located in country 1, will relocate with
both plants to country 2. 3) Total relocation of rm 2 (TR2) if t1 < t2. Firm 2,
originally located in country 2, will relocate with both plants to country 1.
Under the BCA regime, assuming that only government 1 can impose BCAs,
location equilibria NR if t1 = t2 and TR2 if t1 < t2 are the same. However, if
t1 > t2, the TR1-location equilibrium disappears in favour of the PR1-location
equilibrium, standing for `partial relocation of rm 1'. Firm 1´s plant supplying
market 2 will relocate to country 2, but its plant supplying its own market in
country 1 will remain in the country of origin, as also the foreign rm 2 faces de
facto the same tax t1 on its exports to the market in country 1 (and, as pointed
out above, we assume that in case of indierence plants do not relocate). That
is, country 1 imposing BCAs on imports can avoid total relocation of its rm
1, but cannot avoid partial relocation. If we considered that also country 2 can
impose BCAs on imports if t1 < t2, as we do in Appendix E, then also location
equilibrium PR2 would exist.
2.4 Normative Benchmark
Before turning to non-cooperative equilibria under the two policy regimes, we
briey discuss the normative benchmark of the social optimum. MaximisingW1 +
W2 with respect to output levels deliversXS∗1 andX
S∗
2 , the socially optimal output











composition of XS∗1 and X
S∗
2 does not matter, as we assume linear and identical
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production costs for all plants. Moreover, due to a global pollutant (and hence
only aggregate damages matter in the social optimum) and because of symmetric
consumers, XS∗1 = X
S∗
2 must be true.
In order to determine the socially optimal tax, we proceed in two steps. First,
the social optimum cannot be achieved with BCAs. Suppose BCAs are imposed
by country i with ti > tj, implying PRk-location equilibrium. Using equilibrium
output levels (3), gives X∗i = 2 (A− ti) /3 for market i and X∗j = 2 (A− tj) /3
for market j from which it is evident that XS∗i = X
S∗
j is impossible. Second,
without BCAs, XS∗1 = X
S∗
2 is possible under three location equilibria: a) NR
with t1 = t2 = t∗S. b) TR1 with t1 > t2 = t
∗
S and c) TR2 with t
∗
S = t1 < t2. All
three location equilibria imply de facto the same eective tax rate t∗S imposed on
all rms.
Proposition 1. Social Optimum
The socially optimal output levels are given by XS∗1 = X
S∗
2 = A − d. Under the














22 = (A − d)/2. A BCA regime
cannot generate socially optimal output levels and hence global welfare will be
strictly lower.
Hence, the socially optimal eective tax rate is unique with a unique output
vector, though it is associated with three dierent possible location equilibria and
tax vectors. In the following, it is helpful to think of the socially optimal tax
as a uniform tax imposed in both countries for simplicity. It is interesting to
note that - as we will demonstrate later - BCAs can increase global welfare in a
non-cooperative equilibrium. However, as Proposition 1 states, BCAs will always
fall short of achieving the socially optimal global welfare level. Finally, note that
because output levels need to be non-negative, we assume henceforth A > d to
ensure interior solutions. From equilibrium output levels in (3), it is evident that a
necessary condition to ensure positive production levels requires A > ti, i ∈ {1, 2}.
We will use these conditions in the subsequent analysis.
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3 Climate Policy Equilibria: No-BCA Regime
In this section, we solve the rst stage of our game under the No-BCA regime.
Based on subsection 2.3, there are three possible location equilibria: 1) NR if t1 =
t2, i.e., all rms remain in their country of origin; 2) TR1 if t1 > t2, i.e., all plants
are located in country 2; 3) TR2 if t1 < t2, i.e., all plants are located in country 1.
We consider two equilibria: Nash equilibrium (NE) and Stackelberg equilibrium
(SE). In order to determine equilibria, we rst derive the best response function of
each country (Subsection 3.1) and then use those functions to predict equilibria if
countries move simultaneously (Subsection 3.2) and sequentially (Subsection 3.3).
Finally, we compare non-cooperative equilibria and contrast them with the social
optimum.
3.1 Best Responses
We proceed in three steps. First, we write down the welfare function of each
country under the three possible location equilibria. Second, we analyse the best
response of each country for a given location equilibrium. Third, we derive the
best response of each country across all possible location equilibria.
Based on the general welfare function (5), the welfare function in the three location
equilibria can be written as follows:
Wi =







πk2 + Ti −Di if ti < tj (8a)
WNRi = CSi + πk1 + πk2 + Ti −Di if ti = tj (8b)
W TRki = CSi −Di if ti > tj (8c)
where the superscript TR` refers to the total relocation of the foreign rm ` from
country j to country i, TRk refers to the total relocation of the home rm k to
country j and NR denotes no relocation. It is evident that in the TR`-location
equilibrium, prots of all four plants accrue to country i, in the NR-location
equilibrium, country i enjoys the prots of its domestic rm k with its two plants
and in the TRk-location equilibrium, no prots accrue to country i. Also, the
other components (e.g., CSi and Di) may be dierent across the three location
equilibria due to dierent taxes. This is in particular evident for tax revenues,










and in (8b) by
TNRi = ti (xk1 + xk2) and are zero in (8c). Inserting equilibrium output levels
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i the individual marginal damage in country i, i.e., D
′
1 = γd and D
′
2 =
(1− γ) d .
In the TR`-location equilibrium, the optimal tax of country i follows from dier-















1 = γd and t̂
TR1
2 = (1− γ) d (12)
noting that the second order conditions are satised. Given ti < tj, country i has
both rms, can control all output levels, and its optimal unconstrained carbon
tax is equal to its marginal damage. On the one hand, country i has an incent-
ive to subsidise its consumers to correct for market distortions due to imperfect
competition (Barnett, 1980). On the other hand, and, dierent from the stand-
ard prot-shifting argument, the government has an incentive to tax producers.
Country i has both rms and hence no rents can be shifted. Moreover, prots are
maximised by taxing producers to enforce the monopolistic output. These two
incentives cancel out in our model. The remaining incentive is to internalise en-
vironmental damages, which calls for a tax equal to marginal damages in country
i.
We note that if tj > D
′
i, the unconstrained equilibrium tax of country i is t̂i = D
′
i
and the corresponding welfare level of country i is Ŵ TR`i . However, we also need
to consider the possibility that tj ≤ D
′
i. In this case, country i cannot choose its
unconstrained optimum t̂i but must deviate to t̃i = tj − ε, with ε being positive
but close to zero, and the corresponding welfare level is W̃ TR`i . The ε-undercutting
constrained optimum follows from the strict concavity of welfare function (9) with
respect to ti.
In the NR-location equilibrium, we just note that ti = tj = t, which means that
welfare can be expressed alternatively as a function of level ti or tj. Moreover,
WNRi is strictly concave in t.
Finally, in the TRk-location equilibrium, we note that the consumer surplus as
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well as damages are decreasing in tj and W
TRk
i is a strictly convex function in tj.
Summarising, we need to consider three cases for each country.
Welfare Levels of Country i for Three Location Equilibria :
1. Case ti < tj













chooses its unconstrained optimal tax and has both rms.




ti = t̃i = tj − ε
)
as a function of tj in the range
tj ≤ t̂TR`i = D
′
i . Country i chooses its constrained optimal tax by marginally
undercutting the tax of country j in order to have both rms, with ε > 0
and ε being arbitrarily small and close to zero.
2. Case ti = tj: let WNRi be W
NR
i (ti = tj) as a function of tj and each rm
remains in its home country.




i (ti > tj) as a function of tj and both rms
are located in country j.
Using the tax levels listed in Case 1 to 3 above, together with (9), (10) and
(11), we can compare the welfare of country i for dierent location equilibria and
dierent levels of tj, which is illustrated in Figure 1. (The mathematical details
are provided in Appendix B.1.)
In Figure 1, part (a) captures the incentives of country 1, and part (b) of country
2. We notice that the upper bound of the parameter space is t2 = A in part (a)
and t1 = A in part (b) due to the necessary condition for positive production
levels. Since part (a) and (b) are very similar, we focus on part (a) rst.
In Figure 1(a), WNR1 is concave and W
TR1
1 is convex in t2 as explained above.
For W TR21 , the unconstrained optimum lies in the segment t2 ∈ (γd,A), and is a
straight line due to the unique optimal tax t̂TR21 = γd, whereas the constrained
optimum lies in the segment t2 ≤ γd with t̃TR21 = t2 − ε, and is concave and
increasing in t2.




1 in the segment t2 ∈ (−A2 , A)




1 in the segment t2 < −A2 . Clearly, for
t2 ∈ (γd,A), W TR21 must dominate all other location equilibria because country
1 has both rms and entirely controls all outputs and hence emissions without
any constraint. Obviously, for any t2 ≤ γd, undercutting tax t2 in order to
keep all rms also pays country 1 until t2 = −A2 + ε is reached at which point
net prots (producer surplus plus taxes/minus subsidies) are zero for country
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1 in the TR2-location equilibrium.11 At subsidy level t2 = −A2 , country 1 is
indierent between keeping its rm (NR-location equilibrium) and its rm
leaving (TR1-location equilibrium) but would certainly not undercut taxes of
country 2 as net prots would be negative. Finally, for any subsidy level t2 < −A2 ,
country 1 prefers if its rm relocates to country 2, again, because its net prots
would be negative under the NR-location equilibrium. This suggests that the
main driving force for choosing taxes/subsidies are net prots.
(a) Country 1
(b) Country 2
Figure 1: Ranking of the Welfare Levels of Countries without BCAs
From country 1's perspective (Figure 1(a)), starting at tax level t2 = γd, and
11We need to keep in mind that W̃TR21 intersects with W
NR
1 at t2 = −A2 + ε. As ε is assumed
to be close to zero, this detail cannot be seen in Figure 1(a). The same applies for country 2 in
Figure 1(b).
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gradually lowering tax t2, implies that the optimal response of country 1 is to
marginally undercut taxes of country 2 to keep both rms. For any t2, matching
(t1 = t2; NR-location equilibrium) instead of undercutting (t1 = t2 − ε; TR2-
location equilibrium) constitutes a large and discrete loss of net prots of one
rm, a marginal loss of consumer surplus, which cannot be compensated by a
marginal gain in the form of reduced damages. Similarly, starting at any tax level
t2 < A and gradually lowering t2, choosing a higher tax than country 2 (t1 > t2;
TR1-location equilibrium) instead of matching (t1 = t2; NR-location equilibrium)
constitutes a large discrete loss of net prots of one rm, but has no impact on
the consumer surplus and damages. Hence, it is not surprising that there is a
race-to-the-bottom equilibrium in the light of global pollution, which we derive in
the subsequent subsections.
For country 2, displayed in Figure 1(b), welfare levels and incentives in the three
location equilibria are very similar. All welfare functions of the three location
equilibria literally intersect at t1 = −A2 . From country 2's perspective, the welfare
function of location equilibrium TR1 is above NR and TR2 for all t1 ∈ (−A2 , A)
and, below t1 = −A2 , the welfare function of the TR2-location equilibrium is
above the two other welfare functions. The only dierence is that the constrained
optimum of the TR`-equilibrium does not start below tax level γd but below
(1 − γ)d, as these are the marginal damages of country 2. Pulling all results
together, we can make the following statement.
Lemma 1. The Best Responses of Countries under the No-BCA Regime
i. If D
′


















iii. If tj ≤ −A2 , W
TRk
i ≥ WNRi > W̃
TR`
i .
Hence, the best response of country 1 and country 2 are given by:
t1

= γd if γd < t2 < A
= t2-ε if − A2 < t2 ≤ γd





= (1− γ) d if (1− γ) d < t1 < A
= t1-ε if − A2 < t1 ≤ (1− γ) d
≥ t1 if t1 ≤ −A2
(14)
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
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(a) Country 1 (b) Country 2
Figure 2: Best Response Functions of Countries without BCAs
The best response functions are illustrated in Figure 2, each having three segments.
The rst segment is a vertical (horizontal) line associated with the dominant
unconstrained optimum. That is, each country sets its unconstrained carbon tax
at marginal damagesD
′
i. In this range, the location equilibrium is ˆTR2 for country
1 and ˆTR1 for country 2. The second segment lies marginally above (below)
the 45°-line and is upward sloping, which implies that carbon taxes are strategic
complements. In this segment, the best response of countries is to undercut each
other's taxes, which is associated with the constrained optimum. Hence, the
location equilibrium is ˜TR2 for country 1 and ˜TR1 for country 2. The third
segment corresponds to any negative tax level equal or below −A
2
. At tj = −A2 ,
matching, ti = tj , as well as choosing any higher tax, ti > tj are best responses.
For tj < −A2 , the best response of country i is any tax ti > tj. Thus, in the
third segment, the best response is not unique and therefore not drawn. The
corresponding location equilibrium for tj < −A2 is TR1 for country 1 and TR2
for country 2, and at tj = −A2 it is the same plus additionally, NR for both
countries.12
3.2 Simultaneous Game
In this subsection, we assume countries solve the rst stage simultaneously. In
Figure 3, we combine the best response functions of both countries to obtain the
Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies without BCAs. We denote the Nash
12It is worthwhile noting that these best response functions are very dierent from the single-
valued and continuously downward sloping best response functions in models with xed plant
location, which imply that carbon taxes are strategic substitutes and players have unique re-
sponses.
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Figure 3: Nash Equilibrium without BCAs
Proposition 2. Nash Equilibrium under the No-BCA Regime
Without BCAs, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a subsidy tNE∗1 = t
NE∗
2 = −A2 ,
with location equilibrium NR, which constitutes a race-to-the-bottom.
Proof. Follows directly from Figure 3, noting that t1 > t2 = −A2 and t2 > t1 = −
A
2
are not mutually best responses.13
Three features are interesting about Proposition 2. First, both countries are stuck
at the bottom, being afraid that their rms relocate their plants abroad, a phe-
nomenon known as `regulatory chill' (Neumayer, 2001). In a model of xed plant
location, equilibrium taxes would also be below optimal levels due to the incent-
ive to shift rents, but there would be no race-to-the-bottom. Second, the NE is
symmetric irrespective of the asymmetry among countries in terms of their dam-
age evaluations. Again, in a model with xed plant location equilibrium, this
would be dierent as long as marginal damages are dierent (i.e., γ > 0.5 in our
model). Also, in a model with endogenous plant location but local pollution, an
asymmetric NE could occur.14 Third, in our model, there is only one NE, i.e. the
race-to-the-bottom equilibrium. Both countries suer from damages irrespective






are Nash equilibria with NR-location
equilibrium, where −A2 + ε is the point at which countries stops undercutting and become
indierent between NR and ˜TR` location equilibria. However, as ε → 0, this range converges
to point −A2 , and hence a unique equilibrium. See footnote 11.
14For local pollution, an asymmetric NE may emerge with all plants located in the country
with lower evaluation of environmental damages. See Rauscher (1995) and Hoel (1997).
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of the location of production. Hence, governments undercut each other's carbon
tax until the net gains from prots, consumer surplus and tax revenues are ex-
hausted. Our result is qualitatively similar to Rauscher (1995) who considers in his
extensions a global pollutant. In his model, countries compete towards a zero tax
rate as he does not consider prots in governments welfare function and assumes
a monopolistic market structure. In contrast, in a model with local pollution, a
second not-in-my-backyard equilibrium could emerge with high carbon taxes such
that rms either exit the market or move abroad (Markusen et al., 1995).
3.3 Sequential Game
Suppose country 1 is the leader. Country 1 chooses the point associated with its
highest welfare on country 2' best response function. We argue that there are two




2 = −A2 and the NR-




2 = (1 − γ)d and the TR1-location
equilibrium with the subscript referring to the leader and the superscript denotes
the number of the equilibrium.
From Figure 2(b) and the discussion above, it is clear that any point on segment
3 of country 2's best response function with t1 < −A2 cannot be attractive to
country 1 because country 1 would have to subsidise both rms associated with
a loss. Only t1 = −A2 on segment 3 could potentially qualify as an optimal point.
If country 1 sets its tax level at tL1 = −A2 as a leader, then there are basically two
best responses by the follower: tL1 = t
F
2 = −A2 with NR, and t
L
1 = −A2 < t
F
2 with
TR2. Therefore, we need a tie-breaking rule to have a unique equilibrium. In line
with our previous assumption, and, because both countries are indierent between
both equilibria, we assume that rms remain in their home country. Hence, the




2 = −A2 with NR. This tie-breaking
rule also allows for a straightforward comparison between the simultaneous and
sequential scenario.
Considering segment 1 and 2 on country 2's best response function, SE21 with
tL1 > t
F
2 = (1 − γ)d and the TR1-location equilibrium on segment 1 could be
another potential equilibrium candidate if country 1 perceives damages to be
suciently high, i.e., if γd is suciently large. Any point on segment 2 can be
ruled out because this would lead to the same location equilibrium, but a lower
tax level chosen by the follower, i.e., tF2 < (1− γ)d , which, as shown in Appendix
B.3, leads to a lower welfare level for country 1.
It remains to determine for which conditions SE11 and SE
2
1 will emerge, which is
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. Note if A = Â1
TR1
, country 1 is indierent between
the two location equilibria, though the follower, country 2, prefers TR1. Hence,
we select SE21 according to the Pareto-criterion.
Proposition 3. Stackelberg Equilibrium under the No-BCA Regime if
Country 1 is the Leader




2 = −A2 , with location equilibrium
NR if A > Â1
TR1
(d, γ).




2 = (1− γ) d, with location





(d, γ) increases in γ and d. That is, the higher the damage evaluation
of country 1, the more likely it is that the second equilibrium emerges.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
The rst Stackelberg equilibrium is the same as the race-to-the-bottom Nash
equilibrium. The second Stackelberg equilibrium is dierent, which may be viewed
as a chicken equilibrium, with the leader, being the wise chicken, giving in, setting
taxes suciently high as to avoid the race-to-the-bottom. In both equilibria,
prots plus taxes or minus subsidies are zero in country 1. Hence, country 1
chooses between the two equilibria by trading o environmental damages against
consumer surplus. Intuitively, the larger γ and d compared to A , the larger are
damages in country 1 compared to consumer surplus, and, therefore, the larger will
be the threshold level above which country 1 chooses the rst race-to-the-bottom
equilibrium.
If country 2 is the leader, similar arguments hold, also implying two potential
Stackelberg equilibria, SE12 and SE
2
2 , with the rst one being the race-to-the-
bottom equilibrium and the second the chicken equilibrium, also with a threshold
such that if A > Â2
TR2
the rst equilibrium emerges and if A ≤ Â2
TR2
the second









Proposition 4. Stackelberg Equilibrium under the No-BCA Regime if
Country 2 is the Leader




1 = −A2 with location equilibrium
NR for all γ ≥ 0.7 or for all γ < 0.7 if A > Â2
TR2
(d, γ).




1 = γd with the location equilib-





(d, γ) increases in d and decreases in γ. That is, the higher the damage
evaluation of country 2, the more likely it is that the second equilibrium emerges.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Hence, Propositions 3 and 4 are qualitatively similar. The only dierence in Pro-
position 4 is that for the second equilibrium to emerge, we do not only require
A ≤ Â2
TR2
(d, γ), but also γ < 0.7, as otherwise our condition for positive produc-
tion levels A > d cannot be satised as shown in Appendix B.3. It is probably not
surprising that Â1
TR1
(d, γ) ≥ Â2
TR2
(d, γ) for γ ≥ 0.5, due to the higher damage
evaluation of country 1 than country 2. Hence, the range of parameter values for
which country 1 is choosing the chicken equilibrium if it is the leader is larger
than if country 2 is the leader.
3.4 Comparison under the No-BCA Regime
In this subsection, we briey compare the Nash equilibrium with the Stackelberg
equilibria, and compare those non-cooperative equilibria with the social optimum.
Corollary 1. Comparison of Non-cooperative No-BCA Equilibria and
the Social Optimum
i. A sequential instead of a simultaneous choice of taxes is Pareto-improving for
both countries and leads to less global emissions if the marginal damages of the
Stackelberg leader are suciently large.
ii. (a) If A ≤ Â2
TR2
for all γ < 0.7, each country prefers to be the follower. That
is, there is a second mover advantage.
(b) If Â2
TR2
< A ≤ Â1
TR1




< A, it makes no dierence who is the leader since the outcome is
always NR with a race-to-the-bottom.
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iii. The non-cooperative carbon tax equilibria in the simultaneous and the sequen-
tial game imply a lower eective tax rate, hence, larger global emissions, and lower
global welfare than in the social optimum.
iv. The dierence between global welfare and global emissions in the social op-
timum and any of the non-cooperative equilibria increases in the global damage
parameter d.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Results i as well as ii can be related to the literature on imperfect competition
of rms if choices are strategic complements due to upward sloping best response
functions, for instance Gal-Or (1985), assuming symmetric players, shows that
there is a second mover advantage and that Stackelberg equilibria are Pareto-
improving. In our model, this is relevant in segment 2 and point t1 = t2 = −A2
on segment 3, which implies upward sloping best replies. Moreover, players are
`suciently symmetric' for γ < 0.7, but we also need A ≤ Â2
TR2
in our model
to have a qualitatively similar result (Corollary 1, i and ii (a)). However, in all
other cases, we get dierent results. If Â2
TR2
< A ≤ Â1
TR1
(Corollary 1, ii
(b)), country 1 prefers to be the leader and if A > Â1
TR1
(Corollary 1, ii (c)),
leadership makes no dierence. Thus, in our model, asymmetry and multiple
incentives in the objective function (e.g., the trade-o between consumer surplus
and environmental damages), give new results.
Result iii is a direct implication of the fact that, in any non-cooperative equilibria,
global externalities are not fully internalised. More interesting is result iv; the
dierence or gap between the social optimum and any of the non-cooperative
equilibria increases in the damage parameter d. Noting that a proxy of the net
benets from production and consumption is A = a − c in our model, A > d
for an interior solution, an increase of d implies that A
d
is decreasing, holding
A constant. Hence, the higher global marginal damages compared to the net
benets from production and consumption, the larger would be the gains from
full cooperation.
4 Climate Policy Equilibria: BCA Regime
As mentioned in Section 2, we only consider the possibility that country 1 can
impose BCAs on imports if t1 > t2, and consider the possibility that country 2
could do the same if t2 > t1 in Appendix E. Hence, we have the same location
176
equilibria as under the No-BCA regime, except if t1 > t2, in which case we have
partial instead of total relocation: 1) NR if t1 = t2, i.e., no relocation of rms;
2) PR1 if t1 > t2, i.e., rm 1, with its plant supplying the market in country 2,
partially relocates to country 2; 3) TR2 if t1 < t2, i.e., all plants are located in
country 1. We proceed as in Section 3, namely rst derive best responses and
then determine Nash and Stackelberg equilibria.
4.1 Best Responses
Since countries have asymmetric incentives, we treat each country separately in
this subsection. In order to derive equilibrium taxes, we can exclusively focus on
the PR1-location equilibrium with t1 > t2, as the other location equilibria are the
same as in Section 3. The welfare functions of country 1 and country 2 in the
PR1-location equilibrium are given by:
W PR11 = CS1 + π11 + T1 −D1 +BCA1 if t1 > t2 , (15)
where BCA1 = (t1 − t2)x21
W PR12 = CS2 + π12 + π21 + π22 + T2 −D2 if t1 > t2 . (16)
Substituting equilibrium output levels given in Appendix C.1 into (15), we obtain











































We call t̂PR11 (t2), as given in (18), the standard best response function of country 1
in the PR1-location equilibrium, which is upward sloping. That is, for country 1,
taxes are strategic complements in this location equilibrium. Since BCA revenues
depend on the dierence between the two national tax levels, country 1 has an
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incentive to impose a higher tax if t2 increases in order to capture more tari
revenues.
t̂PR11 (t2) can be viewed as the unconstrained optimum in the PR1-location equilib-
rium. Unfortunately, we need to consider two additional constrained optima. The
rst emerges from the non-negativity of output levels, with the non-negativity
constraint (NNC): t̂PR11 < A (see Section 2). If the unconstrained tax would be
given by t̂PR11 ≥ A, country 1 deviates from its optimal tax and sets ẗ1 = A − ε.
This follows from the concavity of the welfare of country 1 with respect to t1 in
the PR1-location equilibrium and the fact that the constraint t̂
PR1
1 < A requires a
tax rate t1 below the optimal level. The second constraint is the BCA-constraint,
which requires t2 < t̂
PR1
1 . If the unconstrained tax would be given by t2 ≥ t̂PR11 ,
country 1 deviates by setting t̆1 = t2 + ε, which is the lowest possible tax level
higher than t2. Again, this follows from the concavity of the welfare function and
the constraint which requires the tax to be above the optimal level.
Substituting equilibrium output levels given in Appendix C.1 into (16), we obtain
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(1− γ)d = 0






(1− γ) d− 3
4
t1 , (20)
where the standard best response function of country 2, t̂PR12 (t1), in the PR1-
location equilibrium, as given in (20), is downward sloping. From country 2's
point of view, carbon taxes are strategic substitutes. If t1 increases, the plant
of rm 2, which supplies country 1, faces a higher carbon tari, which reduces
the producer surplus and the tax revenues obtained from this plant in country 2.
Therefore, country 2 has an incentive to raise its tax as a countervailing measure.
However, such a tax increase negatively aects consumers in country 2 and prots
of the other two plants located in country 2 supplying its market. In our model, the
second eect dominates the rst eect, and, hence, the best response of country
2 is to lower its taxes if country 1's tax increases.
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We need also to consider the best response of country 2 if it is not able to choose
its unconstrained optimal tax as given in (20). The BCA-constraint requires
t1 > t̂
PR1





(1− γ) d. We nd that if the BCA-constraint is satised, this is sucient
that the non-negativity constraint t̂PR12 < A holds. Therefore, if t1 > t1, country
2's best response is to set the unconstrained tax t̂PR12 . However, if t1 ≤ t1, country
2 will deviate from its optimal tax and will choose its constrained tax t̃2 = t1− ε.
Pulling results together, our just obtained results for the new PR1-location equi-
librium as well as our previous results obtained for the NR- and TR2-location
equilibria in Section 3, we obtain:
Welfare Levels of Country 1 for Three Location Equilibria :




1 as dened under the No-BCA regime.
2. Case t1 = t2: WNR1 as dened under the No-BCA regime.
3. Case t1 > t2








as a function of t2, in the range
t2 < 2γd and t2 < 2A − 2γd . Country 1 chooses its unconstrained tax
t̂PR11 (t2) as given in (18).




t1 = ẗ1 = A− ε
)
as a function of t2, in the range
t2 ≥ 2A−2γd. Country 1 chooses its constrained tax ẗ1, which is marginally
smaller than the maximum feasible level.




t1 = t̆1 = t2 + ε
)
as a function of t2, in the range
t2 ≥ 2γd . Country 1 chooses its constrained tax at t̆1, which is marginally
above the lowest possible tax rate and hence marginally above t2.
Welfare Levels of Country 2 for Three Location Equilibria :
1. Case t1 > t2








as a function of t1, in the range
t1 > t1. Country 2 chooses its unconstrained tax level t̂
PR1
2 (t1) as given in
(20).




t2 = t̃2 = t1 − ε
)
as a function of t1, in the range
t1 ≤ t1. Country 2 chooses its constrained tax rate t̃2 marginally below
country 1's tax rate t1.
2. Case t2 = t1: WNR2 as dened under the No-BCA regime.
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3. Case t1 < t2: W
TR2
2 as dened under the No-BCA regime.
The details of the welfare functions dened above are given in Appendix C.1.
In order to derive the best response function of country 1 and 2, it is helpful
to consider Figures 4 and 5.15 Let us start to consider country 1's incentives in
Figure 4.
The welfare function of country 1 in the TR2- and NR-location equilibrium
are the same as in Figure 1(a). The dierent in Figure 4 is that the welfare
function in the TR1-location equilibrium has been replaced by the PR1-location
equilibrium where the latter equilibrium is much more attractive than the
former to country 1. Country 1 can keep one plant of its own rm, and, most
importantly, receives tari revenues from BCAs. Compared to the NR-location
equilibrium, country 1 has both lower prots (since it has one plant fewer) and
lower consumer surplus, but also lower damages and positive tari revenues in
the PR1-location equilibrium. Thus, there exist tax levels t2 above −A2 for which
Ŵ PR11 > W
NR
1 is possible. Similarly, compared to the TR2-location equilibrium,
in the PR1-location equilibrium, country 1 has three plants fewer and hence less
prots, as well as lower consumer surplus, but also lower damages and positive
tari revenues. The intersection point of W̃ TR21 and Ŵ
PR1
1 is at t2, which is larger
than t2 = −A2 .
Figure 4: Ranking of the Welfare Levels of Country 1 with BCAs
From Figure 4, it is evident that there are two relevant segments when it comes to
ranking welfare: i) any tax t2 > t2 implies that TR2 and ii) any tax t2 < t2 implies
15The Welfare functions in Figure 4 correspond to a particular case, which is called case (2 (a))
in Lemma 2, and which is provided in Appendix C.2. For other cases, there will no qualitative
changes.
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that PR1 is the preferred location equilibrium. Pulling all features together, leads
to Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. The Best Response of Country 1 under the BCA Regime









ii. If t2 < t2 ≤ γd, W̃ TR21 > W PR11 and W̃ TR21 > WNR1 .
iii. If −A
2
< t2 ≤ t2, Ŵ PR11 ≥ W̃ TR21 and Ŵ PR11 > WNR1 .







Hence, the best response of country 1 is given by:
t1

= γd if γd < t2 < A
= t2-ε if t2 ≤ t2 ≤ γd
= t̂PR11 (t2) > t2 if t2 ≤ t2
(21)
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Figure 5: Best Response Function of Country 1 with BCAs
The best response function of country 1 has three segments, like under the No-
BCA regime (see Figure 2(a)). The rst two segments are similar: a vertical
line, i.e., the dominant strategy with the unconstrained TR2-location equilibrium
(denoted by ˆTR2), and the marginally undercutting tax segment with the con-
strained TR2-location equilibrium (denoted by ˜TR2), which lies slightly above the
45°-line. However, the second segment stops at t2 in Figure 5 and not at t2 = −A2
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as in Figure 2(a). Also, dierent from Figure 2(a), the third part in Figure 5 is
upward sloping, which is the standard best reply function in the PR1-location
equilibrium (denoted by PR1). Segments 2 and 3 have one point in common at
t2 = t2. Hence, the best response function is discontinuous at t2 = t2: country 1
is indierent between the TR2- and the PR1-location equilibrium. We note that
matching taxes with the NR-location equilibrium is never a best response for any
tax level t2.
Consider now country 2. In Figure 6, for all t1 > t1, country 2 achieves its
highest welfare level if it sets its optimal tax level, t̂PR12 , attracting three plants.
However, since t̂PR12 is a function of t1, we notice that Ŵ
PR1
2 is a convex function.
For any t1 ≤ t1, country 2 responds by choosing its constrained carbon tax in the
PR1-location equilibrium with t̃2 = t1 − ε, and hence W̃ PR12 is a strictly concave
function. As we explained in the No-BCA regime, undercutting will stop when
prots minus subsidies become zero, i.e., marginally above t1 = −A2 .
16 That is,
further undercutting means too much subsidies that exceed prots of rms, and,
hence, this it is not a best response.
Figure 6: Ranking of the Welfare Levels of Country 2 with BCAs




Lemma 3. The Best Response of Country 2 under the BCA Regime









< t1 ≤ t1, W̃ PR12 > WNR2 > W
TR2
2 .
iii. If t1 ≤ −A2 , W
TR2
2 ≥ WNR2 > W̃
PR1
2 .
Hence, the best response of country 2 is given by:
t2

= t̂PR12 (t1) if t1 < t1 < A
= t1-ε if − A2 < t1 ≤ t1
≥ t1 if t1 ≤ −A2
(22)
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
The best response function of country 2 in Figure 7 is nearly the same as under
the No-BCA regime in Figure 2(b). The dierence is that the boundary between
segment 1 and 2 is not t1 = (1− γ)d but t1 = t1 and segment 1 is not a horizontal
line but a downward sloping function.
Figure 7: Best Response Function of Country 2 with BCAs
4.2 Simultaneous Game
The fact that country 1 stops undercutting before country 2 under the BCA regime
implies that a race-to-the-bottom is not a Nash Equilibrium (NE). Moreover,
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matching taxes is never a best response for country 1 with BCAs. Hence, the NR-
location equilibrium cannot be a NE. We can also rule out the constrained PR1-
location equilibrium ( ˜PR1) and the constrained TR2-location equilibrium ( ˜TR2)
with mutually undercutting taxes along the 45°-line, as best response functions
do not intersect. Therefore, if a NE exits, it must be that country 1 sets a higher
tax than country 2 and rm 1 partially relocates with one plant to country 2.
This is the unconstrained PR1-location equilibrium ( ˆPR1). The equilibrium tax
levels of country 1 and 2, tNE∗1 ( ˆPR1) and t
NE∗
2 (P̂R1), follow from solving (18) and
(20) simultaneously (see Appendix C.4).
(a) Existence of a NE
(b) Non-existence of a NE
Figure 8: Nash Equilibrium with BCAs
In Figure 8(a), the two `standard best response functions' in the PR1-location
equilibrium intersect and hence a NE exists. However, this may not always be
the case, and, hence, a NE may not exist as shown in Figure 8(b). As mentioned
by Anderson (1987) and Mintz and Tulkens (1986), this may arise due to the
discontinuity and multivaluedness of best response functions. At t2, country 1 has
two best responses, and there is a discrete jump from one to another segment of
the best response function.
For a pure strategy NE to exist, the intersection of the best reply functions in
the PR1-location equilibrium must occur in the range where country 1's best
response is located on its standard best response function. That is, we must have
t2 ≥ tNE∗2 (P̂R1). However, if t2 < tNE∗2 (P̂R1), the best response of country 1 would
be to marginally undercut country 2's tax t2. Hence, best reply functions in the
unconstrained PR1-location equilibrium do not intersect and a pure strategy NE
does not exist.
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Proposition 5. Nash Equilibrium under the BCA Regime
i. A pure strategy NE may not exist.
ii. A pure strategy NE exists if A ≤ ANE(d, γ) for all γ > 0.855 with ANE(d, γ)
increasing in d and γ. That is, a NE exists if global marginal damages and the
asymmetry among countries are suciently large.




1 (P̂R1) > 0 and −A2 < t
NE∗
2 (P̂R1) < 0,
and the location equilibrium of rms is PR1.
Proof. See Appendix C.4, including the precise denition of ANE(d, γ).
Thus, if the global damage evaluation parameter d is large enough, a NE may
exist under the BCA regime. We recall that the dierence between the NE under
the No-BCA regime and the social optimum in terms of global emissions and
global welfare increases in the parameter d (see Corollary 1, in particular part iv).
Hence, if d is large, the potential gains from cooperation would be large. It is
exactly under those conditions where BCAs are an eective policy measure and
help to escape the race-to-the-bottom, though socially optimal levels cannot be
obtained, as we know from Proposition 1.
4.3 Sequential Game
We rst solve for equilibrium taxes under the BCA regime if country 1 is the
leader. Country 1 can choose any point on country 2' best response function as
shown in Figure 7. There are basically three options.
 Option 1: On segment 3, without BCAs, t1 = t2 = −A2 is the only point that
could be attractive to country 1 with the NR-location equilibrium because
for both countries subsidies above −A
2
are never attractive.
 Option 2: On segment 1, with BCAs, country 1 can set tL1 > t1 to induce
relocation of one plant of its home rm, which results in the unconstrained







with respect to t1, taking into account the best
response t̂PR12 (t1) of country 2, as given by (20). The corresponding equi-
librium tax of country 2 follows by substituting optimal t1 into (20). We
denote equilibrium taxes by tL∗1 ( ˆPR1) and t
F∗
2 ( ˆPR1).
 Option 3: On segment 2, with BCAs, country 1 sets a tax −A
2
< tL1 ≤ t1
which would be undercut by country 2, t2 = tL1 − ε, which results in the
constrained PR1-location equilibrium.
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It turns out that country 1 prefers options 1 and 2 over option 3. Whether option
1 or 2 is chosen depends on parameter values.17
Proposition 6. Stackelberg Equilibrium under the BCA Regime if
Country 1 is the Leader




2 = −A2 , with location equilibrium
NR if A > A1PR1(d, γ).
ii. The second equilibrium SE21 is t
L∗
1 ( ˆPR1) > t
F∗
2 (P̂R), where t
L∗
1 ( ˆPR1) > 0 and





1 (d, γ) increases in d and γ. That is, the higher the damage evaluation of
country 1, the more likely it is that the second equilibrium emerges.
Proof. See Appendix C.5, including the precise denition of A
PR1
1 (d, γ).
There exists a threshold A
PR1
1 (d, γ) below which country 1 would prefer partial
relocation of its home rm.18 As under the No-BCA regime, this equilibrium oc-
curs if marginal damages of country 1, γd, are suciently large compared to A,
a proxy for the net gains from production and consumption. This second equi-
librium allows the leader to escape the race-to-the-bottom, with higher eective
taxes in both countries, hence lower global emissions. Dierent from the No-BCA
regime, the leader does not have to choose between the NR- and the TR1-location
equilibrium, but between the NR- and the PR1-location equilibrium where the
latter choice is more attractive. Hence, the chicken equilibrium is more attractive
to country 1 under the BCA regime. This explains why the threshold under the
BCA regime, A
PR1
1 (d, γ), is higher than the threshold under the No-BCA regime,
Â1
TR1




1 . In other words, for a given value of A, it requires
lower marginal damages in country 1 under the BCA than the No-BCA regime in
order for country 1 to opt for escaping the race-to-the-bottom.
We now consider that country 2 is the Stackelberg leader, even though one may ar-
gue that this possibility is not very likely, given that only country 1 can implement
BCAs. Never, we consider this possibility for completeness.
It turns out that the derivation of Stackelberg equilibria is much more complicated
due to the jump of the best response function of country 1 under this regime.
17In principle, the leader, country 1, could also decide not to use BCAs, set tL1 > (1− γ) d,
in order to induce the total relocation of its rm, resulting in the TR1-location equilibrium. In
Appendix C.5, we show that this option is dominated by option 2.
18If A = A
PR1
1 , country 1 is indierent between the two location equilibria. Hence, according
to the Pareto-criterion, we select SE21 for all γ < 0.98, while SE
1
1 for all γ ≥ 0.98.
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Therefore, we just mention a couple of observations with reference to Figure 5,
while the details are provided in Appendix C.6.
First, the NR-location equilibrium is no longer a choice for country 2 as it is not
part of country 1's best response function under the BCA regime. Second, for the
TR2-location equilibrium, country 2 could choose either tL2 > γd to induce the
unconstrained ˆTR2-location equilibrium or t2 < tL2 ≤ γd to induce the constrained
˜TR2-location equilibrium. Third, for the PR1-location equilibrium, country 2








with respect to t2, taking
country 1's best response function in the PR1-location equilibrium into account
as given in (18) such that the unconstrained ˆPR1-location equilibrium emerges
with tL∗2 ( ˆPR1) < t
F∗
1 ( ˆPR1). However, if t
L∗
2 ( ˆPR1) > t2, country 2 has to deviate
from its unconstrained tax level and set tL∗2 . t2 which follows from the concavity
of the welfare of country 2 in the PR1-location equilibrium. Fourth, if country
2 chooses t2 = t2, country 1 would be indierent between choosing its optimal
tax t̂PR11 in the PR1-location equilibrium or undercutting tax t2, corresponding to
its constrained TR2-location equilibrium (T̃R2). Therefore, if country 2 is better
o under PR1, it will set a tax level marginally below t2, i.e., tL∗2 . t2, that
induces country 1 to react on its standard best reply function in the ˆPR1-location
equilibrium. While if country 2 prefers the ˜TR2-location equilibrium, it will set
a tax level marginally above t2, i.e., tL∗2 & t2, such that country 1 responds by
undercutting this tax level, t1 = t2 − ε.19
As Proposition 7 spells out, country 2 will either choose the PR1-location equilib-
rium or the constrained TR2-location equilibrium around t2 on country 1's best
response function, which gives rise to two Stackelberg equilibria.
Proposition 7. Stackelberg Equilibrium under the BCA Regime if
Country 2 is the Leader
i. The rst equilibrium SE12 is: (a) t
L∗
2 ( ˆPR1) < t
F∗
1 ( ˆPR1) if A < A
PR1
2 for all γ ≥










1 ( ˆPR1) > 0;
−A
2
< tL∗2 < 0. The equilibrium location of rms is PR1.
ii. The second equilibrium SE22 is t
L∗




2 − ε, with −A2 <
tL∗2 , t
F∗
1 < 0. The equilibrium location of rms is TR2, if A > A
TR2
2 (d, γ).
19For a similar case, see Dixit (1979), though in a dierent context. Dixit explains that if
the leader chooses its strategy at the point where the follower is indierent between two best
responses, there is technically no equilibrium if the leader prefers one response by the follower
to the other. In such a case, the leader can choose its strategy slightly larger or smaller than





2 (d, γ) increases in d and decreases in γ.





The incentives of the leader are very dierent for country 2 than country 1.
Whereas country 1 can choose between the race-to-the-bottom equilibrium with no
relocation and the chicken PR1-location equilibrium if its damages are suciently
high, country 2 faces the choice between partial relocation of rm 1 under the
BCA regime (PR1-location equilibrium) and total relocation of its rm to country
1 without BCAs (TR2-location equilibrium). Both equilibria imply lower global
emissions than in the race-to-the-bottom equilibrium. So the `chicken choice' for
environmental reasons is in the range A ≤ ATR22 . For A >A
TR2
2 , country 2 would
need to provide large subsidies to three plants of which one faces taris on exports
to country 1 (and hence net prots are low) in the PR1-location equilibrium, i.e.,
t2 ≈ t2 is negative and large in absolute terms, which does not pay. Hence, total
relocation is preferred and no BCAs are imposed.
4.4 Comparison under the BCA Regime
In this subsection, we compare the Nash equilibrium with the Stackelberg equi-
libria under the BCA regime, and all non-cooperative equilibria with the social
optimum. In order to compare the three non-cooperative equilibria, we need to
assume that a Nash equilibrium exists. It turns out that if the sucient conditions
for the existence of a NE hold, implying an unconstrained PR1-location equilib-
rium, the same is true for the Stackelberg equilibria regardless whether country
1 and 2 is the leader. More specically, if country 1 is the leader, the second
equilibrium SE21 with taxes t
∗L
1 ( ˆPR1) > t
∗F
2 ( ˆPR1) emerges (see Proposition 6) and
if country 2 is the leader, the rst equilibrium SE12 with (a) t
∗L
2 ( ˆPR1) < t
∗F
1 ( ˆPR1)
will materialize (see Proposition 7). In other words, the chicken equilibria emerge
under Stackelberg leadership, implying that global marginal damages d are su-
ciently large compared to the benets from production and consumption, approx-
imated by our parameter A = a− c.
Since already in the Nash equilibrium, a race-to-the-bottom is avoided under the
BCA regime, it cannot be expected that Stackelberg leadership is always Pareto-
improving and leads to lower global emissions compared to the Nash equilibrium
as this was the case under the No-BCA regime (see Corollary 1). Some interesting
ndings are summarized below.
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Corollary 2. Comparison of Non-cooperative BCA Equilibria and the
Social Optimum
Suppose the sucient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium under the
BCA regime hold.
i. If country 1 is the Stackelberg leader, global welfare and global emissions are
higher than in the Nash equilibrium. Stackelberg leadership is Pareto-improving if
γ ≥ γ̌ ≈ 0.94.
ii. If country 2 is the Stackelberg leader, global welfare is higher than in the Nash
equilibrium, Stackelberg leadership is Pareto-improving and leads to lower global
emissions if γ <
...
γ ≈ 0.98.
iii. Global emissions are higher and global welfare is higher under Stackelberg
leadership of country 1 than under Stackelberg leadership of country 2.
iv. Global emissions in all three non-cooperative equilibria are higher than in the
social optimum.
Under those conditions for which a Nash equilibrium does not exist, global emis-
sions under Stackelberg leadership may be lower than in the social optimum. This
is the case if global marginal damages d are low compared to the gains from pro-
duction and consumption A, i.e., if the gains from cooperation are small.
Proof. See Appendix C.7.
Corollary 2 conrms that Stackelberg leadership is not always Pareto-improving
and even global welfare may not increase under Stackelberg leadership of country
2. However, Stackelberg leadership always increases global welfare if country 1 is
the leader and if country 2 is the leader if asymmetries are not too pronounced.
Under leadership of country 2, a global welfare increase goes along with lower
global emissions, but under leadership of country 1 the reverse is true, global
emissions increase. Taken result ii and iii together, Stackelberg leadership always
increases global welfare compared to the Nash equilibrium if a social planner could
choose who is the Stackelberg leader, depending on the value of γ.
The very last result is in line with Hoel (1997) who shows that under endogen-
ous plant location, equilibrium policy levels can lead to an overshooting in that
equilibrium global emissions are below socially optimal levels. However, in our
model, this only occurs if the gains from cooperation are small. In any case, global
welfare levels are always below the socially optimal level, as follows directly from
Proposition 1.
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5 Comparison of Climate Policies across Regimes:
The Role of BCAs
In this section, we compare equilibria with and without BCAs in order to analyse
the eect of BCAs. A sensible comparison must assume the same sequence of
moves under both regimes.
5.1 Simultaneous Game
In order to evaluate the eects of BCAs if countries choose their taxes simultan-
eously, we must assume that a NE exists under the BCA regime. According to
Proposition 5, this implies A ≤ ANE(d, γ) and γ > 0.855. Based on Proposition
2 and 5, we can draw the following conclusions.
Corollary 3. The Eect of BCAs in the Simultaneous Game
i. BCAs lead to higher taxes in both countries, which leads to lower global emis-
sions and higher global welfare.
ii. BCAs always increase the welfare of country 1 and increase the welfare of
country 2 if γ ≤ γ̄ ≈ 0.96
iii. BCAs change the equilibrium location of rms from NR to PR1.
Proof. See Appendix D.1.
Lower global emissions follows directly from the fact that, under the BCA re-
gime, countries avoid the race-to-the-bottom equilibrium, and, instead, the PR1-
location equilibrium with higher taxes in both countries emerges. This is wel-
fare improving for both countries, except for country 2 if its damage evaluation,
(1 − γ)d, is very low. However, even if country 2 would be worse o, aggregate
welfare is higher under the BCA regime. Clearly, BCAs must improve country 1's
welfare position as BCAs equip country 1 with an additional policy tool.
Thus, under a simultaneous move scenario, BCAs achieve for what they are de-
signed: they protect country 1, which is more environmentally conscious, and
allow to implement a more ambitious climate policy which also raises global wel-
fare. Only if country 2 gives hardly any weight to environmental damages are
BCAs not Pareto-improving, a qualication which is hardly surprising. We may
also recall that a NE under the BCA regime exists if the gains from cooperation
would be large. So BCAs are useful when it matters.
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5.2 Sequential Game
In order to analyse the eect of BCAs in the sequential game, we consider three
parameter ranges when country 1 is the leader and the same is true when country 2
is the leader, though ranges under dierent leadership do not coincide as Corollary
4 spells out.
Corollary 4. The Eect of BCAs in the Sequential Game
Let E, W , W1, W2 denote global emissions, global welfare and individual welfare
of country 1 and 2, respectively, and let ↑ denote an increase and ↓ denote a
decrease of a variable. Let the parameter ranges be dened as in Propositions 3,
4, 6 and 7.
(1) Suppose country 1 is the Stackelberg leader. BCAs imply the following changes
compared to No-BCAs:
i. Region F , A ≤ ÂTR11 : TR1 =⇒PR1; E ↓; W1 ↑, W2 ↓, W ↑ if γ ≤ γ̃ ≈ 0.83.
ii. Region G, ÂTR11 < A ≤ A
PR1
1 : NR =⇒PR1; E ↓; W1 ↑, W2 ↑ if γ < γ̆ ≈ 0.98,
W ↑ if γ < γ̆ ≈ 0.98.
iii. Region H, A
PR1
1 ≤ A: NR =⇒NR; no changes.
(2) Suppose country 2 is the Stackelberg leader. BCAs imply the following changes
compared to No-BCAs
i. Region M , A ≤ ÂTR12 and γ < 0.7: TR2 =⇒(PR1) TR2; (E ↑; W1 ↓, W2 ↑,
W ↓) no changes.
ii. Region N , ÂTR12 < A ≤ ĀTR22 : NR =⇒PR1; E ↓; W1 ↑, W2 ↑↓ if γ < γ̊ ≈
0.96, W ↑.
iii. Region O, ĀTR21 < A: NR =⇒T̃R2; E ↓; W1 ↑, W2 ↓ , W ↑ if A < AO.
Proof. See Appendix D.2, including the precise denition of AO.20
Let us start by considering the eects if country 1 is the leader. Without BCAs,
countries escape the race-to-the-bottom in region F , while in regions G and H,
this is not the case. With BCAs, in region F and G, the PR1-location equilibrium
emerges, whereas in region H, the NR-location equilibrium with the race-to-the-
bottom emerges. Thus, in region H, BCAs make no dierence. However, this
20If A = A
PR1
1 and γ < 0.98, country 1, as a leader, chooses PR1, and, hence this threshold
level is included in region G. Whereas if γ ≥ 0.98, country 1 chooses NR, and, hence this
threshold level is included in region H. See footnote 18.
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region is where parameter A is relatively large compared to d (recall: A
PR1
1 (d, γ)
increases in d) and hence the potential gains from cooperation would anyway be
small.
In region G, BCAs help to avoid the race-to-the-bottom, and hence global emis-
sions are lower than without BCAs. Both countries benet from BCAs, except if
country 2 with the lower damage evaluation hardly values damages at all. This
result seems intuitive as well as the fact that country 1 is always better o. BCAs
provide country 1 with an additional policy tool (and country 1 is the Stackelberg
leader), which must be advantageous and at worst neutral.
This is very similar in region F , even though without BCAs the race-to-the-
bottom is avoided. For country 1, clearly, the PR1-location equilibrium is much
better than the TR1-location equilibrium and not surprisingly, for country 2 this is
reversed, as the TR1-location equilibrium provides the highest welfare to country
2. Therefore, even though global emissions decrease under the BCA regime, global
welfare only increases provided a certain threshold of γ is not exceeded. That is,
country 2's damage evaluation is not too low.
Thus, taken together, BCAs lower global emissions whenever the potential gains
from cooperation would be large. They normally raise global welfare if the en-
vironmental damage evaluation in country 2 is not too low, which, in our model,
means that the damage evaluation in both countries is not too dierent. If the
race-to-the-bottom equilibrium is already avoided without BCAs, then BCAs only
benet country 1.
We now consider the eects if country 2 is the leader. We argued above that this
constellation is not very likely as only country 1 can implement BCAs, however,
we consider this possibility for completeness.
Given that country 1 decides about the implementation of BCAs, country 1 would
never implement BCAs in region M , as without BCAs, it has all rms and can
choose its optimal tax. In regions N and O, BCAs improve upon the race-to-the-
bottom equilibrium, which emerges without BCAs. Global emissions are always
lower, global welfare is always higher in region N and in most cases in region O.
However, although country 1 is always better o with BCAs, this is not always
true for country 2. Similar to above, we can conclude that BCAs help the country
which implements this policy, country 1 in our model, lowers global emissions and
in most cases increases global welfare, even though the country on which BCAs
are imposed may be worse o.
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6 Conclusions
One main obstacle of more ambitious policies to address global warming are leak-
age eects. One particular form of leakage is the relocation of the production of
rms, which may even imply that rms close down and move abroad if environ-
mental regulation increases their production cost too much. This is in particular
relevant for emission-intensive industries which trade internationally. In order to
capture this phenomenon and the discussion surrounding it, we set up an intra-
industry trade model and studied an emission tax competition game between two
asymmetric countries when both, the location choice of rms and the policy choice
of governments, are endogenous. Asymmetry implied in our model that countries
evaluate the damages from global pollution dierently. We solved a three-stage
game in which governments rst choose their emission tax, then rms choose the
location of their two plants (one producing for the home and one for the foreign
market), and nally rms choose their production levels. We considered two policy
regimes. Under the No-BCA regime, each government imposes a carbon tax on
the production within its national boundaries. This regime served as a benchmark
to study the eect of border carbon adjustments, abbreviated BCAs, which we
called the BCA regime. Under this regime, the government which sets a higher
carbon tax can additionally impose a tari on imports, which have been produced
facing a lower tax abroad. BCAs fully adjust the dierence between the carbon
taxes in the two countries. This implies that all plants supplying the country that
imposes BCAs face the same eective carbon tax. As under the BCA regime a
Nash equilibrium (i.e., a simultaneous choices of taxes) in the tax game may not
exist (due to discontinuity of reaction functions), we also considered Stackelberg
equilibria (i.e., sequential choices of taxes).
Without BCAs, the eective taxes that rms face, and hence their prots, are
based on the location of production. Thus, each rm will locate with its two
plants in the country which sets a lower carbon tax. Thus, a government setting
a higher carbon tax than its rival government will see its rm relocating abroad.
If countries choose their climate policies simultaneously, this leads to a erce tax
competition in which each government has an incentive to undercut the other
government's carbon tax in order to keep their rm or even attract the foreign
rm. That is, we showed that the Nash equilibrium is a 'race to the bottom'
leading to symmetric low taxes (or symmetric high subsidies) with high global
emissions, irrespective of the absolute value of environmental damages and the
degree of asymmetry among countries in terms of the evaluation of damages. In
this equilibrium, each rm remains with its two plants in the country of origin,
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which we called no relocation (NR). Even if the environmentally more friendly
government recognises damages as being important for the welfare of its country,
it is rational for governments to lower taxes if the foreign government does so as
well. By lowering taxes gradually, environmental damages increase marginally,
but the gain in terms of prots is discrete, (i.e., avoiding the loss of prots be-
cause the own rm does not locate abroad and/or increasing prots because the
foreign rm is attracted to the home country). This is the leakage dilemma of en-
vironmentally concerned governments. Interestingly, in a Stackelberg equilibrium
with a sequential tax choice, governments may be able to avoid the race-to-the-
bottom, and instead a 'wise chicken' equilibrium emerges. This is the case if the
Stackelberg leader values environmental damages suciently high, recognises the
disastrous outcome of the race-to-the-bottom equilibrium and hence sets a high
carbon tax such that its rm relocates to the follower's country. This total relo-
cation (TR) equilibrium leads to less global emissions and, more importantly, is
Pareto-improving for both countries compared to the Nash equilibrium.
Also under the BCA regime, the pressure on the race-to-the-bottom was reduced
even if governments choose their taxes simultaneously. A tari allows the envir-
onmentally more concerned government to set a higher tax without the danger of
loosing both plants. BCAs create an equal playing eld for all production sold
to the home market. Thus, higher taxes do not lead to total relocation (TR)
but only to partial relocation (PR). Moreover, the government imposing carbon
taris at the border gains a strategic advantage because it is able to shift tax rev-
enues from abroad to home. In the simultaneous game, a Nash equilibrium may
not exist (due to non-continuous reaction functions), though we showed that it
exists when the potential gains from cooperation would be large. That is, it exists
if global marginal damages are suciently large. Also in the sequential game, the
wise chicken equilibrium, associated with lower global emissions, is more likely
to emerge than the race-to-the-bottom equilibrium. Hence, taken together, our
results showed that BCAs can support more ambitious climate policies and can
be globally welfare improving under the more general assumption of endogenous
plant location. However, we also demonstrated that BCAs will always fall short
of achieving the socially optimal global welfare level.
In this paper, we considered a weak form of BCAs (also sometimes referred to
as partial BCAs), which was a carbon tari. However, also a strong form  (also
sometimes called full BCAs) has been suggested where taris are complemented
by export rebates. That is, emission taxes on exports are reduced to the lower
foreign emission tax level. This creates not only an equal playing eld for goods
sold to the market in which the higher emission tax is levied on production, but
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also for goods sold to the market in which the lower tax is imposed on production.
De facto, this means to move from a production- to consumption-based emission
tax. It may also imply that BCAs do not only avoid total relocation of rms
located in environmentally friendly countries abroad, but may even avoid partial
relocation. Hence, it would be interesting to explore whether strong BCAs could
further improve global welfare. This is not obvious in a strategic context as export
rebates per se increase pollution. Another extension could be to analyse whether
and under which conditions BCAs are an eective policy tool to enforce a socially
optimal solution. We showed that the social optimum can be obtained under
three location equilibria, which greatly dier in the individual welfare levels of
countries. In addition, BCAs result in partial relocation of rms from the more
to the less environmentally concerned country. Hence, it is not straightforward
to predict a priori whether BCAs would be a credible threat to enforce a socially
optimal solution in this set-up.
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Appendix
A Possible Location Equilibria
Consider the No-BCA regime. Firm k will base its decision where to locate its
plant supplying market i on ∆πki = πki(i, `) − πki(j, `), ` = i, j. For a given
location of rm `´s plant supplying market i, rm k will locate in country i if
∆πki > 0 and will locate in country j if ∆πki < 0.
i) Let ` = i. Then, ∆πki = πki(i, i)− πki(j, i) = −49 (ti − tj) (A− tj) as πki (i, i) =
(A−ti)2
9
and πki (j, i) =
(A−2tj+ti)2
9
, making use of (3) and (4) in the text, noting that
the rst payo assumes tax vector (ti, ti) and the second (tj, ti).
ii) Let ` = j. Then, ∆πki = πki(i, j)−πki(j, j) = −49 (ti − tj) (A− ti) as πki (i, j) =
(A−2ti+tj)2
9
and πki (j, j) =
(A−tj)2
9
, again, using (3) and (4) in the text, and noting
that the rst payo assumes tax vector (ti, tj) and the second (tj, tj). Since
A− tj > 0 and A− ti > 0 by assumption, rm k's plant supplying market i has a
dominant strategy, irrespective where rm `´s plant supplying market i locates.
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It moves its plant to country j if ti > tj and moves it to country i if the reverse
is true, i.e., ti < tj. By assumption, if ti = tj, rm k´s plant supplying market i
remains in its home country.
The same considerations apply for rm k´s plant supplying market j. Accordingly,
all plants of rm k are based in the same country and hence there are three
location equilibria: NR, TR1 and TR2. Under the BCA regime, assuming that
country i can impose BCAs, it is clear that the same computations apply for
production sold to market j. For the protected market i, it is easily checked that
∆πki = 0, irrespective where the competitor plant of rm ` supplying market i
locates. Consequently, rm k with its plant supplying market i remains it its
country of origin. If we let i = 1, then NR, PR1 and TR2 are possible location
equilibria and if i = 2, then NR, PR2 and TR1.
B Appendix of Section 3
B.1 Welfare Functions of Countries under Possible Location Equilib-
ria
Recall that we assume A > ti and A > d throughout the paper to ensure positive
production levels in all possible location equilibria.
In case ti < tj, all plants are located in country i and face an eective tax tki =
tkj = ti ∀k = 1, 2, and i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Inserting these tax levels into (3) in
the text, gives the equilibrium output levels under TR`: x∗ki = x
∗
kj = (A− ti)/3.
Substituting these equilibrium output levels into (8a) in the text gives the welfare




































< 0. (The four terms are consumer
surplus, producer surplus, tax revenues and damages.) Simplication of (A.1)
leads to (9) in the text.
Ŵ TR`i and W̃i
TR` are obtained by inserting t̂TR`i = D
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In case ti = tj, each rm locates with its two plants in the country of origin and
faces an eective tax tki = tkj = ti = tj, which gives equilibrium output levels:
x∗ki = x
∗
kj = (A− ti)/3 = (A− tj)/3 ∀k = 1, 2, and i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.


































< 0. Simplication of (A.4) gives (10) in the text.
In case ti > tj, all plants are located in country j, and face an eective tax
tki = tkj = tj. Inserting these tax levels into (3), gives the equilibrium output
levels under TRk as x∗ki = x
∗
kj = (A− tj)/3.


















which is convex in tj.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We use Appendix B.1. First, it is clear that each country achieves the highest
welfare level if it attracts all plants and imposes its unconstrained carbon tax.






i . Second, W
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i . Third, W̃
TR`
i intersects with W
NR
i at two levels










and WNRi > W̃
TR`













i . Fourth, the three curves intersect at tj = −A2 for
ε→ 0. Nevertheless, strictly speaking, W̃ TR`i intersects withWNRi at tj = −A2 +ε,
200






i . Finally, for all tj < −A2 , we have





B.3 Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
First, we compare the equilibrium welfare levels (denoted by an asterisk hence-































if A ≤ Â2
TR2
= 2(1 − γ)d + 2
5
d. However, given our
condition, A > d, we can only have A ≤ Â2
TR2
if γ < 0.7.
Second, we need to check that if the leader i chooses to let its rm to relocate
with both plants, whether it always prefers the follower j to choose its optimal
unconstrained tax t̂j = D
′
j instead of undercutting, tj = ti − ε. We know that
W TRki is strictly convex with minimum t
min











which gives rise to three possibilities.
1) tminj ≤ −A2 < D
′
j. t̂j = D
′






< tminj ≤ D
′
j. Again, t̂j = D
′
j is at the upward sloping part of W
TRk
i .
If W TRki (t̂j = D
′





j)< W (tj = −A2 ), country i would anyway choose the NR-location equilibrium





j ≤ tminj . t̂j = D
′
j is at the downward sloping part of W
TRk
i and hence
country i would choose the NR-location equilibrium instead of the TRk-location
equilibrium.
B.4 Proof of Corollary 1
(i) The SE improves upon the NE outcome only if the Stackelberg leader chooses
the second equilibrium as the rst equilibrium is exactly the same as the NE. In the
second equilibrium, the leader must be better o than in the rst equilibrium and
for the follower the same is true because its best location equilibrium materialises.
The tax in the second equilibrium is tj = D
′
j > −A2 and hence global emissions
must be lower than in the rst equilibrium.
(ii) (a) If A ≤ Â2
TR2
for all γ < 0.7, each country as a leader will choose the TRk-





for all γ ≥ 0.5. For the follower, this is the ˆTR`-location equilibrium which




< A ≤ Â1
TR1
, country 2 as a leader will choose the NR-location
equilibrium (SE12 in Proposition 4), while country 1 chooses the TR1-location
equilibrium over the NR-location equilibrium (SE21 in Proposition 3). Hence,
both countries prefer country 1 to be the leader.
(c) Finally, if Â1
TR1
< A, both countries as a leader will choose the NR-location
equilibrium, hence it makes no dierence who is the leader.
(iii) We have t∗S − tNE∗ = 32d > 0. If country 1 is the leader, we have t
∗
S ≤ tF∗2 =
(1−γ)d if A ≥ d (2γ + 1) in the second equilibrium which requires A ≤ Â1
TR1
. We
nd d (2γ + 1) > Â1
TR1
, and, hence t∗S > t
F∗
2 . Similarly, if country 2 leads, in the
second equilibrium which requires A ≤ Â2
TR2
, t∗S ≤ tF∗1 = γd if A ≥ d (3− 2γ).
However, d (3− 2γ) > Â2
TR2
, thus, t∗S > t
F∗
1 .
(iv) Global welfare and global emission levels in the social optimum are W ∗S =
(A− d)2 and E∗S = 2 (A− d), respectively, while under the non-cooperative





(A− (1− γ)d) (2 (A− d)− γd), ESE21∗ = 4
3





(A− γd) (2A− 3d+ γd), ESE22∗ = 4
3
(A− γd) in the sequential game















> 0 if A < d (3− 2γ), which is larger than Â2
TR2
. Note that the rst










(1 + 2γ) and ∂E
SE22∗−E∗S
∂d
> 0 for all γ < 1.5, which
holds as we assume γ ≤ 1.
C Appendix of Section 4
C.1 Welfare Functions of Countries under Possible Location Equilib-
ria
In the case t1 > t2, there is a partial relocation of rm 1. Both plants supplying
country 1 face tk1 = t1 ∀k = 1, 2, while those plants supplying country 2 face
tk2 = t2 ∀k = 1, 2. Hence, inserting these tax levels into (3) gives the equilibrium
output levels under PR1: x∗k1 = (A− t1)/3 and x∗k2 = (A− t2)/3 for k = 1, 2.
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We start rst with the welfare functions of country 1 as follows:
(a) Inserting t̂PR11 (t2) = γd+
1
2


















(2γd− t2) (2A− 2γd− t2)
12
+

















, i.e., Ŵ PR11 is convex in t2.
(b) Inserting ẗ1 = A− ε into (17) gives:
Ẅ PR11 =








which is linear in t2.






























which can be shown to be linear in t2.
The remaining cases are the same as in Appendix B.1.
For country 2, the welfare functions under the PR1-location equilibrium are given
by:





(1− γ) d− 3
4










t1 − (1− γ)d
)2
+






(A− 3t1 + 6 (1− γ) d) (5A+ t1 − 6 (1− γ) d)
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, i.e., Ŵ PR12 is convex in t1.
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, i.e., W̃ PR12 is concave in t1.
The remaining cases are the same as in Appendix B.1.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Recall that we assume throughout the paper that A > d and A > ti.
In the text, we state the cases under which country 1 chooses its best response tax
level under the three location equilibria. In what follows, we rst summarise these
cases with the constraint for each case. Second, we compare these constraints to
determine which welfare functions are relevant for comparisons. This helps us
to divide the values of our parameters into to three ranges as illustrated below.
Finally, we rank the welfare levels of country 1 under each range in Lemma 2 (a)
to (c). Those lemmas lead to Lemma 2 in the text.
First: the best responses of country 1 are summarised as follows:
Under the TR2-location equilibrium:
if
t2 > γd t̂
TR2
1 → Ŵ TR21 unconstrained
t2 ≤ γd t̃TR21 → W̃ TR21 constrained (undercutting)
Under the PR1-location equilibrium:
if

t2 ≥ 2γd t̆PR11 → W̆ PR11 constrained (BCA-constraint violates)
t2 ≥ 2A− 2γd ẗPR11 → Ẅ PR11 constrained (NNC violates)
t2 < 2γd& t2 < 2A− 2γd t̂PR11 → Ŵ PR11 unconstrained
Obviously, there is only one function under the NR-location equilibrium that
assumes t1 = t2.
Second, we check whether the two constraints under the PR1-location equilibrium
violate at the same time. We nd that if A > 2γd, then A < 2A−2γd and since we
assume that t2 < A, thus t2 < A < 2A− 2γd, i.e. the NNC is satised. However,
the BCA-constraint is not necessarily satised since we may have A > t2 ≥ 2γd.
While if A ≤ 2γd, we have 2A−2γd ≤ A, which may lead to 2A−2γd ≤ t2 < A, i.e.
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the NNC is violated. In such cases, the BCA-constraint is satised, t2 < A ≤ 2γd.
Hence, we either use W̆ PR11 or Ẅ
PR1
1 according to the parameter range.
We also need to compare the constraints across the location equilibria. Clearly,
2γd > γd, hence if t2 ≥ 2γd, t2 is necessarily larger than γd. In such cases,
the constrained welfare level W̆ PR11 is compared with the unconstrained welfare
level Ŵ TR21 . In addition, we nd that 2A − 2γd > γd if A > 32γd. As a result,
if t2 ≥ 2A − 2γd, i.e. if the NNC is violated, we must have t2 > γd. In such
cases, the constrained welfare level Ẅ PR11 is compared with the unconstrained
welfare level Ŵ TR21 . In contrast, γd ≥ 2A − 2γd if A ≤ 32γd . This implies that
if 2A − 2γd ≤ γd < t2, we compare the constrained welfare level Ẅ PR11 with the
unconstrained welfare level Ŵ TR21 , while if 2A − 2γd ≤ t2 ≤ γd, we compare the
constrained welfare level Ẅ PR11 with the constrained welfare level W̃
TR2
1 .
Finally, we divide Lemma 2 into three ranges based on what we have explained
above: (a) A > 2γd, (b) 3
2
γd < A ≤ 2γd and (c) d < A ≤ 3
2
γd . We illustrate the
three ranges below and then we derive the proof of Lemma (a) to (c).
(a) A > 2γd
(b) 3
2
γd < A ≤ 2γd
(c) d < A ≤ 3
2
γd
Lemma. 2(a) A > 2γd (implying A < 2A− 2γd)
i. 2γd ≤ t2 < A: Ŵ TR21 > WNR1 > W̆
PR1
1 .
















< t2 ≤ t2: Ŵ PR11 ≥ W̃ TR21 > WNR1 .
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Proof. We use appendices B.1, B.2 and C.1.
(i) It is clear that as long as Ŵ TR21 is feasible, it dominates all other welfare
















all t2 ≥ A, which is not feasible, and for all t2 ≤ −A2 , which is not included in this
range. Therefore, for 2γd ≤ t2 < A, we have Ŵ TR21 > WNR1 > W̆
PR1
1 .









(iii) W̃ TR21 intersects with Ŵ
PR1




all ε → 0 where Θ =
√





(A+ γd+ Θ) + ε,∞
)




(A+ γd−Θ) + ε
]
. Tax
level t2 = 29 (A+ γd+ Θ) + ε is larger than γd for all A > 1.08γd, and hence it is
not included in this range since we have A > 2γd. Tax level t2 = 29 (A+ γd−Θ)+
ε ≤ 0 for all A ≥ γd, which holds with strict inequality since we assume A > d.
In addition, t2 = 29 (A+ γd−Θ) + ε ≤ −
A
2
for all A ∈ (−∞,−γd] which is not
feasible, and t2 = 29 (A+ γd−Θ) + ε ≥ −
A
2
for all A ≥ 4
5
γd which holds with




denote this tax level by t2 (γ, d, A)=29 (A+ γd−Θ) + ε in the text. Therefore, we
have W̃ TR21 > Ŵ
PR1










(iv) Ŵ PR11 intersects with W
NR
1 at two levels of t2:
2
11




6(2A2 + Aγd− 4γ2d2), such that WNR1 ≥ Ŵ
PR1
1 for all t2 ∈[
2
11
(A+ 3γd)− ψ, 2
11
(A+ 3γd) + ψ
]
. However, the larger tax level is not included
in this range, where 2
11
(A+ 3γd) + ψ≥ γd for all A > 1.232γd, which holds since
A > 2γd, while 2
11








ways holds as long as A > 2γd, but also if A > d for all γ ≤ 0.843. However, if





> A > d, ψ is not dened and we have WNR1 < Ŵ
PR1
1 .
Applying the same conditions, we nd that 2
11
(A + 3γd) − ψ is also larger than
t2. Hence, we have Ŵ
PR1
1 ≥ W̃ TR21 > WNR1 . (v) For all t1 ≤ −A2 , we have







γd < A ≤ 2γd (implying γd < 2A− 2γd ≤ A)
i. 2A− 2γd ≤ t2 < A: Ŵ TR21 > WNR1 > Ẅ
PR1
1 .












< t2 ≤ t2: Ŵ PR11 ≥ W̃ TR21 > WNR1 .
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Proof. (i) WNR1 intersects with Ẅ
PR1
1 at two levels of t2, which are A and −2A+
3γd for ε → 0, such that Ẅ PR11 ≥ WNR1 for all t2 ∈ [A,∞) and for all t2 ∈
(−∞,−2A+ 3γd]. The rst solution is not feasible since it is larger than A, while
the second solution is less than 2A − 2γd for all A > 5
4
γd, which holds since we
assume in this case A > 3
2
γd. Hence, the two intersection points are not included





(ii) to (v) The BCA-constraint and the NNC are satised, and, hence we have
the same proof as in Lemma 2(a). Note that if A = 2γd, A = 2A − 2γd, and,
hence t2 < A = 2γd = 2A − 2γd, i.e. both constraints are satised under the
PR1-location equilibrium and the Lemma starts from (ii).
Lemma. 2(c) d < A ≤ 3
2
γd (implying 2A− 2γd ≤ γd < A)



















< t2 ≤ t2: Ŵ PR11 ≥ W̃ TR21 > WNR1 .







Proof. (i) In this range, the NNC is also violated under PR1, and, hence, we have
the same proof as for the rst range in Lemma 2(b). The only dierence is that
−2A+ 3γd < γd for all A > γd, which holds.
(ii) In this range, W̃ TR21 intersects with Ẅ
PR1
1 at two levels of t2: A and γd−A for
ε→ 0, such that Ẅ PR11 ≥ W̃ TR21 for all t2 ∈ [A,∞) and for all t2 ∈ (−∞, γd− A].
However, the rst solution is not feasible. In addition, we have γd − A < 0 for
all A > γd, which holds since we have A > d. Moreover, this range assumes
t2 ≥ 2A − 2γd where 2A − 2γd ≥ 0 for all A ≥ γd. Hence, the second solution
is not included in this range. Therefore, we have W̃ TR21 > Ẅ
PR1
1 . Recall that we
also have W̃ TR21 > W
NR
1 from Appendix B.2.
(iii) to (v) We have the same proof as in Lemma 2(a) and (b). However, we need
to mention that in this case in (iii) the tax level t2 = 29 (A+ γd+ Θ)+ε, at which
W̃ TR21 intersects with Ŵ
PR1
1 is larger than 2A− 2γd for all 45γd < A < 2γd, which
holds, and, hence this level is not included in this range.
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C.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The NNC requires t̂PR12 (t1) < A, which implies t1 > 2 (1− γ) d − A. The BCA-
constraint requires t1 > t̂
PR1






(1− γ) d. We nd that t1 ≥ 2 (1− γ) d − A for all A ≥ (1− γ) d,
which generally holds with strict inequality. Thus, we only have to consider the
BCA-constraint. We use appendices B.1, B.2 and C.1.








(A+ 14 (1− γ) d) ± Ω, where Ω = 4
11
√
4 (γ − 1)2 d2 + A (γ − 1) d− 2A2
. However, these two tax levels are not dened for all A > d. Hence, we always
have Ŵ PR12 > W
NR




2 for all t1 ≤ −A2 .
In addition, we have t1 > −A2 for all A > −
4
3
d (1− γ), which obviously holds since





(ii) In the range t1 ≤ t1, country 2 chooses its constrained carbon tax t1−ε where
W̃ PR12 intersects with W
NR
2 at two tax levels of t1: A and −A2 for ε → 0, where
W̃ PR12 < W
NR





W TR22 . The three curves intersect at t1 = −A2 for ε→ 0. Strictly speaking, W̃
PR1
2
intersects with WNR2 at t1 ≈ −A2 + ε. (See Appendix B.3 and footnote 11 in the
text).
(iii) Finally, in the range t1 ≤ −A2 , we have W
TR2
2 ≥ WNR2 > W̃
PR1
2 .
C.4 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) The proof follows directly from Figure 8(b).
(ii) Solving the two response functions as given in (18) and (20) in the text, gives,










d (6− 9γ). A NE exists
if t2 ≥ tNE∗2 ( ˆPR1), where t2 = 29 (A+ γd−Θ) + ε with Θ as dened in Appendix









ε → 0. As also for the threshold ANE > d must hold, we nd A ≤ ANE is only
feasible if γ > 0.855. Then, the threshold ANE increases in d. Hence, existence of
a NE requires d and γ to be large.
(iii) If a NE exits, tNE∗1 ( ˆPR1) > 0 and t
NE∗
2 (
ˆPR1) < 0 (since a NE exists only if
t2 ≥ tNE∗2 ( ˆPR1), and, as mentioned in Appendix C.2, t2 < 0, hence, tNE∗2 ( ˆPR1) is
a subsidy). In addition, tNE∗2 ( ˆPR1) ≤ −A2 if A ≤ d ((12γ − 8) /5). However, this
condition violates our assumption A > d for all γ ≤ 1.083. Hence, tNE∗2 ( ˆPR1) > −A2 .
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C.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Country 1 chooses between PR1 and NR. WL∗1 (NR) is given in Appendix




























< 0. It is clear that
tL∗1 ( ˆPR1) > 0 for all γ ≤ 1. In addition, tF∗2 ( ˆPR1) ≤ −A2 if A ≤
1
5
d (12γ − 11), which
violates the NNC A > d. Hence, tF∗2 ( ˆPR1) > −A2 . Furthermore, t
L∗
1 ( ˆPR1) > t1
if A > d (3− 4γ), which holds as long as A > d, and tL∗1 ( ˆPR1) < A if
A > 1
5
d (3− 2γ), which also holds as long as A > d. Inserting these equilib-
rium taxes into (17), we obtain WL∗1 ( ˆPR1). We nd that W
L∗
1 ( ˆPR1) ≥ WL∗1 (NR) for








where the threshold A1PR1 increases in
d and γ as the term in brackets is larger than zero and increases in γ for all values
of γ. In addition, this threshold level is always feasible, i.e., A1PR1 > d.
In order to check that country 1 does not prefer to set −A
2
< tL1 ≤ t1,
such that country 2 responds by undercutting t1, we insert t2 = t1 − ε into
(17) and obtain WL∗1 (P̃R1). We nd that W
L∗
1 ( ˆPR1) = W
L∗
1 (P̃R1) at t̃1 =
3A2+(30−48γ)Ad+(80γ2−72γ−9)d2
28(A−4γd) for ε → 0. On the one hand, W
L∗
1 ( ˆPR1) ≤ WL∗1 (P̃R1)




if A < 4γd, which implies that A < A1PR1 . Nevertheless,
we have t̃1 > t1 for all A < 4γd. Hence, country 2 would react on its stand-
ard reaction function and country 1 chooses tL∗1 ( ˆPR1). On the other hand, we




if A ≥ 4γd. However,
if A ≥ 4γd, but A ≤ A1PR1 , we nd that t̃1 ≤ −A2 for ε → 0, and hence un-
dercutting is not a best response for country 2. Finally, if A > A1PR1 , which





t̃1 > −A2 . However, in this case, i.e. if A > A1
PR1 , WL∗1 (NR) ≥ WL∗1 (P̃R1) for
all t1 ≥ −A2 for ε → 0. Therefore, to sum up, for all A ≤ A1
PR1 , we have
WL∗1 ( ˆPR1) ≥ WL∗1 (NR) and WL∗1 ( ˆPR1) > WL∗1 (P̃R1). In contrast, for all A > A1PR1 ,
we have WL∗1 (NR) > W
L∗
1 ( ˆPR1) and W
L∗
1 (NR) > W
L∗
1 (P̃R1).








, which violates the NNC for all γ ≤ 1. Hence, we have
WL∗1 ( ˆTR1) < W
L∗
1 ( ˆPR1). Recall that W
L∗
1 ( ˆTR1) is the equilibrium welfare level in
the unconstrained TR1-location equilibrium, i.e. tF∗2 = (1 − γ)d, (see Appendix
B.3).
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C.6 Proof of Proposition 7
Country 2 chooses between PR1 and TR2. In the unconstrained PR1-location
equilibrium, we obtain tF∗1 ( ˆPR1) =
d(2γ+9)
13
and tL∗2 ( ˆPR1) =
1
13















inserting these tax levels into (19), we obtain WL∗2 ( ˆPR1).
We need rst to check under which conditions country 2 could set this tax level.










for ε→ 0. However, this condition is feasible only for all γ ≥ γ̂ = 0.881. If these
conditions do not hold, country 2 sets its tax marginally below t2 and country 1





tL2 + γd. Inserting these
tax levels into (19), we obtain WL∗2 (PR1). These equilibria under PR1 need to
be compared with the welfare level under TR2. There are two best responses for
country 1 in the TR2-location equilibrium: t1 = γd and t1 = t2 − ε. Inserting
these tax levels into (A.5), we obtain WL∗2 ( ˆTR2) and W
L∗
2 (T̃R2), respectively.







violates our assumption A > d. Hence, we always have WL∗2 ( ˆTR2) < W
L∗
2 ( ˆPR1).
Then, we need to check whether WL∗2 ( ˆTR2) ≥ WL∗2 (PR1). Due to the complexity of
the formula t2, it is sometimes not possible to obtain analytical solutions. Thus,
we conduct numerical simulations by dividing a large parameter space into four
ranges for A and d given the NNC A > d and for all γ ∈ [0.5, 1]. We enlarge the
set of parameter values in each range as follows: 1) d ∈ (0, 50], A ∈ (d, 100], 2)
d ∈ (0, 100] , A ∈ (d, 500], 3) d ∈ (0, 500] , A ∈ (d, 1000], and 4) d ∈ (0, 1000], A ∈
(d, 10000]. In addition, and as mentioned by Markusen et al. (1995), we set the
marginal cost c = 0, since an increase in c and a decrease in a are equivalent (recall
A = a − c). We nd that WL∗2 ( ˆTR2) < WL∗2 (PR1) for all the ranges of parameter
values. Hence, the two PR1-location equilibria dominate the unconstrained TR2-
location equilibrium.
Second, we need to consider the constrained TR2-location equilibrium. We




, where t2 = A −
3d (1− γ)− 1
26
√
(7540γ2 − 15288γ + 8190) d2 + (3380γ − 4056)Ad+ 1690A2, for
ε → 0. However, t2 ≥ t2 for all A ≥ 45γd, which holds with strict in-





will not respond by undercutting. Therefore, we always have WL∗2 ( ˆPR1) >
WL∗2 (T̃R2). However, we nd W
L∗


















5A− 4γd+$ + ϕ
and $ = (729 + 473γ2 − 1134γ) d2 and ϕ = (280γ − 405)Ad + 131A2 for ε → 0.
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Country 1 responds by undercutting only if t2 ≥ t2. We nd that t̃2 > t2 if









γ2 − 8γ + 10− 5γ
))
, where the term in
brackets is larger than 1, and, hence this threshold increases in d. However, A
TR2





possible tax that country 2 can choose to induce country 1 to undercut its tax
is marginally above t2, while if A ≤ A
TR2 , t̃2 < t2. Therefore, if A > A
TR2 ,
WL∗2 (PR1) < W
L∗
2 (T̃R2) and t
L
2 ? t2.
C.7 Proof of Corollary 2
Inserting the Nash equilibrium tax levels under PR1 in Appendix C.4 into the
equilibrium output levels in Appendix C.1 and into (17) and (19), we obtain
ENE∗( ˆPR1), WNE∗( ˆPR1), WNE∗1 ( ˆPR1) and W
NE∗










Note that we consider only SE12 (a) in Proposition 7.
We start by comparing the equilibrium welfare and emission levels across the two
non-cooperative scenarios (i, ii, iii) and then we compare the non-cooperative
outcome with the social optimum (iv).
i) If country 1 is the Stackelberg leader, W SE
2
1∗






, where the upper condition always holds as long as A ≤ ANE, while the
lower condition always holds for all γ ≥ γ̌ ≈ 0.94 and there is a contradiction for all
γ < 0.877. However, in terms of global welfare, W SE
2





, where both conditions hold as long as A > d and A ≤ ANE. On
the other hand, ESE
2
1∗ > ENE∗ if A < d(12γ+3)
5
, where this condition always holds
since A ≤ ANE.
ii) If country 2 is the Stackelberg leader, W SE
1
2∗
1 ≥ WNE∗1 and W SE
1
2∗ ≥ WNE∗ if
A ≤ d(21−4γ)
13
, where this condition is satised as long as A < A
PR1
2 and A ≤ ANE
for all γ <
...
γ ≈ 0.98. While for γ ≥ 0.98, this condition needs to hold. In
addition, ENE∗ ≥ ESE12∗ if the same condition holds, i.e. if A ≤ d(21−4γ)
13
.
iii) We show in i) that global welfare and global emission levels are higher under
the leadership of country 1 than under the NE. Hence, we compare now with the
leadership of country 2: W SE
2




−Ψ < A < d(5631+1468γ)
4121
+




. Both conditions always hold as long as A < A
PR1
2 and




2∗ if A < d(57+4γ)
39
, which also
always holds as long as A < A
PR1
2 and A ≤ ANE.
iv) We have E∗S ≥ ENE∗, if A ≥
d(15+16γ)
14
, however, this condition violates the NE




if A ≥ d(39+44γ)
37
. However, this condition also violates A ≤ ANE , while if a NE
does not exists, we have E∗S > E
SE21∗ if d(39+44γ)
37
< A < A1
PR1 (see Proposition
6). If country 2 leads, E∗S ≥ ESE
1
2∗ if A ≥d(12+20γ)
13
, which also violates A < A
PR1
2
and A ≤ ANE, and, hence E∗S < ESE
1
2∗.
D Appendix of Section 5
D.1 Proof of Corollary 3
(i) We show in Appendix C.4 that tNE∗1 ( ˆPR1) > 0 and t
NE∗
2 (
ˆPR1) > −A2 = t
NE∗
i (NR).
Hence, global emissions are higher without BCAs. From Appendix B.4 and C.7,
we obtain the global welfare level without BCAs, WNE∗(NR), and with BCAs,
WNE∗( ˆPR1). We nd WNE∗( ˆPR1) ≤ WNE∗(NR) if A ≤ d(204+244γ−Ω)197 or if A ≥
d(204+244γ+Ω)
197
, where Ω = 66
√
12γ − 16γ2 + 47. The rst solution violates the
NNC, while the second solution violates the existence condition of the NE, A ≤
ANE. Hence, WNE∗( ˆPR1) > WNE∗(NR).
(ii) From Appendix B.3, we obtain the equilibrium welfare levels without BCAs,
WNE∗i (NR), and from Appendix C.7, we have the equilibrium welfare levels with
BCAs, WNE∗i ( ˆPR1). We nd W
NE∗




if A ≥ d(488γ−120+ξ)
163




38γ2 − 8γ + 9. The rst solution violates
the NNC, while the second solution violates the threshold level under which the
NE exists. Hence, we have WNE∗1 (NR) < W
NE∗
1 ( ˆPR1). Moreover, we nd that
WNE∗2 ( ˆPR1) > W
NE∗









, while WNE∗2 (NR) > W
NE∗
2 ( ˆPR1) ∀ γ > 0.976 .
(iii) Follows directly from Propositions 2 and 5.
D.2 Proof of Corollary 4
(1) If country 1 is the leader, we have Â1
TR1
< A1
PR1 from Proposition 3 and 6.
This allows us to dene three parameter ranges regions: region F with A ≤ Â1
TR1
,
region G with Â1
TR1
< A ≤ A1PR1 and region H with Â1
TR1
< A1
PR1 ≤ A. We
use Appendices B.4 and C.7.
i) In region F , ESE
2
1∗( ˆTR1) ≤ ESE
2
1∗( ˆPR1) if A ≤ d(11−12γ)9 , which violates the NNC.
Hence, global emissions decrease with BCAs. We have shown in Appendix C.5




1 ( ˆTR1) < W
∗SE21
1 ( ˆPR1). On the other hand, it is obvious that country
212
2 becomes worse o with BCAs as it moves away from its best location equilib-
rium, i.e. unconstrained TR1-location equilibrium. In terms of global welfare,
W SE
2
1∗( ˆPR1) ≥ W SE
2









tion holds for γ ≤ γ̃ ≈ 0.83 because then Â1
TR1
< AWF . However, if γ > 0.83, we
need A < AF to hold.
ii) In region G, we showed in Appendix C.5 that the tax levels under the BCA
regime are larger than under the No-BCA regime. Thus, global emissions are
lower with BCAs, ESE
2
1∗( ˆPR1) < ESE
1
1∗(NR). It is straightforward to show that













. This condition cannot hold,
given the NNC, A > d, for all γ < γ̆ ≈ 0.98, and, thus W ∗SE
1
1
2 (NR) < W
∗SE21
2 ( ˆPR1).




2 (NR) > W
∗SE21
2 (PR1). Global welfare increases under the BCA regime








. We nd that this condition always
holds as long as A ≤ A1PR1 if γ < γ̆ ≈ 0.98. However, if γ ≥ 0.98, we need
A < AG to hold.
iii) In region H, we have the same outcome with and without BCAs.




2 from Proposition 4 and 7.
Therefore, we dene three parameter regions. Region M with A ≤ Â2
TR2
for all
γ < 0.7, region N with Â2
TR2
< A ≤ ATR22 and region O with A
TR2
2 < A.
i) In region M , all rms are subject to tax equal to γd under the No-BCA re-
gime. With BCAs, country 2 chooses SE12 in this region (see Proposition 7).
Either tL∗2 ( ˆPR1) or t2 is a subsidy level. In addition, from (18), t̂
PR1
1 < γd since
t2 < 0. Hence, both countries set a lower carbon tax, and, consequently, global
emissions are higher under the BCA regime. Without BCAs, country 1 achieves
the highest welfare level, i.e., Ŵ TR21 . Hence, it obviously becomes worse o under
the BCA regime. We have shown in Appendix C.6 that WL∗2 ( ˆPR1) > W
L∗
2 ( ˆTR2)
and W ∗L2 (PR1) > W
∗L
2 ( ˆTR2). Hence, country 2 is better o with BCAs. From a
global perspective, and if country 2 chooses SE12(a), W





13(46γ−27) , which must hold as long as A ≤ Â2
TR2
. If country 2 chooses
SE12(b), we insert t
L∗
2 ≈ t2 and tF∗1 = t̂
PR1
1 into (17) to obtain W
∗SE12
1 (PR1). Hence,
we need to compare W SE
2
2∗( ˆTR2) with W SE
1
2∗(PR1). Recall that due to the com-
plexity of t2, we sometimes need to resort to numerical simulations. We use the
same ranges of parameter d as in Appendix C.6, however, for parameter A, we
restrict our simulations in this region to d < A ≤ Â2
TR2
and for only γ ∈ [0.5, 0.7).
We nd W SE
2
2∗( ˆTR2) > W SE
1
2∗(PR1), and, hence global welfare is higher under the
213
No-BCA regime in this region.
ii) In region N , rms move from NR to PR1. In this case, both countries set
higher carbon taxes since t2 > −A2 . Hence, global emissions are lower under
the BCA regime. For country 1, we have W SE
1
2∗
1 ( ˆPR1) ≤ W
SE12∗











, where the rst condition violates the NNC,
and the second condition violates A < A
PR1
2 . Hence, W
SE12∗
1 ( ˆPR1) > W
SE12∗
1 (NR).
In addition, W SE
1
2∗
1 (PR1) > W
SE12∗
1 (NR) for all A > −γd, which must hold. We
checked this also for the same parameter ranges for d and γ dened in Ap-
pendix C.6, while for parameter A, it is restricted to A
PR1
2 ≤ A ≤ A
TR2
2 for
all γ ∈ (0.881, 1] and d < A ≤ ATR22 for all γ ∈ [0.5, 0.881). For country 2,
W
SE12∗
2 (NR) < W
SE12∗










for all 0.96 < γ < 0.98. However, this condition cannot hold for all γ ≥ 0.98 as
it would violate the NNC, A > d. Using the same ranges of the parameter values
as for country 1, we nd W SE
1
2∗
2 (NR) < W
SE12∗
2 (PR1) if A is not too large for all
γ < 0.964. However, for all γ ≥ 0.964, W SE
1
2∗
2 (NR) > W
SE12∗
2 (PR1). In terms of
global welfare, W SE
1
2∗(NR) ≥ W SE12∗( ˆPR1) if A ≥ d(12+20γ+Λ)13 or if A ≤
d(12+20γ−Λ)
13
with Λ = 12
√
3γ − 4γ2 + 10. The rst condition violates the threshold APR12 and
the second condition violates the NNC. Hence, W SE
1
2∗( ˆPR1) > W SE
1
2∗(NR). In ad-
dition, we nd W SE
1
2∗(PR1) > W SE
1
2∗(NR) for the range of parameter values in this
region.
iii) In region O, equilibrium taxes under the BCA regime are t∗L2 & t
∗F
1 & t2, which
are larger than −A
2
under the No-BCA regime. Hence, global emissions are lower
with BCAs. Inserting t2 = t∗L2 & t2 into (A.3) we obtainW
SE22∗
1 ( ˜TR2), and inserting
tF∗1 & t2 into (A.5), we obtain W
SE22∗
2 ( ˜TR2). We nd W
SE22∗
1 ( ˜TR2) < W
SE12∗
1 (NR) if
A ≤ −γd, which violates the NNC. In addition, we checked that W SE
2
2∗
1 ( ˜TR2) >
W
SE22∗
1 (NR) for the parameter values of d and γ as dened in Appendix C.6, while
for parameter A we assume A > A
TR2















for all γ < 0.79 and if A > 4
5
γd
for all γ ≥ 0.79. The two conditions must hold as long as A > d and A > ATR22 .
Finally, from a global perspective, we nd W SE
2









10− γ − 2γ + 39
)
. Therefore, W SE
2






Consider the case in which both countries could impose BCAs, country i if ti > tj
and country j if ti < tj. For bilateral BCAs, there are three possible location
equilibria: NR, PR1 and PR2. The rst two equilibria are covered in the main
text. In the PR2-location equilibrium, i.e., if t2 > t1, only the plant of rm 2
that supplies the home market remains in country 2, while the other plant that
supplies country 1 will relocate.
All the analysis that we have done for country 1 in PR1-location equilibrium will
be the same for country 2 in the PR2-location equilibrium if t2 > t1. Therefore,
also the best response function of country 2 is discontinuous in this case. Hence,
in the simultaneous game, a NE does not always exist as shown in Figure A.1
below.
In case of symmetric countries, no NE exists, as this has been derived in the
main text for a unilateral BCA-policy. If a NE exists, it would be partial re-
location of rm 1, i.e., t1 > t2. The intersection of the standard best response
functions is not possible in the PR2-location equilibrium. That is, the condi-





2A+ 3 (1− γ) d−
√
12 (1− γ) d (A− 4) + 42A2
)
+ ε. In addition, we
have t∗NE1 (PR2) > t
∗NE
2 (PR2) for all γ > 0.66. Therefore, in equilibrium, only coun-
try 1 will impose BCAs. Existence of a NE in this case requires similar conditions
as derived in Section 4. That is, global marginal damages and asymmetry among
countries need to be suciently high, i.e., we need t2 ≥ t∗NE2 (PR1) as derived in




12γd (A− 4) + 42A2
)
+ ε,
which is larger than the critical tax level if only country 1 imposes BCAs. There-
fore, in the case of bilateral BCAs, the range of parameter values for which a NE
exists would be larger than in the case of unilateral BCAs, as considered in the
main text. It is obvious that t1 ≤ t2 if γ ≥ 0.5. The complexity of the ana-
lysis if country 2 is the Stackelberg leader would now also extend to Stackelberg
leadership of country 1 under a bilateral BCA regime.
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(a) Existence of a NE 'asymmetric countries'
(b) Non-existence of a NE 'symmetric countries'





1 Summary of Results
In this thesis, we studied the decisions of two asymmetric countries regarding
their actions to mitigate climate change using a game-theoretic analysis. Essay 1
presented the basic features of the interaction among countries in mitigating cli-
mate change. Generally, countries decide on their climate action based on trading-
o the benets and costs of curbing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However,
those benets and costs dier among countries to such extent that some countries
could even be worse o under a cooperative outcome than under no cooperation,
and hence cooperation might not be individually rational. We demonstrated that
asymmetries across countries greatly aect the outcomes of climate change ne-
gotiations and the allocation of abatement burdens. In Essays 2, 3 and 4, those
benets and costs were introduced explicitly by employing an extended version
of a strategic trade model due to Brander and Spencer (1985). In these three
essays, countries choose their climate policy level, which does not only aect their
environmental damages, but also has impacts on governmental income, consumers
and the prots of rms that compete in outputs, i.e. in a Cournot fashion.
International trade and the movement of rms raise concerns among nations about
carbon leakage and the competitiveness of their rms resulting from dierential
national climate policies. Therefore, governments may be inclined to implement
ineciently lax environmental policies to protect their home rms. A recently
proposed solution to those concerns is to oset the dierences between national
carbon prices using border carbon adjustment (BCA) measures such as carbon
taris and export rebates. Implementing BCAs can be considered as a switch
to design climate policies based on consumption rather than production. Our
study considered dierent forms of BCAs: a) carbon taris, which fully adjust the
dierence between national carbon taxes, b) carbon taris are complemented with
export rebates where the export rebate rate is chosen optimally, c) carbon taris
combined with a full export rebate, which is de facto a unilateral consumption-
based carbon tax.
Essay 2 showed that BCAs can partially or completely correct some distortions
aecting the choice of carbon taxes, in particular the prot-shifting and carbon
leakage eects. As a result, countries may adjust their carbon tax upward. We
showed that carbon taris with a full export rebate could restore the eectiveness
of the environmentally more concerned country's carbon tax by fully internalising
its own damages. Nevertheless, tax levels would be set below individual mar-
ginal damages due to the optimal response of the other country. Only a bilateral
consumption-based carbon tax could be set equal or even above individual mar-
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ginal damages. We also showed that either unilateral or bilateral consumption-
based taxes could surpass the socially optimal policy level. However, this could
occur if the environmental damage is not serious.
Essay 3 took a closer look both at the impacts of these measures on individual
and global welfare, and also on their strategic role to enforce cooperation. On the
one hand, we found that a gradual switch by the environmentally more concerned
country to a unilateral consumption-based tax, using BCA-measures, constitutes
escalating penalties to enforce full cooperation, with a uniform socially optimal
tax. In addition, escalating penalties is credible in the sense that the full set
of BCA-threats will be exploited to establish full cooperation. On the other
hand, escalating penalties are global welfare distorting should they be implemen-
ted compared to the social optimum. We conclude that BCAs can be successful in
enforcing cooperation, but whenever the potential gains from full cooperation are
expected to be rather signicant, even the harshest punishment fails to establish
cooperation.
Essay 4 studied the impacts of introducing BCAs (carbon taris) if rms can
completely close down and relocate abroad their plants. Without BCAs, prots
of rms are based on the location of production, and consequently each rm will
locate with all its plants in a country which sets a lower carbon tax. If countries
choose their carbon taxes simultaneously, they result in a 'race to the bottom'
with high emission subsidies. This negative outcome can be avoided if govern-
ments move sequentially and the Stackelberg leader chooses the 'wise chicken'
equilibrium, which leads to higher welfare levels and lower global emissions. This
equilibrium implies that all rms locate in the follower's country and face a higher
carbon tax than under the race-to-the-bottom equilibrium. With BCAs, the loc-
ation of production becomes prot neutral for the plants supplying the country
imposing carbon taris. This additional measure allows the country to set a
higher carbon tax without losing all its plants and gain a strategic advantage by
shifting tax revenues from abroad to home. We have thus showed that BCAs
reduce the pressure on the race-to-the-bottom if taxes are chosen simultaneously
or sequentially.
Comparing a strategic trade model with xed versus endogenous plant location
oers an opportunity to meaningful observations, rstly, under a regime without
BCAs. In a xed plant location model, a) the reaction functions of countries are
downward sloping, implying that carbon taxes are strategic substitutes. b) Nash
equilibrium taxes would be sub-optimal due to the prot-shifting incentive but
there would be no race-to-the-bottom. c) Equilibrium taxes would be asymmetric
as long as marginal damages of countries are dierent. In contrast, in an en-
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dogenous plant location model, a) the reaction functions of countries have three
segments, one of which is upward sloping, implying that carbon taxes are stra-
tegic complements. b) Governments have incentives to not only shift rents, but
attract total prots of foreign rms which lead to the Nash equilibrium with a
race-to-the-bottom. c) The Nash equilibrium policy level is a symmetric subsidy,
irrespective of the asymmetry among countries in terms of their damage evalu-
ations. Secondly, under a regime with BCAs (carbon taris) reveals that a Nash
equilibrium always exists in a model with xed plant location leading to higher
carbon taxes in both countries and lower global emissions than in one without
BCAs. However, in a model with endogenous plant location, a Nash equilibrium
may not exist due to the discontinuity of reaction functions. Nevertheless, if an
equilibrium exists, BCAs also lead to higher carbon taxes in both countries than
in the ones without BCAs. This result is also conrmed in a Stackleberg equi-
librium. Hence, taken together, our results showed that BCAs can support more
ambitious climate policies under the more general assumption of endogenous plant
location.
2 Discussion and Possible Future Research
Overall, conclusions drawn by this thesis provide useful insights into designing cli-
mate policies. In a strategic context, carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns
can be eliminated if countries impose a uniform global carbon tax or multilat-
eral consumption-based carbon taxes. However, both solutions need coordination
among countries which might be dicult to agree upon, at least in the short run.
Therefore, unilateral BCA-measures are more likely to emerge in the near future.
Although these measures could lead to more stringent climate policies, they should
be considered with cautions. Countries with relatively higher carbon price, typic-
ally environmentally more concerned countries, would be better o implementing
these measures, and in contrast countries on which these measures are imposed
might be worse o, which could result in a global welfare loss. Therefore, BCA-
measures should ideally be used in the rst place as a threat to enforce climate
agreements.
Across BCAs measures, adding export rebates to carbon taris would result in
higher global emissions and lower global welfare than restricting BCAs to imports
only. Therefore, our results support the argument that export rebate will less
likely be defended on an environmental basis, and also in terms of global welfare.
Moreover, we showed that the strategic role of BCAs to support a stricter non-
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cooperative policy level in the country confronting these measures is triggered
by carbon taris, whereas export rebates weaken this role thus questioning the
eectiveness of export rebates for the internalisation of global damages.
In this thesis, two assumptions allow us to analyse the impacts of BCAs that have
been designed in accordance with the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
More specically, we consider a two-country model and assume an identical emis-
sion/carbon intensity across rms. Therefore, according to the national treatment
principle (Article III) of the General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT), we
assume that BCAs, either on imports or exports, are imposed in such a way that
foreign producers do not face higher eective carbon payments than domestic
producers. In practice, the implementation of unilateral BCA-measures would
confront certain legal and practical challenges. For instance, generalising our as-
sumptions to an n-country model with dierent carbon intensities and/or dierent
carbon prices would imply an unequal treatment between domestic and foreign
producers and among foreign producers. BCAs would also not be imposed against
countries with comparable or higher carbon prices. In such cases, BCA-measures
will violate not only Article III, but also the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) prin-
ciple (Article I) which requires all imported 'like' products to be subject to the
same treatment.
Given the potential legal challenges, there is a trade-o between an eective and a
legal design of BCAs. Regarding import side, an eective BCA-measure requires
that carbon taris fully adjust the dierence between domestic and foreign carbon
taxes. This regulation implies that taris would be imposed at dierent rates
depending on the carbon tax in the exporting country, with the highest eective
tari rates imposed against countries with the lowest carbon tax. In such cases,
as shown in the thesis, BCAs would incentivise each exporting country to raise
its carbon policy level to avoid taris, and will both mitigate carbon leakage and
protect domestic plants from relocation to less regulated countries. Similarly, in
order to reduce foreign emissions eectively, carbon taris should be calculated
based on the carbon intensity of the foreign production, where countries with the
highest carbon intensity would face the highest tari rate. This would not only
protect domestic plants from relocation, but could even attract foreign plants to
low-carbon intensity regions, which in turn might encourage countries to adopt
clean technologies. Nevertheless, irrespective of the legal issues, information about
the carbon intensity of the foreign production process might be dicult and costly
to obtain. With respect to export rebates, these should be based on the carbon
intensity of the domestic production.
If BCAs were designed to meet Article I and III of the GATT, all imported
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products should face the same carbon taris. Therefore, the government which
imposes BCAs could set a uniform tari rate that would possibly adjust the dif-
ference between the domestic carbon price and the highest carbon price (but still
below the domestic one) among the exporting countries or the average carbon
price in exporting countries. This would greatly undermine the eectiveness of
BCAs to tackle carbon leakage. In addition, the strategic eect of carbon taris
on certain exporting countries would be weakened in particular if there is a wide
gap between the carbon prices of exporting countries. Similarly, it has been sug-
gested that BCAs based on carbon intensity from the best available technology
or the carbon intensity of the importing country could be legal under the WTO
(Ismer and Neuho, 2007; Mattoo et al., 2009). However, in both cases, the ef-
fectiveness of BCAs to control foreign emissions would dwindle. Regarding BCAs
on exports, rebates in excess of a full rebate could be considered as an export
subsidy and hence might not be allowed according to the Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures Agreement. However, our results show that giving a full rebate
or full adjustment is not always in the best interest of governments.
In order to implement BCAs with an eective environmental outcome, these meas-
ures could pass the legal issues above under the umbrella of Article XX. The article
provides general exceptions for the adoption of certain policy measures which are
not compatible with WTO rules, but necessary to protect the environment. How-
ever, applying these measures should follow a justiable discrimination against
certain countries or between domestic and foreign producers. These measures,
furthermore, should not restrict international trade or constitute a disguised pro-
tection.1 Our results show that BCAs on imports allow countries to impose higher
carbon taxes and hence reduce global emissions. Therefore, adjustments on im-
ports could potentially be legal based on Article XX. In addition, it could be
justied that discrimination might mitigate carbon leakage rather eectively and
encourage other countries to lower their emissions. To avoid any protectionist
motive for using BCAs, they should only be implemented as a second best option
if a global climate agreement could not be reached. In addition, compensations to
countries that might suer a welfare loss from facing BCAs could be considered
through allocating the tari revenues to technology transfers or the Green Climate
Fund to support their mitigation and adaptation eorts (Böhringer et al., 2012;
Sakai and Barrett, 2016). We have shown that although adding export rebates is
a stronger policy to control carbon leakage than carbon taris alone, it would be
less likely to be legitimate under Article XX.
1See Article XX in GATT Analytical Index (pre-1995).
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Multilateral full BCAs (that is multilateral consumption-based carbon taxes)
could be recommended as a legal and eective measure. This would mean that
foreign producers receive a full export rebate in the home country and pay carbon
taris equivalent to the carbon tax paid by domestic producers in the foreign (des-
tination) country. In such cases, all imported products are subject to the same
tari rate with an equal treatment between the domestic and imported products.
However, as mentioned above, this regime needs coordination between countries
to avoid double taxation.
Most of the discussion about BCAs relates to carbon taxes which could, arguably,
qualify as an indirect tax, and ones that are adjustable at the border either on im-
ports or exports (given compatibility with Article III). Extending BCAs to other
climate policies such as cap-and-trade implies that foreign producers would be
required to purchase emissions allowances on terms comparable to domestic pro-
ducers, and payments to buy allowances would be rebated to exporters. However,
the free allocation of allowances would be less likely to justify the application of
BCAs, and hence, as suggested by many scholars, such as Pauwelyn (2007), Mon-
jon and Quirion (2010) and Fischer and Fox (2012), the auctioning of allowances
might be necessary to impose BCAs, in particular if they are allowed under Article
XX.
Our work can be extended in several directions for future research. First, we
considered two-country models which could be extended to an n-player asymmet-
ric agreement formation game. Second, dierent aspects of asymmetry can be
assumed, for instance carbon intensity, and also dierent anti-leakage measures
like output-based rebating. Third, further studies could investigate under which
conditions countries would agree to switch to a multilateral consumption-based
carbon pricing approach. Fourth, for the endogenous plant location model, fur-
ther research could consider other measures such as export rebates and compare
production-based with consumption-based taxes in this set-up.
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